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inTRodUCTion: ThE EURopEAn Union’S RELATionS wiTh 
ThE SoUThERn-MEdiTERRAnEAn in ThE AfTERMATh 
of ThE ARAb SpRing
G. Fernández Arribas, K. Pieters and T. Takács
Cooperation with the Southern-Mediterranean has for long been a high prior-
ity in the European Union’s external relations. Instruments aimed at supporting 
economic and social transition of partner countries, trade liberalisation and 
market access for both parties, and strengthening the internal security of the 
Union were in focus of multilateral approaches such as the Barcelona Process 
(1995) and its re-launch within a regional forum, the Union for the Mediterranean 
(2008), complemented by instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
extended to countries of the region since 2004. In addition, association agree-
ments signed with individual countries have focused on economic relations so 
as to foster development, political and social reform, and ultimately, to create 
sustainable and overall regional integration. Europe is of the highest importance 
for the economic development of the Mediterranean area. For the EU, the 
Mediterranean countries have always been economically important since they 
are large suppliers of natural resources, such as gas and petroleum, to the 
European market.1 The Mediterranean countries have also become an essen-
tial outlet for European exports. Therefore, the EU aimed at the development 
of a stable economic situation in the Mediterranean region since this would 
create attractive export possibilities for the EU. The Mediterranean area has 
been important for Europe for reasons of security and strategy as well. 
A stable and secure Mediterranean region is in the best interest of the EU, 
but so far the situation in the region has remained politically and economically 
unstable. Conflicts in the Mediterranean region have direct consequences for 
political and social stability in the EU. Instability in the Mediterranean region 
may, for example, lead to mass migration, fundamentalist extremism, terrorism, 
drugs and organised crime, which is harmful to both the area itself and to the 
EU.2 Nowadays, the situation in the Mediterranean area is politically and eco-
nomically unstable, unpredictable and explosive. Instead of taking effective 
action which helps the Mediterranean people to ensure the establishment of 
democratic regimes and human rights in the region, the EU has remained very 
cautious since the outbreak of the revolts. The EU not only has to support the 
implementation of democratic regimes in the Mediterranean area, but also 
needs to tackle, now more than ever, the roots of the uprising, being the eco-
1 T. Sadeh, ‘The Economic Desirability of the Middle Eastern Monetary Cooperation’, 20 The 
World Economy (1997) pp. 809-827.
2 K. Pieters, The integration of the Mediterranean Neighbours into the EU internal Market 
2010 (T.M.C. Asser Press, The hague), p. 2-3.
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nomic and social problems (youth unemployment, rising food prices etc.) in the 
Mediterranean area by strengthening and deepening the Euro-Med bilateral 
and multilateral relationship. Two years after the Arab uprising, there are still 
no real democratic regimes in the Mediterranean countries.
As a response to the events of the Arab Spring, the EU reframed its policy 
toward the Southern-Mediterranean region, as indeed its entire neighbourhood, 
and redesigned its tools of cooperation so as to deliver support for transition 
to democracy and work closely with the partner governments. These instru-
ments include the ‘more aid for more democracy’ conditionality in the reviewed 
European Neighbourhood Policy; the Dialogue for migration, mobility and se-
curity with the Southern Mediterranean countries and the conversion of free 
trade agreements into deep and comprehensive free trade agreements. The 
question therefore arises as to how effective such instruments are and can be 
and what the future of the EU’s relations with the Southern-Mediterranean 
region is. 
To approach these new developments, the conference co-organised by the 
Universidad Pablo de Olavide and CLEER on 10-11 May 2012 addressed the 
multi-layered construction of EU and Southern-Mediterranean relations, un-
packing the new and renewed normative frameworks and policy instruments 
available within the European Neighbourhood Policy, bilateral agreements and 
regional approaches. Tackling specific issues from the EU’s Mediterranean 
strategy, such as the promotion of fundamental rights, rule of law, security and 
the future of deep and comprehensive trade agreements, policy-makers and 
academics from the EU and the Southern Mediterranean region evaluated the 
cooperation, highlighted the major challenges ahead and put forward recom-
mendations for a stable, mutually beneficial approach. 
The contributors to this CLEER Working Paper address some of these ques-
tions. Assessing the constitutional foundations of the EU’s relations with its 
neighbours, including the Southern Mediterranean, Christophe hillion asserts 
that by locating it in the Common Provisions of the TEU, the treaty drafters 
have given a considerable prominence to the neighbourhood policy in the 
Union’s action, confirming its all-encompassing dimension and endowing it with 
a bold finalité by reference to EU values. he adds, however, that the actual 
commitment of the Union (and its Member States) following the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty has remained circumspect, despite the strong constitu-
tional mandate given by the TEU and the profound changes in the region, which 
both call for a new and ambitious engagement. Taking stock of the various 
instruments, Jan wouters and Sanderijn duquet find that the use of different 
policy instruments did not result in the ambitious creation of a comprehensive 
strategy, partly because the EU has not been successful in prioritising the in-
terests it has pursued. They assess that the EU’s quest for stability in the MENA 
region is still reflected in all its instruments, notwithstanding the re-orientation 
of programmes towards the engagement of civil society and the support of the 
democratic aspirations of the people of the region. Concerning the revision of 
the ENP and EIDhR, they claim that on the basis of preparations that had 
started before the recent changes in the region, and of the countless tools and 
9
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projects concerned, has not been sufficiently thorough. The EU has made clear 
progress in using its diplomacy tools; but still lacks a long-term vision on the 
future of the MENA. Looking at the negative conditionality (‘less for less’) ap-
proach, introduced in the reviewed European Neighbourhood Policy, Steven 
blockmans claims that the revised ENP seems unsuitable as the sole agent 
for the implementation or support of democratic and socio-economic reforms 
and carries the risk of counteracting the normative objective which the EU has 
pursued for the last decade, that of transforming the outer periphery into one 
area of peace and prosperity built on democratic principles.
Pointing out the meager results of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 
José Manuel Cortés and gloria fernández Arribas consider that the main 
problem can be found in the primarily economic approach to the region, leaving 
apart the political and social dimension. Together with this complex situation, 
the intricate institutional structure of the UfM makes it also hard to implement 
the objectives, and the budgetary restrictions will have a negative impact on 
projects. Despite these difficulties, the UfM is considered an appropriate tool 
to conduct the Euro-Mediterranean relations, if the necessary changes are 
taken. Assessing the Union’s various efforts to foster region building through 
instruments and overlapping policy frames of ENP, Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership and the Union for the Mediterranean, nikos Skoutaris gauges the 
EU’s success in region-building. he notes that in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring, the UfM does not place emphasis on a region-building approach and 
that the asymmetrical political and economic relationship between the EU and 
its Southern-Mediterranean partners undermine interregional characteristics 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as a policy framework.
Looking at select EU strategies toward the region, Elisabeth Johansson 
nogués’ paper looks at the EU’s discourse about civil society actors, as im-
portant components to ‘deep democracy’ and the ambitious rhetoric and mea-
sures that were introduced following the Arab Spring. Looking at various recent 
policy instruments for civil society promotion she observes as positive feature 
their obvious mission to strengthen relations between the EU and the region’s 
civil society, but laments the EU’s timid efforts to speak up against aggression 
on civil society actors and questions whether the Union will (or can) engage in 
direct dialogue with civil society actors in the different national assistance plans. 
For a genuinely new approach toward civil society actors and an effective and 
fruitful policy, she calls for readjustment of existing policy instruments and as-
sertiveness from the EU and its Member States to defend civil society.
Karolien pieters looks at the ongoing liberalisation process of goods be-
tween the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea through the conclusion of 
Euro-Med DCFTAs, through the implementation in the Mediterranean countries 
of the most essential EU acquis, but also via the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition between the Mediterranean countries and the EU. The ap-
plication of this principle requires confidence between the Mediterranean coun-
tries and the EU. Therefore, the establishment of strong independent and 
institutions in the Mediterranean area are crucial to strengthen confidence. 
Further she looks at the early stages of the liberalisation process of services 
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between the Mediterranean countries and the EU. She notes that the best thing 
is for the EU to involve the interested Mediterranean countries already at an 
early stage in the liberalisation process of services: common Euro-Med stan-
dardisation projects are the best solution to establish an efficient Euro-Med 
system of movement of services. She also notes that for the liberalisation of 
services, there will be a need for solid institutions in het Mediterranean area; 
institutions which develop standards for licensing and certification of profes-
sional service providers equal to those in force in the EU should be established 
with financial support of the EU. 
The present CLEER Working Paper thus brings together a number of issues 
related to the EU’s relations with the southern-Mediterranean region in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring. The conference organisers and editors are grate-
ful for Professor Lucía Millán Moro at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide, and 
the T.M.C Asser Institute for continuously stimulating the implementation of the 
conference and the publication, as well as the European Commission’s Rep-
resentation in Madrid, for their support toward the organisation of the confer-
ence. A special word of thanks goes to Professor Ramses A. Wessel, member 
of the Centre’s governing board, who instigated the idea of collaboration be-
tween CLEER and the Universidad Pablo de Olavide.
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ThE EU MAndATE To dEVELop A ‘SpECiAL RELATionShip’ 
wiTh iTS (SoUThERn) nEighboURS
Christophe hillion
INTRODUCTION
The terms and modalities of the EU’s relations with its South-Mediterranean 
neighbours are not only coloured by the events unfolding in the region, they 
are also determined by the evolution of the EU constitutional context. The lat-
ter has been significantly altered with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
This is the subject of this paper. In particular, since Lisbon, the EU has been 
formally instructed to ‘develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries’ 
(Article 8 TEU). While this express mandate partly codifies past EU engage-
ment with its neighbours, particularly in the context of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy (ENP), it introduces several noticeable novelties in the way in which 
the EU conceives of, and develops its policy towards its vicinity. Thus, Article 
8 establishes an express EU ‘neighbourhood competence’ which is formulated 
in mandatory terms (1). Confirming its all-encompassing scope, the new Trea-
ty provision also adjusts the purpose of the Union’s neighbourhood policy and 
the methodology to attain it (2). As it will be argued below, such innovations 
may contribute to the cohesion of the EU Neighbourhood Policy. At the same 
time, it will be suggested that, despite its general ambition to enhance the 
coherence of the EU external action, the Treaty of Lisbon also appears to have 
some disrupting effects on the institutional framework of the EU external action 
in general, and on the EU policy towards its neighbours, in particular (3). 
1. ThE EU OBLIGATION TO DEVELOP A ‘SPECIAL 
RELATIONShIP WITh NEIGhBOURING COUNTRIES’
1.1. An EU express competence 
The Treaty of Lisbon introduces an express legal basis for the EU to develop 
‘a special relationship’ with its neighbours. While textually identical to Article 
I-57 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) where it finds 
its roots, Article 8 TEU was placed in a very different section of the founding 
treaties. Article I-57 was included in Part I of the TCE containing all the funda-
mental provisions of the EU constitutional order, and was the sole article of a 
specific Title entitled ‘The Union and its Neighbours’, that preceded the Title 
on Union Membership (Title Ix), to which it was thus related. By contrast, Ar-
ticle 8 TEU is inserted in the Common Provisions of the Treaty on European 
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Union.1 hence, the new neighbourhood legal basis is no longer structurally 
related to the enlargement provision, still located in the Final Provisions of the 
TEU (Article 49 TEU). Nor is it formally included in the specific sections of the 
Treaties relating to the external action of the Union, namely Title V TEU, and 
Part V TFEU. 
Its new home in the Common Provisions colours the meaning of the com-
petence Article 8 TEU encapsulates, the nature of the policy it envisages, as 
well as its function. In particular, the inclusion of the specific legal basis in the 
TEU, although outside the chapter on the Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy, entails that the neighbourhood policy should not be affected by the pillar-
politics deriving from the recurrent distinction between the CFSP and 
non-CFSP powers of the Union (cf. Article 40 TEU). It thereby consolidates the 
all-encompassing character of the neighbourhood policy, as conceived and 
developed pre-Lisbon. In this sense, the 2004 Strategic document of the Eu-
ropean Commission emphasised that the ENP is ‘a comprehensive policy in-
tegrating related components from all three “pillars” of the Union’s present 
structure’,2 which offers ‘a means for an enhanced and more focused policy 
approach of the EU towards its neighbourhood, bringing together the principal 
instruments at the disposal of the Union and its Member States. It was also 
conceived to further advancing and supporting the EU’s foreign policy objec-
tives’ (emphasis added).3 To be sure, the Commission underscored the full 
accordance of the ENP with the goals of the 2003 European Security Strategy 
whereby the EU’s ‘task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the 
East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom 
we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’. 4
Moreover, its location outside the specific provisions on the ‛EU external 
action’ suggests that the neighbourhood competence is conceived as a policy 
with both internal and external dimensions. Its all-encompassing character 
might indeed explain why it is not expressly set out in the catalogue of compe-
tence included in the TFEU. To be sure, its inclusion in the Common Provisions 
of the TEU means that the objective of the EU special relationship with the 
neighbours is mainstreamed into other policies of the EU. In practical terms, it 
entails that EU institutions ought to take account of the neighbourhood policy 
aims when exercising Union competences, for instance in elaborating the 
Union’s transport, energy, environment policies, in the development of the in-
ternal market and, naturally, in the enlargement process. Such a constitutional 
integration of the neighbourhood aims in the policy-making of the Union, if ef-
fective, can significantly contribute to furthering the consistency of the EU’s 
action in general, and towards its neighbours in particular. 
1 For an elaborate and insightful discussion on this point, see S. Blockmans, ‘Friend or Foe? 
Reviewing EU Relations with its Neighbours Post Lisbon’, in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The European 
Union’s External Relations A Year After lisbon, CLEER Working Paper 2011/3, 113-124.
2 European Commission, Communication on the European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy 
Paper; COM(2004) 373, at 6.
3 Ibid., at 8.
4 European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a better world, Brussels, 12 December 
2003, at 8.
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1.2. A formal EU obligation to engage 
Not only does Article 8 TEU formally provide an express competence to ‘de-
velop a special relationship’, its mandatory formulation by the use of ‘shall’ 
entails the Union is under an obligation to develop such a relationship. 
In that, the exercise of the neighbourhood competence differs significantly 
from that of enlargement. The activation of the accession procedure enshrined 
in Article 49 TEU is wholly determined by the applicant state’s compliance with 
a set of eligibility conditions, set out in Article 49 TEU and articulated in the 
so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’. Indeed, the Union is not obliged to trigger the 
accession procedure, but may choose to do so if the applicant is deemed to 
fulfil EU conditions. In the case of the competence of Article 8 TEU by contrast, 
the decision to engage with the neighbours is not subject to political conditions 
(safe the somewhat ambiguous requirement that the countries concerned must 
be neighbouring the EU), but compulsory. Only the modalities of that engage-
ment, i.e., of the actions undertaken, are function of the behaviour of the coun-
try concerned. In that, the neighbourhood competence could be likened to 
common policies, such as agriculture, transport or the common commercial 
policy, which all involve a strong EU mandate to act.
As legal basis establishing an express mandate for an EU engagement with 
its neighbours, Article 8 TEU formally integrates the EU Neighbourhood Policy 
in the EU constitutional framework. While this may have positive consequenc-
es in terms of substantive coherence as suggested above, it may also entail a 
degree of formalism in the policy-making that may challenge coordination be-
tween various institutional actors. In particular, in constitutionalising the neigh-
bourhood competence, the Treaty adds constraints on the development of a 
policy which, thus far, had been incremental and flexible, thanks notably to the 
fact that it was carved out outside the Treaty framework, on the basis of soft 
law instruments.5 As new express competence, its exercise should fully comply 
with the structural and procedural principles of the Union legal order, such as 
conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality, and consistency. In the same vein, the 
exercise of the EU neighbourhood competence might become subject to com-
petence struggle among institutions, as we shall see below. 
The flip side of the coin is that the neighbourhood competence is more 
constraining as a result of its inclusion in the institutional system of the EU, in 
as much as Union’s inaction could lead to possible proceedings before the 
Court of Justice, the way failures to develop common policies were in the past 
sanctioned by the Court. Moreover, the exercise of the EU neighbourhood 
competence requires from both institutions and Member States a higher degree 
of compliance with the measures thereby adopted, and a mutual duty of coop-
eration to ensure the fulfilment of the Union objectives thereof.
5 Further, see B. Van Vooren, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Case-Study for 
Soft Law in EU External Relations’, 34 European law Review 2009, at 696. C. hillion ‘The EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy towards Eastern Europe’ in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), law 
and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of a Changing landscape (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2008), 309-333.
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2. A SPECIAL RELATIONShIP WITh A FiNAliTé 
Indeed, Article 8 TEU establishes a Union’s neighbourhood competence with 
a broad political objective: the envisaged ‘special relationship’ is aimed at es-
tablishing ‘an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the 
values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based 
on cooperation’. While partly resonating the objectives of the existing ENP, 
Article 8 TEU appears to refine the ultimate purpose of the Union’s neighbour-
hood policy (2.1) by articulating the foundations of the area it is purported to 
establish. It also changes the methodology to achieve this aim (2.2).
2.1. A refined purpose
By including an explicit reference to ‘the values of the Union’ as foundation of 
the future area of good neighbourliness, Article 8 TEU is moving away from the 
language hitherto employed in most ENP strategic documents. The latter rath-
er referred (as they continuously do) to ‘shared values’ or ‘common values’, if 
not to international standards. In other words, Article 8 TEU encapsulates a 
normative shift in the EU policy towards the neighbours even if, admittedly, the 
previous ‘shared values’ discourse was a fig leaf to the Union’s promotion of 
its own principles. In that, Article 8 is more consistent with the genuine EU in-
terest: it affirms, if not confirms the EU as normative power in the region, acting 
in coherence with its own political foundations, in line with the general prescrip-
tion of Article 3(5) TEU.6
2.2. An adjusted methodology
Alongside the normative shift incarnated by the reference to EU values, Article 
8 TEU envisages a partial departure from an approach thus far based primar-
ily on conditionality. While it has been argued that the provision ‘impedes the 
Union from entering into special relationship with neighbouring countries refus-
ing to commit themselves to the values Union’,7 such a reading does not appear 
to fit entirely with the terminology of the said article. As suggested earlier, Ar-
ticle 8 TEU binds the EU to engage with the neighbours, precisely with a view 
to asserting its own values. 
That the EU engagement is conceived as mandatory indeed coincides with 
the strategic interest the Union has in a stable and prosperous neighbourhood, 
as conspicuously acknowledged in the 2003 European Security Strategy. As it 
6 According to Art.3(5) TEU, ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and 
promote its values and interests…’.
7 See D. hanf, ‘The ENP in the light of the new “neighbourhood clause” (Article 8 TEU)’, Col-
lege of Europe, Research Paper in law – Cahiers juridiques No 2 (2011); P. Van Elsuwege and 
R. Petrov, ‘Article 8 TEU: Towards a New Generation of Agreements with the Countries of the 
European Union?’, 36 European law Review 2011, at 688.
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has been suggested elsewhere,8 this neighbourhood-security nexus makes 
conditionality partly inappropriate inasmuch as the EU cannot passively wait 
that the states in its vicinity comply with political and economic conditions, 
before eventually engaging if its own security is at stake. Article 8 TEU points 
towards the development of an active policy of transformation of the neighbour-
ing states, in line with its own values and interests (Article 21 TEU). In that, 
Article 8 TEU is a neighbouring state-building policy, involving the whole array 
of EU instruments. 
having said this, conditionality is not excluded from the neighbourhood 
policy based on Article 8 TEU. While engagement is conceived as compulsory, 
the way in which the EU engages with a particular neighbour is significantly 
coloured by the situation on the ground. Indeed, Article 8 TEU is remarkably 
unspecific as regards the actual form of the ‘special relationship’. The provision 
is thus formulated so as to encompass the multiplicity of instruments that have 
so far been carved out, viz. unilateral initiatives (e.g., ENP, ENPI), bilateral 
(e.g., association or partnership agreements), multilateral (UfM, EaP), in view 
of the plurality of the neighbours concerned. It also accommodates the diver-
sity of views as regards the ultimate purpose of the neighbourhood competence, 
viz. alternative or preparation for membership. Such an undefined character 
makes it possible to adapt the Union’s engagement to the particular circum-
stances of the country concerned, with a view to influencing its development, 
ultimately to achieve the ultimate political finalité of the policy, namely the es-
tablishment of an area of stability, based on the values of the Union. 
3. AN ExPECTATION-IMPLEMENTATION GAP? 
In the light of the above, it may be suggested that in principle, Article 8 TEU 
has the potential to contribute to furthering consistency in the EU policy towards 
its neighbours. In substantive terms at least, the competence conferred to the 
Union permits it to develop an all-encompassing policy, inasmuch as it is the 
first and only policy to be included in the Common Provisions of the TEU. In 
practice however, various elements suggest that the benefits of Article 8 TEU, 
in terms of providing a legal basis for pursuing a coherent policy towards the 
neighbours, remain to be reaped. In effect, the Treaty of Lisbon has had dis-
rupting effects on the governance of EU external affairs in general, and of the 
ENP in particular. While the latter was essentially Commission-driven until the 
Lisbon Treaty, its development and management has thereafter been divided 
most notably between the Commission and the European External Action Ser-
vice (EEAS), without clear allocation of tasks between the two. The European 
Council and its President are also getting increasingly involved in the shaping 
of the Union’s relations with its neighbours, and so is the European Parliament, 
while the rotating presidency remains active. 
8 M. Cremona and C. hillion, ‘l’Union fait la force? Potential and limits of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy as an integrated EU foreign and security policy’, European University Institute 
Law Working Paper No 39 (2006).
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Often presented as a template for cohesive and coherent EU external action, 
the ENP is thus less well-integrated post-Lisbon, than it was under the previous 
dispensation. In effect, new needs for inter-institutional coordination have sur-
faced since the Treaty entered into force. A potent illustration of the ensuing 
complexity in the governance of the EU Neighbourhood Policy is the 2010 
Council Decision on the functioning and organisation of the EEAS,9 and par-
ticularly its Article 9(5), which envisages the involvement of both Commission 
and EEAS for the programming of ENP funds. Indeed, while the Commission 
includes a specific Commissioner responsible for the neighbourhood, the in-
cumbent has been deprived of his specific ‘neighbourhood’ staff since the 
latter, which formerly belonged to Commission’s DG RELEx, has been trans-
ferred to the EEAS. 
New policy initiatives as regards the neighbourhood therefore require tight 
coordination, notably but not only, between the Commission services and the 
EEAS, and so does the management of the policy on the ground, notably at 
the level of EU delegations. Coordination and cooperation appear all the more 
pressing, since the multiplicity of actors has led to diverging EU approaches to 
the neighbourhood. hence, the European Council stresses the contribution of 
the ENP to fulfilling the Union’s economic interests (see the European Council 
conclusions of October 2011), whereas the Commission points to further con-
ditionality by reference to international standards while toning down the EU 
value promotion.10 At the same time, Member States have been pursuing their 
own agenda towards EU neighbours, particularly in the context of the Arab 
spring, including sometimes through military means. This diversity of approach-
es indicates that the benefits of the unified normative framework established 
by Article 8 TEU remains to be reaped. 
To be sure, the institutional actors of the EU Neighbourhood Policy appear 
to underestimate, when they do not simply ignore the new neighbourhood 
competence of the Union, and the objectives thereof. For instance, the 2011 
Joint Communication of the Commission and high Representative11 displays 
a failure to draw the full potential of the new EU competence. In effect, and 
quite remarkably, Article 8 TEU, namely the constitutional foundation for the 
establishment and development of the policy, is hardly mentioned in the 20-
page document. It is only evoked once, not to articulate its potentiality, but as 
a way to include a harmless reference to Article 49 TEU in the document. In-
deed, a growing discrepancy is appearing between the policy as conceived in 
Article 8 TEU, and as envisaged in the context of the ENP, notably in terms of 
its normative foundations and objectives. To put it simply, the objectives of 
 9 OJ [2010] L 201/30, 3. 8. 2010.
10 See e.g. Joint Communication of the Commission and high Representative. A New 
Response for a Changing Neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy. 
COM(2011)303, Brussels, 25 May 2011; Joint Communication of the Commission and high Rep-
resentative. Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy. JOIN(2012)14, Brussels, 15 
May 2012.
11 Joint Communication of the Commission and high Representative. A New Response for a 
Changing Neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy. COM(2011)303, Brus-
sels, 25 May 2011.
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Article 8 TEU are far more ambitious than those of the ENP as set out in, e.g., 
the Joint communication of May 2011. While the latter foresees increasing dif-
ferentiation within the vicinity, and restraint in the approach, Article 8, as sug-
gested above, establishes a robust transformative mandate.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In constitutionalising it, the Lisbon Treaty has modified the nature of the Union’s 
policy towards its neighbours, particularly in view of the mandatory language 
it contains. By locating it in the Common Provisions of the TEU, the treaty 
drafters have given a considerable prominence to the neighbourhood policy in 
the Union’s action, confirming its all-encompassing dimension and endowing 
it with a bold finalité by reference to EU values. however, the reality check is 
somewhat humbling. The actual commitment of the Union (and its Member 
States) following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has remained circum-
spect, despite the strong constitutional mandate given by the TEU and the 
profound changes in the region, which both call for a new and ambitious en-
gagement. In that, the policy appears to be affected by the disadvantages of 
its constitutionalisation (viz. less flexibility, and contamination by the post-Lisbon 
institutional politics) without reaping the latter’s benefits in terms of compelling 
the EU institutions and Member States to act forcefully.
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ThE ARAb UpRiSingS And ThE EURopEAn Union:  
in SEARCh of A CoMpREhEnSiVE STRATEgY
Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet*
I. INTRODUCTION
The self-immolation of Mohammed Ben Bouazizi, a university-educated street 
vendor, on 17 December 2010 in a Tunisian provincial city is generally seen 
as the symbolic trigger for the Arab uprisings. It set in motion a series of civil 
protests and revolutionary chain reactions against uncompromising and au-
thoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) during the 
first half of 2011, and their aftereffects continue until today. Within just a few 
months, governments were overthrown in Tunisia (President Ben Ali fled to 
Saudi Arabia on 16 January 2011), in Egypt (President hosni Mubarak resigned 
on 11 February 2011), and in Libya (Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was killed on 
20 October 2011). The Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh was formally re-
placed on 27 February 2012 and mass demonstrations took place in Iran, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Syria and, to a lesser extent, in Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, and 
Saudi Arabia. 
It has been observed that the Arab Spring originated from a combination of 
an economic deficit, a political deficit, and a dignity deficit.1 Remarkably, the 
unrests occurred with such great suddenness that few had seen them coming.2 
Reactions in Europe were initially slow and reluctant, in sharp contrast with the 
attention they subsequently received. The uprisings triggered a re-thinking of 
economic, political and security relations of both the European Union (EU) and 
its Member States with the Arab world. The Arab Spring was, moreover, the 
first major foreign policy test for the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
which had only become operative in January 2011. At the peak of the Arab 
uprisings, the EEAS was confronted with the enormous challenge of coordinat-
ing external policies in the region without key officials being appointed or prec-
edents to fall back on. 
This contribution critically reviews the instruments at hand for the EU to 
respond to the Arab uprisings, with a focus on EU policies toward Arab countries 
in transition (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria). It 
starts with a broad overview of the EU’s strategy vis-à-vis the MENA over the 
* The authors wish to thank Jed Odermatt for valuable comments and suggestions.
1 T. Behr and M. Aaltola, ‘The Arab Uprisings: Causes, Prospects and Implications’, FiiA Brief-
ing Paper 76 (2011), available at <http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/174/the_arab_uprising/>.
2 See J. Goodwin, ‘Why We Were Surprised (Again) by the Arab Spring’, 17 Swiss Political 
Science Review 2011, 452; and the May-June 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs, entitled ‘The New 
Arab Revolt. What Just happened. Why No One Saw It Coming. What It Means. What Comes 
Next’.
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last two decades and its strategy reformulation in the wake of the 2011 upris-
ings (Section II). Subsequently, we examine the instruments which the EU 
currently has at its disposal to address the challenges posed by the Arab upris-
ings, in particular those with regard to security, economics, social issues, pol-
itics, and legislation (Section III). We then review the EU’s structural efforts to 
engage with MENA countries bilaterally, to cooperate with the United Nations 
(UN) and regional organisations, and to engage with non-state actors (Section 
IV). Finally, a number of policy suggestions are made in order to enable the 
EU to address in a more comprehensive manner the rapid changes in the Arab 
world (Section V).
II. ThE EU’S STRATEGY VIS-À-VIS ThE MENA AND ThE ARAB 
UPRISINGS
2.1. EU strategy prior to the Arab uprisings 
having close historical, geographical, and cultural links with the region3, the 
EU has been moulding its policies vis-à-vis the Arab world for decades. The 
relationship today comprises an economic (in terms of trade, finance, energy, 
but also migration) and a political (predominantly security, stability) dimension.4 
Although a strategic approach is indispensable, the establishment of a coher-
ent regional policy has proven to be a process of trial and error. A number of 
different instruments have been launched, tested and re-launched by the Eu-
ropean Commission, the Council, and the EU Member States, resulting in a 
tangle of different policies and attitudes. Ad hoc instruments, mostly bilateral 
economic agreements, were supplemented only gradually by more structural 
programmes and working plans. Between 1972 and 1990, trade relations be-
tween Europe and the Mediterranean countries were incorporated in the Glob-
al Mediterranean Policy.5 The shaping of a more holistic policy towards Arab 
States only kicked-off in the mid-1990s following the end of the Cold War and 
the attempt of the 1993 Oslo Accords to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.6 
It was this often contradictory policy towards the region that the EU relied upon 
3 See e.g. Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008, at 
1; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Barcelona 
Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Brussels, 20 May 2008, COM(2008) 319 (Final), para. 1. 
For considerations on policy-making in the 1970s and 1980s, see P. J. Cardwell, EU External Re-
lations and Systems of Governance: The CFSP, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Migration 
(London/New York: Routledge 2009), at 94-95.
4 Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) and Regional Indicative Programme (2007-2010) for 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, at 3, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/world//enp/pdf/coun-
try/enpi_euromed_rsp_en.pdf>. 
5 See the Declaration of the Paris Summit, 19-20 October 1972, Bull. EC. 10/1972 establish-
ing Global Mediterranean Policy and the Rome European Council Conclusions, 14-15 December 
1990, Bull. EC 12/1990 repealing it.
6 S. Keukeleire and J. MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (New York: 
Palgrave 2008), at 274.
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when it was confronted with the Arab Spring in 2011. The next section briefly 
outlines and comments on the juridico-political regime that existed at this time. 
2.1.1. Regional instruments
The Barcelona Conference in 1995 established the central multilateral instru-
ment to govern EuroMed relations: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).7 
The continuous regional forum (hence the term ‘Barcelona Process’) instituted 
political, economic and cultural co-operation between the then 15 EU Member 
States and 12 Mediterranean partners.8 The 1995 Barcelona Declaration9 was 
ambitious. It introduced a common area of peace and stability, aimed at grad-
ually establishing a free trade area by 2010 through Euro-Mediterranean As-
sociation Agreements, and promised broader understandings between cultures 
and exchanges between civil societies in a decentralized manner.10 This ambi-
tion made the Barcelona Process vulnerable to criticism throughout the years 
and by its tenth anniversary in 2005 it was considered a failure for not meeting 
these (high) expectations.11 While some efforts were made at its decennial to 
constructively rethink and reinforce the EMP, it ended up being renewed, devoid 
of any critical reassessment. 
The search for a new impetus in EuroMed relations resulted in the 2008 
creation Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), upon the initiative of French Pres-
ident Nicolas Sarkozy.12 Although this Union builds on the foundations laid by 
the EMP, which it does not replace, its institutional framework and rationale are 
quite different. The UfM has its own intergovernmental set-up, separate from 
the EU, institutionalized in the form of a Joint Permanent Committee in Brussels 
and a Secretariat in Barcelona.13 It launched a limited number of realistically 
7 Financial programmes were installed under the headings MEDA I (1995-1999) and MEDA 
II (2000-2006); Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical 
measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework 
of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, OJ 30 July 1996, L 189.
8 The EMP nowadays brings together the 27 EU MS and 16 Mediterranean partners: Albania, 
Algeria, Bosnia and herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
9 Final Declaration of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, 27-28 No-
vember 1995, Bull. EU 11/1995, at 136. 
10 A. P. Vallelersundi, ‘The Barcelona Process – A Euro-Mediterranean North-South Partner-
ship’, 5 Georgetown Journal of international Affairs 2004, 145-151, at 147. The Euro-Mediterra-
nean Committee hosts senior level meetings (representatives of MS, Mediterranean partners and 
the Commission), dialogues also take place in the EuroMed Parliamentary Assembly.
11 A. P. Vallelersundi, ibid., at 147; R. A. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, ‘From EMP to ENP: 
What’s at stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?’, 
10 European Foreign Affairs Review 2005,17-38. 
12 The Commission, aware of EMP criticism, in 2008 expressed scepticism to the intergovern-
mental approach proposed by France to reform the Barcelona Process. See: M. Emerson, ‘Mak-
ing sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean’, CEPS Policy Brief No 155, March 2008, at 1.
13 Communication from the Commission, Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, 
paras. 11-16. Along with the 27 Member States, members are 16 Mediterranean, African and Mid-
dle Eastern countries: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, 
and Turkey.
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implementable projects that were specifically chosen to enhance the visibility 
of EU actions in the Mediterranean region.14 Concretized commercial missions 
were oriented to maintain a status-quo rather than to pursue political objectives, 
democracy or sustainable prosperity.15 The UfM has been criticised for adopt-
ing a national rather than a European approach and for lacking focus and 
strategic objectives.16 
Even before the UfM had seen the light of day EuroMed relations were 
enhanced through the development of the Southern dimension of the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The general aims of the ENP (stability, 
security, and societal well-being) do not substantially differ from those of the 
EMP.17 While the ENP targets long-term goals in order to reform partner coun-
tries, it puts short term goals of enhancing economic relations and European 
security ahead of addressing local socio-economic problems.18 The ENP also 
differs from the EMP in that, rather than a partnership, the former constitutes 
unilateral – and therefore rather EU-centric – policy-making. The limited mul-
tilateral action under the ENP has been subject to criticism, amongst others 
from the European Parliament.19 Another complication was that the EU had to 
develop relations with the countries of the Arab region, at least partly, through 
a different set of instruments than those used with regard to Eastern neigh-
bours.20 Moreover, the lack of a direct connection to the plight of the peoples 
in the MENA complicated the implementation of an effective conditionality 
policy, an essential part of the ENP.21
It is particularly interesting to consider the position of Libya in the programmes 
of the EU. Libya was not invited to be part of the EMP at the kick-off in 1995 
14 Nominated projects are the depollution of the Mediterranean, construction of maritime and 
land highways, civil protection, alternative energies, higher education and research, and the Med-
iterranean Business Development Initiative.
15 S. Colombo and N. Tocci, ‘The EU response to the Arab uprisings: Old wine in new bot-
tles?’, in R. Alcaro and M. haubrich-Seco (eds.), Re-thinking Western policies in light of the Arab 
uprisings (Roma: IAI Research Papers 2012), at 82.
16 J.-R. henry, ‘Sarkozy, the Mediterranean and the Arab Spring’, 16 Contemporary French 
and Francophone Studies 2012, 405-415, at 411.
17 European Commission, Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
Brussels, 12 May 2004, COM(2004) 373 final, at 3. Like the EMP, the ENP aimed to promote the 
Southern neighbours’ commitment to the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, 
all of which were seen as building blocks of good neighbourly relations. See: Communication 
from the Commission to the Council on the Commission proposals for Action Plans under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Brussels, 9 December 2004, COM(2004) 795 final, at 3.
18 Ch. Kaunert and S. Léonard, ‘EU Counterterrorism and the European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy: An Appraisal of the Southern Dimension’, 23 Terrorism and Political Violence 2011, 286-309, 
at 289. R. A. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, supra note 11,at 19.
19 See: European Parliament Resolution of 19 February 2009 on the review of the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 2008/2236, paras 34-35. The Parliament expressed 
its preference for a multilateral regional approach and for the strengthening of regional, multilat-
eral, and cross-border projects within the framework of the ENP.
20 The perspective of accession to the EU gave broad latitude to influence political and eco-
nomic developments in Central and Eastern Europe before 2004.
21 J. Kelley, ‘New wine in old wineskins: Promoting political reforms through the New Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy’, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 2006 29-55. See generally: 
M. Maresceau and E. Lannon, The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies. A Compara-
tive Analysis (New York: Palgrave 2001).
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and only obtained observer status in 1999.22 EU relations with the country 
primarily developed in a bilateral way, the main reason being Libya’s subjection 
to both UN and EU sanctions. The political climate in 2004 following the Liby-
an Government’s steps towards a settlement of claims in connection with the 
Lockerbie case in 1988 changed the EU’s position significantly.23 The Union 
lifted its arms embargo against Libya and included it in the ENP. Libya would 
have been granted full partnership in the EMP framework had it carried out its 
intention to accept to the Barcelona acquis. In 2008 the Commission made a 
final attempt to close this gap through opening up negotiations for a Framework 
Agreement.24 This dialogue was suspended due to the outbreak of the Arab 
uprisings. 
It should be noted that a number of Arab States are also included in other 
EU regional programmes: Northern African countries are part of the EU-Africa 
framework.25 The current framework, for the period 2011-2013, was concluded 
at the EU-Africa Summit in November 2010 in Tripoli, just weeks before the 
uprisings started. The development of good relations with two of the Barcelona 
Process partners, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, is incorporated in the 
Middle East Peace Process.26 
2.1.2. Bilateral instruments
The multilateral EuroMed framework was complemented with bilateral instru-
ments. Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements and ENP Action Plans 
are the two most prominent examples. The Commission has been the driving 
force behind this process. The first generation of EC Cooperation Agreements 
had been in place prior to the Barcelona Summit in 199527 and have been 
renegotiated and replaced by Association Agreements, concluded between 
1995 and 2005 within the EMP’s framework and later also under the ENP.28 
Two notable exceptions exist. EU-Syria relations are still governed by the 1977 
22 P. J. Cardwell, supra note 3, 101. 
23 See: Council Common Position 2004/698/CFSP of 14 October 2004 concerning the lifting 
of restrictive measures against Libya, OJ L 317, 16 October 2004. The United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1506 (2003) lifting the restrictive measures imposed by UN-
SCR 748 (1992) and 883 (1993).
24 Press release, ‘Libya: Commission proposes negotiating mandate for a Framework Agree-
ment’, Brussels, 27 February 2008, IP/08/308.
25 The EU-Africa Action Plans define the long-term policy orientations between the two conti-
nents, based on a shared vision and common principles. See: Council, General Secretariat, ‘The 
Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership’, June 2008, available at <http://www.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/EN_AFRICA_inter08.pdf>.
26 See generally: G. harpaz, ‘Mind the Gap: Narrowing the Legitimacy Gap in EU-Israeli Rela-
tions’, 13 European Foreign Affairs Review 2008, 117-137. 
27 The European Economic Community entered into cooperation agreements with Algeria 
(OJ L 263/2, 27 September 1978) and Tunisia (OJ L 265/2, 27 September 1978) in 1976, with 
Egypt (OJ L 266/2, 27 September 1978), Jordan (OJ L 268/2, 27 September 1978), Lebanon 
(OJ L 267/2, 27 September 1978), and Syria (OJ L 269/2, 27 September 1978) in 1977, and with 
Morocco (OJ L 264/2, 27 September 1978) in 1978. 
28 Euro-Mediterranean Agreements establishing an association between the European Com-
munities and their Member States, of the one part, and, respectively, Tunisia (OJ L 79/2, 30 March 
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Cooperation Agreement since signatures to the Association Agreement, al-
though negotiated in 2004, are still pending for political reasons. The EU is 
currently not linked with Libya by similar contractual relations, and neither a 
Cooperation nor an Association Agreement is in force.29
Association Agreements have set up all-embracing frameworks to conduct 
bilateral relations. Provisions on social and cultural cooperation and coopera-
tion in the field of justice and home affairs are included, in particular security-
related issues.30 Association Agreements comprise cooperative efforts on 
migration, such as the resettlement of the repatriated,31 and contain provisions 
on topics such as money laundering, organised crime, and drug trafficking.32 
Yet, the main features of association agreements are trade and development 
aid relations. As such, the progressive liberalisation of trade is included in the 
Association Agreements. The intensity may differ to various degrees depend-
ing on the profile of the partner country. The EU entered into a customs union 
with Turkey33 and opted for the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) with 
other partners in the Southern Mediterranean.34 These bilateral instruments 
are the most concrete, legally binding contributions to the EuroMed free trade 
area envisioned by the EMP.35 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements also systematically include 
human rights and democracy clauses.36 Although not identical, these provisions 
1998), Morocco (OJ L 70/2, 18 March 2000), Jordan (OJ L 129/3, 15 May 2002), Egypt (OJ L 
304/39, 30 September 2004), and Algeria (OJ L 265/2, 10 October 2005), were concluded. 
29 Bilateral negotiations on a EU-Libya Framework Agreement were formally launched in No-
vember 2008. The EU decided to suspend these in February 2011. See: Declaration by the high 
Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the European Union on Libya, Brussels, 23 Febru-
ary 2011.
30 W. Rees, ‘The External Face of Internal Security’ in C. hill, M. Smith (eds.), international 
Relations and the EU ( New York: Oxford University Press 2011), at 226-245.
31 S. Lavenex, ‘EU external governance in ‘wider Europe’’, 11 Journal of European Public Pol-
icy 2004, 680-700, at 689-690. Migration policies are discussed in further detail infra, Part 3.3.3.
32 As an example see Art. 60 and 61 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an associa-
tion between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Re-
public of Morocco, OJ L 70/2, 18 March 2000; and Articles 61 and 62 of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, OJ L 79/2, 21 October 2005.
33 An Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community 
and Turkey (OJ 217/3687, 29 December 1964) was signed in 1963 and a customs union has 
been in force since 1996. 
34 For example, art. 6 of the EU-Algeria Association Agreement reads: ‘The Community and 
Algeria shall gradually establish a free-trade area over a transitional period lasting a maximum 
of 12 years starting from the date of the entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the 
following provisions and in conformity with those of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and the other multilateral agreements on trade in goods annexed to the Agreement estab-
lishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO), hereinafter referred to as ‘GATT’.’
35 Multiple association agreements with similar contents, although separate bilateral instru-
ments, can be considered as contributing to a regional, multilateral approach. R. A. Del Sarto and 
T. Schumacher, supra note 11, at 21.
36 human rights and democracy clauses are thus relatively new: since the early 1990s, these 
have been systematically included in the EU’s bilateral agreements of a general nature. In com-
parison, the 1963 Association Agreement with Turkey, and even the 1995 Association Council 
decision establishing a customs union with Turkey failed to contain such references to human 
rights and democracy.
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are shaped in a way that makes the respect for human rights and democratic 
principles an essential element of the Agreement.37 Their practical implemen-
tation takes two forms. First, the Association Agreements with Morocco, Jordan 
and Tunisia have established subcommittees with a mandate to discuss the 
promotion of human rights and democracy. Second, all Association Agreements 
concluded with Southern Mediterranean partners entail that the application of 
such provision may give rise to the adoption of appropriate measures following 
failure to respect human rights and democratic principles.38 Although constitut-
ing a form of political conditionality, bilateral relations have never been sus-
pended because of human rights violations in partner States. 39 This 
implementation deficit is partly due to security concerns of the EU. Instability 
in the region is to be avoided at all cost, which has impeded the Union from 
taking strong action.40 As Colombo and Tocci put it: ‘Stability and democracy 
were perceived as incompatible goals and the latter was increasingly sacrificed 
with a view to securing the former’.41
Bilateral policies were also strengthened via the EU’s adoption of ENP Ac-
tion Plans.42 These Action Plans are negotiated with each neighbouring coun-
try, while their follow-up instruments, the annual progress reports are drafted 
unilaterally by the Commission. These translate general political and econom-
ic reform objectives of the ENP into concrete measures to be applied at the 
bilateral level, resulting in differentiated bilateralism.43 The broader EU secu-
37 Art. 2 of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement reads: ‘Respect for the democratic prin-
ciples and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of human Rights 
shall inspire the domestic and external policies of the Community and of Morocco and shall con-
stitute an essential element of this Agreement’. This language was copied in Agreements with 
other Southern Mediterranean partners. A somewhat modified version is used in Art. 2 of the 
EU-Jordan Association Agreement: ‘Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions 
of the Agreement itself, shall be based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental hu-
man rights as set out in the universal declaration on human rights, which guides their internal and 
international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement’.
38 See European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Study on 
the ‘human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EU’s International Agreements’, 29 September 
2005, vii.
39 For further reading on human rights conditionality, see L. Bartels, Human Rights Condition-
ality in the EU’s international Agreements (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005); B. Brandtner 
and A. Rosas, ‘Trade preferences and human rights’ in Ph. Alston, M. Bustelo and J. heenan 
(eds.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999).
40 As A. Driss formulates it: ‘The Union, which certainly does not miss a chance to issue 
declarations and condemnations every time it notices violations of human rights, is disappointing 
when it comes to taking firm action against these violations. This double standard attitude strongly 
handicapped its action towards the Mediterranean Arab countries, whose leaders took advantage 
of this ambiguity to entrench their authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes’; A. Driss, ‘The EU 
response to the Arab uprising: A show of ambivalence’, in R. Alcaro and M. haubrich-Seco (eds.), 
supra n. 15, 97-110, at 98-99.
41 S. Colombo and N. Tocci, supra note 15, at 71. 
42 ENP Action Plans are being implemented with Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia since 2005 
and with Lebanon and Egypt since end 2006. The Plans can be consulted at <http://ec.europa.
eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm>. 
43 R. A. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, supra note 11, at 21. Differentiated bilateralism is in-
creasingly used in MENA politics, see infra.
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rity discourse is more explicitly incorporated in these Action Plans.44 They 
contain extensive provisions on collaboration in internal security areas such as 
irregular migration, organised crime, human and drug trafficking, money laun-
dering and terrorism.45 Similar to the Association Agreements, human rights 
and democratic expectations are integrated in the individual programmatic 
approaches to the Arab States, yet, they were far from consistently pursued.46 
The pursuit of the EU’s interests in trade, financial, energy, and labour rela-
tions was central to the EMP and ENP frameworks. This has been further 
translated in the bilateral Association Agreements. As was explained, both 
instruments have been used extensively in anticipation of a further integration 
of markets, among others via the establishment of FTAs. A result, however, 
was that the integration of EuroMed markets became conditional upon the 
progress of the partner States, as stipulated in the bilateral agreements. Fur-
thermore, the ENP’s integration of markets’ goal of 2003 was replaced by a 
weaker form of integration, the FTAs, or in some cases and depending on the 
performances and willingness of partner countries ‘deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreements (DCFTAs)’.47
2.2. EU strategy post the Arab uprisings
As from December 2010, events in the MENA region have resulted in new 
challenges for the EU. Initial reactions to the uprisings showed European re-
luctance and indecisiveness, as the EU and various Member States were un-
sure about which side to support.48 In early February 2011, the European 
Council recognised citizens’ democratic aspirations. It committed to providing 
effective support to those pursuing political and economic reforms including 
through standing mechanisms, the EMP, UfM and the ENP.49 
In the course of 2011, three cross-cutting instruments, aimed to set out the 
broader EU-MENA strategy were presented and/or renewed. The first compre-
hensive initiative was the Joint Communication of the high Representative and 
the Commission on ‘a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with 
44 S. Biscop, ‘The ENP, Security and Democracy in the Context of the European Security 
Strategy’, 3 Global Europe Papers No 3 2008, at 2. 
45 D. Lutterbeck, ‘Policing Migration in the Mediterranean’, 11 Mediterranean Politics 2006, 
59-82, at 71.
46 S. Colombo and N. Tocci, supra note 15, at 80. 
47 K. Pieters, The integration of the Mediterranean Neighbours into the EU internal Market 
(The hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2010), at 41-42.
48 Tellingly, the first joint statement calling for reform, democratic freedoms and free and fair 
elections in Egypt was made by Merkel, Sarkozy and Cameron on behalf of their countries, not 
the EU. See: Joint statement by Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and David Cameron, 29 Janu-
ary 2011, available at <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/spip.php?page=article_imprim&id_arti-
cle=14940>. 
49 European Council, Conclusions of the European Council of 4 February 2011: Statement 
by the heads of State or government of the Euro area and the EU institutions, Brussels, 8 March 
2011.
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the Southern Mediterranean’, of March 2011.50 As the Communication’s title 
indicates, topics discussed relate to democratic transformations, institution-
building, and the enhancement of the role of civil society, as well as to eco-
nomic development, trade, investment, and finance. The document also 
demonstrated the EU’s constant preoccupation with security issues in the South-
ern Mediterranean. Topics such as the management of migration flows and 
border security were included in the democracy partnership. Second, in May 
2011 the high Representative and the Commission presented the renewed 
ENP, which had been prepared since the Summer of 2010.51 Although it ad-
dressed recent changes in the MENA and explicitly referred to them in a neigh-
bourhood context, the basic features of the ENP were not significantly rethought. 
Third, in September 2011 the Commission launched its SPRING programme 
(Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) as a strategic and 
cross-cutting financial instrument to support democratic transformation, insti-
tution-building and economic growth.52 To realise these goals in the years 2011 
and 2012, a moderate EUR 350 million was foreseen.
2.3. interim conclusion
The MENA has been a focus of EU external actions and policies, both bilater-
ally and as a component of EuroMed and neighbourhood policies. It remains 
difficult, however, to discern a fully-fledged and integrated policy, despite mul-
tilevel (bilateral and regional) instruments having been in place for many years. 
The Barcelona Declaration was overly ambitious, which accounts for the dif-
ficulties experienced in the implementation phases that followed. Succeeding 
EU instruments no longer attempted to be all-inclusive. The 2004 ENP embod-
ies a more traditional, unilateral, foreign policy-making model that abandoned 
the partnership idea. The 2008 UfM, characterized by intergovernmentalism 
and an apolitical approach, represents a micro-management model that fo-
cuses on project-based, commercially sponsored cooperation. The EU’s ap-
proach of strategic regionalism was replaced by the differentiated bilateralism 
in Action Plans and Association Agreements. The sum of these initiatives re-
50 high Representative and the European Commission, Joint Communication ‘A Partnership 
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, Brussels, 8 March 2011, 
COM(2011) 200 final [hereafter: ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’].
51 Joint Communication by the high Representative of the Union For Foreign Affairs and Se-
curity Policy and the European Commission, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, a 
review of European Neighbourhood Policy’, Brussels, 25 May 2011 [hereinafter ‘A New Response 
to a Changing Neighbourhood’]. During the strategic review of the ENP prior to the Arab upris-
ings, a consultation process was set up with Member States, ENP partner countries, experts and 
academics, senior officials, and civil society organisations from all over the region.
52 ‘EU response to the Arab Spring: new package of support for North Africa and Middle 
East’, Press Release, Brussels, 27 September 2011, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-1083_en.htm>. See also Commission Implementing Decision of 09 March 2012 
amending Decision C(2011) 6828 adopting the Programme of Support to the Association Agree-
ment and the Transition Process for Tunisia under the SPRING programme, to be financed un-
der Art. 19 08 01 01 of the general budget of the European Union, Brussels, 9 March 2012, 
C(2012)1439 – PE/2012/111.
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sulted in the creation of a toolkit for the EU to use in EuroMed relations rather 
than a comprehensive European strategy.
The EU’s relations with the MENA have concentrated on a number of dom-
inant topics, all of which remain very present in post-Arab Spring initiatives. 
First, the Barcelona Process initiated progress in economic relations, a subject 
that reappeared in the UfM and (revised) ENP framework. Second, the EU has 
let security and stability concerns prevail in its relations with the MENA.53 Pol-
icies were driven by Member States’ fear of radicalism, migration, and terrorism, 
which is reflected throughout the regional and bilateral initiatives taken. We 
can point to measures combatting money laundering and drugs trafficking in 
Association Agreements and to the recurring topic of the management of migra-
tion flows and borders in the ENP Action Plans. This not only hindered the 
development of a comprehensive EU strategy, but also created double stan-
dards in the relationship with authoritarian regimes. Socioeconomic, rights-
based, and democratic policy-making remained to a large extent 
underdeveloped.54 From the outset, cultural understanding, poverty reduction, 
the promotion of democracy, rule of law, and human rights have been present 
in EU discourse on the region, but a yawning gap existed between theory and 
practice.55 
III. TARGETED EU RESPONSES TO ThE ARAB UPRISINGS
After the general overview above, the present section focuses on specific tar-
geted actions the EU has taken since 2011. This section will present a the-
matic overview based on three major – often interlinked and even overlapping 
– challenges related to: (i) security and defence; (ii) economic concerns; and 
(iii) human rights and democratic aspirations of the people in the Arab world. 
3.1. Security and defence challenges
As indicated above, the EU’s attitude towards the MENA has been strongly 
shaped by its quest for European security and regional stability.56 Regional 
conflict combined with rising radicalism in the Arab world were explicitly men-
53 K. Roth, ‘Time to abandon the autocrats and embrace rights’, 22 Human Rights Watch 
World Report 2012, 1-22.
54 T. Behr, ‘L’Union Européenne et le Printemps arabe : Réactions, ruptures et ralliements’, 8 
Annuaire français de relations internationales 2012, at 437.
55 The Barcelona Declaration stated that partners are ‘convinced that the general objective of 
turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guarantee-
ing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human 
rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty 
and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of 
partnership’.
56 See supra and the European Security Strategy (European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a 
better world. European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 December 2003), stating that the EU’s 
task is to ‘make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neigh-
bourhood [and] to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union 
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tioned in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy as factors leading to instability.57 Two security aspects can be dis-
cerned: an external (unrest in Arab countries) and an internal one (threats to 
the EU caused by spill-over effects). 
3.1.1. The EU as an external security actor
The Arab uprisings presented some of the first real foreign policy challenges 
for the Union’s post-Lisbon Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). More specifically, in countries 
such as Libya, Syria and Bahrain, the safety of citizens exercising civil and 
political rights has been threatened by local leaders, resulting in these com-
munities and opposition groups calling for external support. In spite of its insti-
tutional and constitutional innovations regarding CFSP and CSDP58, the 
Treaty of Lisbon did not do away with the old intergovernmental approach to 
foreign policy. The effective use of instruments still very much depends on the 
European and global context and the dynamics in place between the EU actors 
involved. 
Thus far, CSDP instruments have remained underutilised in answering the 
Arab awakenings, in spite of the EU’s repeated commitment to the ‘responsibil-
ity to protect’.59 A failed attempt was made in the case of Libya. On 6 March 
2011, the high Representative sent a technical fact-finding mission to the coun-
try. On 1 April 2011, the Council adopted the decision to launch an EU hu-
manitarian operation, EUFOR Libya.60 This CSDP operation had the objective 
of providing humanitarian support to the operationalization of missions man-
dated by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1970 and 1973.61 however, 
in practice, the Council Decision merely served as a notification of the EU’s 
readiness to assist the UN Office for the Coordination of humanitarian Affairs 
(OChA) if requested. As such request never came, EUFOR Libya was repealed 
and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative rela-
tions’. 
57 European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brus-
sels, 11 December 2008, at 7. 
58 See inter alia J. Wouters, S. Bijlmakers and K. Meuwissen, ‘The EU as a Multilateral Se-
curity Actor after the Treaty of Lisbon: Constitutional and Institutional Aspects’, in S. Lucarelli, L. 
Van Langenhove and J. Wouters (eds.), The EU and Multilateral Security Governance (London: 
Routledge 2012), 72-103.
59 For a discussion on the EU’s adoption of the ‘R2P’ concept, see J. Wouters, Ph. De Man 
and M. Vincent, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and Regional Organisations: Where Does the EU 
Stand?’, in J. hoffmann and A. Nollkaemper (eds.), Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to 
Practice (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications 2012), 247-270. 
60 Council Decision of 1 April 2011 on a European Union military operation in support of 
humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya), 
2011/210/CFSP, OJ L 89/17, 5 April 2011.
61 UNSC Resolution 1970 of 26 February 2011 on peace and security in Africa, 6491st meet-
ing, S/RES/1970 (2011) and UNSC Resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011 on the situation in Libya, 
6498th meeting, S/RES/1973 (2011).
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and the closure of the Operational headquarters was announced in November 
2011, without it ever having been operationalized.62 
A number of Member States contributed individually to the NATO operations 
in Libya.63 The lack of a common understanding within the EU on how to 
handle the crisis, and in what multilateral forum, was illustrated by Denmark’s 
decision to participate in the NATO actions without having done the same in 
EUFOR Libya64, and by Germany’s abstention on Security Council Resolution 
1973 establishing a no-fly zone in Libya and mandating the use of force, going 
against the position of France and the UK. 
The EU has shown more vigour in finding short term alternatives to CSDP 
instruments. Most notably it applied its ‘restrictive measures’ policy under Title 
VI TFEU. Restrictive measures are instruments that have the dual objective of 
restoring international peace and security in accordance with the principles of 
the UN Charter and CFSP and maintaining respect for human rights, democ-
racy, the rule of law and good governance.65 EU sanctions do not need to be 
preceded by a UN Security Council Resolution, and are tools of a diplomatic 
or economic nature seeking to bring about a change in activities or policies of 
external actors.66 The EU has imposed sanctions on regimes and natural per-
sons in Tunisia67, Egypt68, Libya69 and Syria.70
One of the most pressing outstanding challenges in the longer term is initi-
ating a revision of the EU framework for Member States’ arms export controls. 
For a number of years, efforts have been made to establish a common Euro-
pean framework for the export of weapons. These did not achieve the results 
62 Council Decision 2011/764/CFSP of 28 November 2011 repealing Decision 2011/210/
CFSP on a European Union military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations 
in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR Libya), OJ L 314/35, 29 November 2011.
63 France and the United Kingdom first preceded, and subsequently participated in, the NATO 
Unified Protector Operation. Other Member States participating were: Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Denmark, Italy, Romania, Spain and Sweden. 
64 In accordance with Art. 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the TEU 
and TFEU Recital 11, Council Decision of 1 April 2011 on a European Union military operation in 
support of humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya (EUFOR 
Libya), 2011/210/CFSP, OJ L 89/17, 5 April 2011. 
65 Council of the European Union, Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanc-
tions), Brussels, 7 June 2004.
66 Council of the European Union, Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive 
measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, 
15 December 2009.
67 Council Decision 2012/724/CFSP of 26 November 2012 amending Decision 2011/72/
CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the 
situation in Tunisia OJ L 327/45, 27 November 2012.
68 Council Decision 2012/723/CFSP of 26 November 2012 amending Decision 2011/172/
CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in 
view of the situation in Egypt, OJ L 327/44, 27 November 2012.
69 Council Decision 2011/867/CFSP of 20 December 2011 amending Decision 2011/137/
CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya, OJ L 341/56, 22 Decem-
ber 2011.
70 Council Decision 2012/739/CFSP of 29 November 2012 concerning restrictive measures 
against Syria and repealing Decision 2011/782/CFSP, OJ L 330/21, 30 November 2012. For an 
accurate list of sanctions in force, consult <http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_
en.pdf>.
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hoped for. Member States have been adopting legislation and administrative 
rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment in light 
of the 2008 Council Common Position.71 This policy, which was adopted before 
the Arab uprisings, has so far had only mixed success. Moreover, reports by 
journalists and NGOs of Member State exports of conventional weapon systems 
to Libya, which were used by Gaddafi for internal repression, have been high-
ly damaging and embarrassing for the EU.72 It became clear that the common 
framework had not stopped Member States from delivering ‘made in Europe’ 
weapons to the Gaddafi regime until shortly before the uprisings. The EU arms 
embargo, imposed on 28 February 2011, could only prevent worse damage.73 
3.1.2. The EU’s internal security
The management of external security threats has to be reflected in internal 
policies. The area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), integrated in Title 
V TFEU, provides the framework to materialise this. It compiles EU policies 
related to external border checks, asylum and immigration, judicial cooperation 
in civil matters and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including 
terrorism. Given the often transnational nature of actions falling within this area, 
the effectiveness of internal policy often depends on external action.74 As indi-
cated above, the EU had already developed cooperation in AFSJ matters with 
partners prior to the Arab uprisings, through its EMP and ENP policies.75 Con-
sequently, Arab countries, and more specifically Northern-African States, in the 
past have been serving as a barrier against illegal migration, radicalism, and 
organised crime.76
The Arab uprisings have thus far not resulted in a reshaping of AFSJ instru-
ments. however, two of its external aspects have received increased attention 
since the uprisings. First, migration issues have occupied a central position 
71 Council Common Position defining common rules governing control of exports of military 
technology and equipment, 2008/944/CFSP, OJ L 335/99, 13 December 2008. This Common 
Position replaced the 1998 Code of Conduct on arms exports. A number of non-EU countries, 
none of them Arab countries, have officially aligned themselves with the criteria and principles of 
the Code.
72 The promotion by individual Member States (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK have been named) of weapons 
exports followed the lifting of the EU and UN weapon embargoes in 2003 and 2004. See: M. 
Bromley, ‘The review of the EU common position on arms exports: prospects for strengthened 
controls’, Non-Proliferation Papers No 7, January 2012, at 10, available at <http://www.nonprolif-
eration.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/markbromley4f7971fb1fd21.pdf> and D. Spleeters, 
‘Tracking Belgian Weapons in Libya’, New York Times 28 December 2011.
73 Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP of 28 February 2011 concerning restrictive measures in 
view of the situation in Libya, OJ L 58/53, 3 March 2011. 
74 J. Monar, ‘The EU as an International Actor in the Domain of Justice and home Affairs’, 9 
European Foreign Affairs Review 2004, 395-415, at 395. 
75 See e.g. the Barcelona Declaration: ‘Fighting terrorism will have to be a priority for all the 
parties’ and ‘in the area of illegal immigration they decide to establish closer cooperation’.
76 See supra; A. Driss, supra note 40, at 100; C. M. O’Donnell, ‘The European Security Policy 
and the Euro-Meditarranean region 2010-2011’, in Alcaro and haubrich-Seco (eds.), supra n. 15, 
at 164.
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from the onset (and are discussed in more detail below). Second, counterter-
rorism policies have received attention.77 Former leaders of Arab countries 
shared with the Union an interest in controlling the risk of terrorism locally. 
Whereas they perceived various forms of political activism as threatening the 
stability of their regime, strategically, a status quo in politics was also seen to 
be in the interests of the EU. Tunisia, for example, effectively collaborated with 
the EU in fighting terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, despite NGO criticism on 
the implementation instruments used.78 The uprisings brought about a pressing 
need to redefine EU policies in this respect. The EU Counterterrorism Coordi-
nator (CTC) has pointed out that the new Tunisian government, amongst oth-
ers, is willing to further coordinate terrorism-related policies.79 Aware of the 
flaws associated with former EU counterterrorism cooperation arrangements, 
the CTC stressed that actions have to be brought in line with the ‘deep democ-
racy’ principle endorsed by the European Council.80 The CTC’s efforts to con-
vince the EU to respond to the Tunisian request for assistance had little success. 
Counterterrorism does not seem the highest priority of the EU in the post-Arab 
uprisings era,81 possibly because threats are perceived to be greater in the 
MENA region than in the EU. 
3.2. Economic challenges
The external dimension of the EU’s single market remains pivotal in the after-
math of the Arab Spring. Its prominence has been translated into the so-called 
‘3 Ms’ – Money, Markets and Mobility – policy launched by the high Represen-
tative and the Commission in their March 2011 Joint Communication ‘A Partner-
ship for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’.82 
77 Council of the European Union, The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisa-
tion and Recruitment to Terrorism, Brussels, 24 November 2005. See S. Wolff, ‘The Mediter-
ranean Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism’, 31 Journal of European integration 2009, 137-156.
78 R. Kéfi, ‘Tunisia sparks Arab revolutions’, in Mediterranean Yearbook (Barcelona: IEMed 
2011), at 27. NGOs have called upon the EU to engage Tunisia in a programme of action to bring 
its terrorism laws and practices into line with the country’s obligations under national and interna-
tional law. See Amnesty International briefing note to the European Union EU-Tunisia Association 
Council 30 September 2003, available at <http://www.amnesty.eu/static/documents/Tunisia_Anti-
Terrorism_briefing_30Sept2003.doc>. 
79 Council of the European Union, EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy – Discussion paper of the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Brussels, 28 November 2011, at 5. Tunisia also requested the 
EU’s assistance in Security Sector Reform.
80 Ibid., at 6, the Counter-terrorism Coordinator notes that: ‘In order to be effective this kind 
of reform should not consist of a series of piecemeal projects which do not address the core of 
the issue, which is transformation of the security sector. There must a broad strategy if reform 
is to achieve the depth and sustainability needed for long term success. This applies not only in 
Tunisia but also to opportunities in Morocco, Libya and Egypt’.
81 On the general ‘EU counterterrorism fatigue’, see: EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy – discussion paper, 26 November 2009, available at <http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st09/st09717.en09.pdf>, at 2 and R. Coolsaet, ‘EU counterterror-
ism strategy: value added or chimera?’, 86 international Affairs 2010, 857-873, at 858.
82 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, supra note 50, at 14.
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3.2.1. Money
The MENA is a particular area of focus of the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
The Bank clusters three tasks (the development of financial instruments, the 
support of the private sector, and the creation of investor friendly environments) 
in its Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). 
Through the instrument, introduced in 2002 by the European Council and now 
part of the UfM and ENP, EUR 12 billion were invested on behalf of the Union 
in the form of loans, private equity investments and technical assistance in the 
period 2000-2009.83 The March 2011 Communication called upon the EIB ‒ 
already the biggest development lender in the region ‒ to take the lead in the 
promotion of inclusive growth. In follow-up to this, the Council reached agree-
ment with the European Parliament to increase the ceiling for EIB operations 
for Mediterranean countries undertaking political reform by EUR 1,68 billion.84 
The capital injection was approved by the General Affairs Council without much 
discussion.85 Civil society has cast a critical eye on the mere increasing of 
funding. NGOs have argued that the EIB may not be the right institution to fi-
nancially support the transition in the region86, recalling that the high level of 
funding already provided to the region had too few results and lacked effective 
accountability to external stakeholders.87 The Communication’s proposal to 
allow the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to sup-
port ‘the current democratic wave in the region’ is even more problematic. The 
Bank has had no running projects or any experience in the MENA region. Its 
statutes had to be amended for it to be able to be active in the region.88 
Within the existing EuroMed framework, additional funding was made avail-
able to face short-term difficulties resulting from the impact of the revolutions 
on trade and investment, domestic market failures and a decrease in tourism.89 
This is done so via the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
83 See the EIB’s website at <http://www.eib.org/projects/regions/med/index.htm> and Studi e 
Ricerche per il Mezzogiorno, ‘EU financial instruments for the Mediterranean Countries’, available 
at <http://www.srm-med.com/images/stories/allegati/nicchia_2%20_eng_a.pdf>. 
84 Decision No 1080/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2011, OJ L 280/1, 27 October 2011.
85 See Council approves agreement with EP on EIB lending mandate, Press release, Brus-
sels, 18 July 2011.
86 See CEE – Bank Watch, ‘Keep European public banks out of Mediterranean region, say 
NGOs’, 9 March 2011, available at <http://bankwatch.org/news-media/for-journalists/press-re-
leases/keep-european-public-banks-out-mediterranean-region-say-ng>. 
87 For further reading, see: N. hachez and J. Wouters, ‘A responsible lender? The European 
Investment Bank’s environmental, social and human rights accountability’, 49 Common Market 
law Review 2012, 47-95.
88 Decision No 602/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on 
amendments to the Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD) extending the geographic scope of EBRD operations to the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean, OJ L 177, 7 July 2012.
89 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, supra note 50, at 12. As such, recov-
ery support programmes were set up and grants were released to, for example recently, Tunisia 
(‘EU releases €107 million to boost Tunisian economy’, Press Release, Tunis, 8 December 2012) 
and Libya (‘EU-Libya: supporting transition and reforms in key sectors’, Press Release, Brussels, 
20 December 2012).
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(ENPI) that not only supports the ENP but also replaced the former EuroMed 
cooperation programme MEDA. Through the ENPI, the EU has set up pro-
grammes providing financial assistance to Arab partners.90 More importantly 
in the long run, the refocusing of the economic and socio-economic aspects of 
bilateral programmes of ENP/ENPI is noteworthy. The renewed instrument 
foresees funding of social and economic development, and links this to positive 
and negative conditionality.91 
Southern Mediterranean countries had seen only occasional Macro-Finan-
cial Assistance (MFA) operations before 2011.92 Yet, Arab partners are also 
eligible to receive this type of assistance if requested.93 This policy-based fi-
nancial instrument provides medium and long-term loans or grants on a case-
by-case basis for countries experiencing exceptional balance-of-payments 
difficulties.94 It is specifically designed for countries close to the EU. Like the 
instruments discussed above, this financial assistance model has not been 
spared from criticism. The lengthy decision-making process and the Council 
being the only legislator for this form of EU assistance has been a thorn in the 
90 In particular bilateral cooperation, co-financed by the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF), between EU Member States and Southern Mediterranean partners was set up as 
well as regional programmes such as the ENPI CBC Mediterranean Basin and the Neighbour-
hood Investment Facility (NIF).
91 Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Octo-
ber 2006, OJ L 310/1, 9 November 2006, establishes the financial envelope for the period 2007 to 
2013. A Regulation renewing European Neighbourhood Instrument is proposed, see Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Neighbour-
hood Instrument, COM/2011/0839 final, 7 December 2011. On the negative conditionality, see 
also: A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, at 3 states: ‘They will recognise that mean-
ingful reform comes with significant upfront costs. It will take the reform track record of partners 
during the 2010-12 period (based on the annual progress reports) into account when deciding 
on country financial allocations for 2014 and beyond. For countries where reform has not taken 
place, the EU will reconsider or even reduce funding’. 
92 In a study entitled ‘EU macro-financial assistance: a critical assessment’, by the European 
Parliament’s Directory-General for external policies of the Union, 23 February 2012 and available 
at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/inta/studiesdownload.html?languageDocumen
t=EN&file=67351>, it is argued that Arab countries suffered less from the 2009 recession, and 
were therefore in less direct need of this type of assistance. Yet, it is concluded, the damaging 
economic consequences of the Arab Spring may generate substantial new demands from this 
region. Decisions on MFA are taken following a request by a third country. For example, at the 
November 2012 EU-Egypt Task Force, it was announced that, upon the agreement of an Egypt-
IMF arrangement, the EU will provide an additional €50 million in grants and €450 million in 
concessional loans, in the form of Macro-Financial Assistance. See: Co-chairs conclusions of the 
First Meeting of the EU-Egypt Task Force, Cairo 13-14 November 2012.
93 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, supra note 50, at 13. 
94 The MFA complements financing provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Eligi-
bility for MFA has been informally based on the ‘Genval criteria’ originating from the conclusions of 
the informal ECOFIN Council of 9 October 1993 and reconfirmed in the Conclusions of the Coun-
cil meeting Economic and Financial Affairs, Luxembourg, 8 October 2002, available at <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/72608.pdf>, para. 4. The 
Genval criteria provide for a non-legally binding framework that guides MFA proposals by the 
Commission and following Council (ECOFIN) deliberations. The five criteria are: (i) exceptional 
character of the assistance; (ii) complementarity to financing of the international financial institu-
tions; (iii) existence of policy conditionality attached to the assistance; (iv) existence of political 
pre-conditions; and (v) strong financial discipline that needs to accompany the MFA.
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side of the European Parliament since 2003. The Lisbon Treaty stipulated that 
legislative decisions on MFA are to be taken by the Parliament and the Coun-
cil under the ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 209 and 212 TFEU). however, 
this constitutional change also amplified the need to further streamline MFA 
procedures. The MFA still struggles to function as a crisis response instrument 
to effectively deal with macroeconomic and financial emergency situations.95 
2011, a tumultuous year in international politics, witnessed continuous imple-
mentation of existing MFA actions, while no new MFA was approved by the 
Council and Parliament.96 Admittedly, the Arab uprisings created momentum 
to address these critiques: initiatives that speed up the allocation process were 
revitalised soon after the start of the uprisings. In July 2011, the Commission 
proposed a Framework Regulation that makes it possible to grant MFA via an 
implementing act of the Commission under the supervision of a committee of 
Member State representatives.97 The proposed allocation procedure is similar 
to those used in other external financial instruments of the EU.
3.2.2. Markets
A second area of economic focus is the improvement of market access for 
MENA producers and the facilitation of export and import of both goods and 
services. The Arab awakenings opened up new possibilities for the establish-
ment of the Barcelona-envisioned free trade area. By 2010, the EU had large-
ly fulfilled its part of the arrangement. Bilateral FTAs had been included in the 
Association Agreement instruments, discussed supra. Two remarks are in order. 
First, the coverage of these Agreements is essentially limited to trade in goods. 
Second, for the multi-State area to be completed, the FTAs need to be con-
cluded among the Southern Mediterranean partners themselves.98 The only 
partners that have engaged in such projects so far are Egypt, Jordan, Mo-
rocco, and Tunisia. These countries concluded the Agadir Agreement in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 
95 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 7 July 2011 
on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2010, COM/2011/0408 
final, at 4.
96 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the imple-
mentation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2011, Brussels, 28 June 2012, 
COM(2012) 339 final, at 3. 
97 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
laying down general provisions for Macro-Financial Assistance to third countries, Brussels, 4 July 
2011, COM(2011) 396 final. At the time of writing, the Parliament’s first reading is awaited and a 
decision by the co-legislators is expected for 2013. 
98 The EU faced difficulties to engage Arab partners to cooperate amongst each other. An im-
portant example of a similar exercise is the 1997 Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), estab-
lished by the League of Arab States. The agreement has reached full trade liberalisation of goods. 
Negotiations on services and investment liberalisation were ongoing at the outbreak of the Arab 
uprisings. The Arab League foresees to upgrade GAFTA into a customs union by 2015. For fur-
ther reading: B. hoekman and Kh. Sekkat, ‘Arab Economic Integration: Missing Links’, 44 Journal 
of World Trade 2010, 1273-1308. The GAFTA has been criticized for not living up to expectations 
formulated at its launch: W. Abdmoulah, ‘Arab Trade Integration: Evidence from Zero-Inflated 
Negative Binomial Model’, 32 Journal of Economic Cooperation & Development 2011, 39-66.
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1994 (GATT) and the EU rules of origin.99 The EU has been financially sup-
porting the consolidation of the Agadir Agreement through ENPI100 and it should 
now grasp the opportunity to push forward the inclusion of other Arab States. 
The development of the capacity of the Agadir Technical Unit (ATU) to support 
potential future signatories to the Agadir Agreement was a specific objective in 
the second phase of the EU support project, but has to this date not been suc-
cessful.101 
Rather than investing in an inclusive multilateral agreement102, the EU has 
opted to continue to apply differentiated bilateralism in market access policies.103 
In December 2011, by adopting negotiating directives, the Foreign Affairs Coun-
cil gave the Commission a mandate for trade negotiations about the conclusion 
of DCFTAs with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.104 Currently, prepara-
tory work is being carried out for the Commission to start conducting negotia-
tions to establish deep and comprehensive free trade areas (DCFTAs) that 
may lead to giving these countries a stake in the internal market, by upgrading 
existing Association Agreements to an advanced status.105 One new feature 
compared to the former agreements, which concentrated only on removing 
tariffs, is the proposed full coverage of all regulatory issues relevant to trade 
such as trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, investment protection, public procurement, and competition policy. 
Additionally, the EU established advanced preferential market access arrange-
ments for agricultural and fisheries products with Egypt and Jordan, while 
EU-Morocco relations now also include an exchange of offers to liberalise 
99 The Agreement Establishing a Free Trade Area Amongst Arab Euro-Mediterranean Coun-
tries (Agadir Agreement), signed in Rabat on 25 February 2004 between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
and Tunisia, entered into force 6 July 2006. For the full text and most recent status of the Agree-
ment <http://www.agadiragreement.org>. 
100 See ENPI Project: Agadir Agreement-EU support project (phase II). The project provides 
EUR 4 million in the 2008-2012 period, see <http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=314&id_
type=10>. 
101 Ibid.
102 Reference should, however, be made to the opening for signature on 15 June 2011 of 
the regional Convention on Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Rules of Origin. Since then, only the EU, 
the EFTA States, FYROM, Montenegro, Croatia, Albania and Turkey have done so. At the time 
of writing, no MENA country has formally endorsed this. For an up-to-date overview, visit <http://
ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_783_
en.htm>. 
103 For an assessment of the effects of the EU’s market access policies in the different Arab 
countries from an economics perspective, see: A. Ghoneim N. Péridy, J. Gonzalez and M. Parra, 
‘Shallow versus Deep Integration between Mediterranean Countries and the EU and within the 
Mediterranean Region’, CASE Network Report No 96 (2011), available at <www.ceps.eu/ceps/
dld/6795/pdf>. 
104 Council conclusions on the EU response to the developments in the Southern neigh-
bourhood, 3130th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 1 December 2011, para. 10. The 
authorization of the Foreign Affairs Council to start the negotiations of DCFTAs happened on 14 
December 2011.
105 R. A. Del Sarto and T. Schumacher, supra note 11, at 34. Negotiations on a DCFTA can 
only be launched after the decision of the Trade Policy Committee of the Council on the basis of 
a report from the Commission. Green light was given in the case of Morocco in November 2012. 
See: Council, press release, 3203rd Council meeting foreign affairs and trade, Brussels, 29 No-
vember 2012. 
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services.106 In conclusion, facilitated by impulses from the Commission’s DG 
Trade, medium- and long-term revised market access policies are amongst the 
most concrete instruments the EU has used effectively to reconnect to the Arab 
world. Other objectives that remain to be achieved include the conclusion and 
EU approval of trade liberalisation agreements on agricultural and fisheries 
products with Tunisia, the launch of negotiations on agreements on confor-
mity assessment and acceptance of industrial products, and the acceleration 
of on-going bilateral negotiations on the liberalisation of trade in services.107
The EU has also sought to take action to stabilise economies within the Arab 
region through participation in G8 initiatives. On 27 May 2011, in the French 
city of Deauville, a Partnership was launched between the G8, MENA countries, 
and a number of external actors108 to implement home-grown reforms and 
programmes to restore economic growth and confidence.109 This informal forum 
managed to address two of the aforementioned structural bottlenecks which 
the EU faces in the Arab region: (1) the inclusion of the topics of trade in ser-
vices and investment and (2) the expansion of trade and intra-MENA investment 
cooperation. 
3.2.3. Mobility
The turmoil of Arab awakening caused an alarming numbers of people to move 
both within and away from the region.110 EU Member States were the preferred 
destination of many migrants. The EU responded to this challenge in a rapid 
manner and with a strong focus on security issues. In February 2011, the joint 
operation EPN hERMES of Frontex and Europol was launched following Italy’s 
request for assistance in managing the influx of migrants. Additional funds of 
€25 million were made available by the Commission to be mobilised under the 
External Borders Fund and European Refugee Fund following concrete requests 
106 Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, supra note 50, 8-9.
107 Ibid. at 9. Since the launch of the Partnership, an EU-Morocco Agreement on agricultural, 
processed agricultural and fisheries products entered into force 1 October 2012 (OJ L 255/1, 21 
September 2012) and a regional Convention on Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Rules of Origin was 
opened for signature, see supra note 102.
108 Since the inaugural meeting in Jordan on April 11-12, 2012, partnership States are five 
MENA countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, and Libya), the G8, Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, qatar, and Turkey. Participating International Financial Institutions include 
the African Development Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab 
Monetary Fund, the EBRD, the EIB, the Islamic Development Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation, the International Monetary Fund, the OPEC Fund for International Development, 
and the World Bank. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development is also a 
Partnership member.
109 Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Spring, G8 Summit of Deauville, 26-27 May, 2011, avail-
able at <http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/the-2011-summit/declarations-and-reports/
declarations/declaration-of-the-g8-on-the-arab-springs.1316.html>.
110 Member States had lively discussions on how to control this ‘human tsunami’ (dixit Ber-
lusconi) within the Schengen zone: D. Perrin, ‘Arab Revolts and Migration: Behind the Mediterra-
nean Wall, the Unity of Europe’, in Mediterranean Yearbook (Barcelona: IEMed 2011), at 283-286.
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of Member States.111 A more comprehensive approach was sought in the open-
ing of a Dialogue on Migration, Mobility, and Security (‘the Dialogue’).112 The 
Dialogue was presented in May 2011 and aims at enhancing and facilitating 
the regular channels for migration and mobility of the citizens between Arab 
countries and the EU. Under impulses of the Member States, extra funds were 
made available, technical assistance to the migration operations was increased, 
and a resettlement policy was presented.113 
The EU’s management of migration flows reflects pre-Arab Spring practices 
and a Member State-driven reasoning. To a certain extent, and despite the title 
of the instrument, the Commission attempted to de-connect migration from its 
security dimension when it presented its medium and long-term views in the 
Dialogue. It was argued that mobility would enhance economic prosperity, and 
thus job creation, and even democracy.114 Thereto, migration policies were 
integrated in the economic 3Ms policy framework. The movement of people is, 
however, not to be reduced to a mere side-effect of market integration. As 
stated, increased international mobility of people challenges the EU in terms 
of security and human development as well.
In a follow-up instrument to the Dialogue, the Commission re-introduced a 
tool it had launched itself, with limited success, in 2006: Mobility Partnerships.115 
In June 2011, the European Council embraced the Commission’s proposal to 
conclude partnerships these with Arab States.116 The Mobility Partnerships are 
to be agreed at the political level between the EU, its Member States and the 
partner country concerned. The reciprocal dimension of the envisioned Partner-
ships includes increased opportunities for legal (economic) migration, increased 
capacity building and financial support for border management, in return for 
cooperation in preventing and fighting irregular migration and trafficking in hu-
man beings.117 Mobility Partnerships will be differentiated according to partner 
countries’ individual merits, agreed with each partner country separately, and 
will be conditional on efforts and progress made.118 The conditionality principle 
(‘more for more’) was as such included in migration politics, transforming the 
‘partnerships’ into rather unilateral instruments, with a strong role for the Union.
111 See: The European Commission’s response to the migratory flows from North Africa, 
MEMO/11/226, Brussels, 8 April 2011. 
112 See: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A dialogue for 
migration, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries, Brussels, 24 May 
2011, COM(2011) 292 final.
113 Ibid., at 4-6. 
114 Ibid., at 6-7.
115 On 16 May 2007 the Commission issued a Communication on Circular Migration and 
Mobility Partnerships between the EU and third countries Brussels, COM(2007) 248 final, on the 
basis of which the Council defined the purpose and parameters of Mobility Partnerships. See: 
Council Conclusions on extending and enhancing the Global Approach to Migration, 2808th Gen-
eral Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 17-18 June 2007, para. 10. 
116 Conclusions of the European Council of 23-24 June 2011, Brussels, paras 27-28. Before 
the uprisings partnerships had been concluded with Cape Verde and Moldova (2008), Georgia 
(2009), and Armenia (2011).
117 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, supra note 50, at 7.
118 Conclusions of the European Council of 23-24 June 2011, para. 28.
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Through its ‘Erasmus Mundus’ programme, the Commission doubled the 
number of education and teaching grants available for young people and uni-
versity staff from MENA countries.119 Though valuable, this is a relatively small 
project that only encourages short-term stays. 
3.3. Challenges related to human rights and democracy policies
The upheavals in the Arab region underlined the need for the EU to revisit its 
role as a promoter of human rights, democracy, rule of law, socio-economic 
equality, and its contribution to reforming institutions in partner countries.120 
Despite external human rights and democracy policies having been in place 
for many years, the EU cannot take credit for having enhanced the 2011 de-
mocratisation processes.121 Neither had the European human rights and de-
mocracy discourse impeded gross human rights violations from happening or 
dictators from remaining in power for many years.122 Coming clean with the 
past, nostra culpa speeches were delivered by Commissioner for ENP Štefan 
Füle and high Representative Ashton. Both recognised that policies favouring 
short-termism had to be replaced by a ‘sustainable stability’ which includes 
political, social, and economic development, as well as enhanced efforts in 
defending human rights and local democratic forces.123 Instruments considered 
to be fit to put such promising words into practice were those Europe was al-
119 The Commission announced an allocation of nearly EUR 30 million through Erasmus Mun-
dus in the 2011-2012 academic year, specifically for Southern Neighbourhood countries; Euro-
pean Commission, Erasmus Mundus: funding boost for Arab Spring countries, MEMO/11/918, 16 
December 2011. 
120 The EU sees itself as a normative actor in global governance. It prioritises the promotion 
of human rights, democracy, good governance, and rule of law and seeks to develop relations 
and build partnerships with third countries and organisations that share these values; see e.g. 
Art. 21(1) TEU. 
121 K. Roth, supra note 53, at 12; A. Driss, supra note 40, at 97.
122 This critique on European pre-Arab Spring policies has been very present. It was also ob-
served that, at the outset, the uprisings were not particularly supported by the EU and its Member 
States. See, among others: R. hollis, ‘No friend of democratization: Europe’s role in the genesis 
of the Arab Spring’, 88 international Affairs (2012), 81-94; B. Ward, ‘Europe’s own human rights 
crisis’, Human Rights Watch essay 2012, available at <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/re-
lated_material/eucrisis_2012.pdf>. 
123 C. Ashton remarked: ‘We know that we need the right blend of democratic and economic 
reforms to build sustainable stability. Events in the region show that the “old stability” wasn’t work-
ing. That is why we need to build a new “sustainable stability”. This will require us to tackle the 
political and economic aspects in an integrated manner. What these last few weeks have shown 
us is that political and economic reforms must go hand-in-hand. Populations are striving for politi-
cal rights and freedoms, accountability and participation’: Remarks at the Senior officials’ meeting 
on Egypt and Tunisia, Brussels, 23 February 2011, A 069/11. Commissioner S. Füle stated: ‘We 
must show humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and 
local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritar-
ian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region. This was not even Realpolitik. It was, at 
best, short-termism – and the kind of short-termism that makes the long term ever more difficult 
to build’: Speech on the recent events in North Africa Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), Eu-
ropean Parliament, Brussels, 28 February 2011.
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ready familiar with: the ENP, the European Instrument for Democracy and 
human Rights (EIDhR), and the European Endowment for Democracy (EED). 
First of all, the EU made convenient use of the strategic revision of its ENP 
framework to stress the importance of human rights and democracy in its 
neighbourhood policies. The new ENP approach is more explicitly based on 
mutual accountability and enhanced commitment to the universal values of 
human rights, democracy and rule of law, and as such builds on the normative 
approach the EU has taken for years.124 More emphasis is put on comprehen-
sive implementation. It does so by differentiating levels of assistance, depend-
ing on progress made in building and consolidating human rights.125 This is 
realised, first, via a ‘more for more’ political conditionality, notwithstanding the 
implementation deficit that such clauses suffered from in the past.126 Addition-
ally, a ‘less for less’ conditionality was introduced enabling the EU to reduce 
benefits when democratic expectations are not met.127 A second method used 
to differentiate policies was the move towards a multi-level and multi-actor ap-
proach. This included the boosting of joint initiatives in international fora on 
issues of common interest128 and the further engagement of civil society. In this 
respect, the ENP explicitly aims to address criticism that, although human rights 
principles have been integrated into ENP action plans and association agree-
ments, they are not matched by sufficient and effective instruments adapted 
to the local context and needs of the countries and regions concerned.129 
The second tool in human rights and democratisation policies is the Instru-
ment for Democracy and human Rights (EIDhR). It functions as the concrete 
expression of the EU’s intention to integrate the promotion of democracy and 
human rights into all of its external policies.130 It thereby serves to respond to 
the often-voiced criticism of a lack of coherence of EU human rights policy.131 
The instrument reaches out to local NGOs and supports those promoting hu-
man rights, democracy, and the rule of law via a chain of micro-projects.132 The 
EIDhR has also suffered from an implementation deficit. The requirement to 
approve projects on a case-by-case basis has severely limited the scope of 
124 A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, at 2. 
125 Ibid., at 3.
126 Ibid., at 6.
127 Ibid., at 3. 
128 Ibid., at 2.
129 B. Van Vooren, EU External Relations law and the European Neighbourhood Policy: A 
paradigm for coherence (London and New York: Routledge 2012), at 255.
130 Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 De-
cember 2006 on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human 
rights worldwide, OJ L 386/1, 29 December 2006. Through a variety of EIDhR projects the Eu-
ropean Commission demonstrates a significant political and financial commitment to supporting 
human rights and democracy worldwide.
131 S. Gstöhl, ‘Patchwork Power’ Europe: The EU’s Representation in International Institu-
tions’, 14 European Foreign Affairs Review 2009, 385-403; G. de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: 
The European Union as a Global human Rights Actor’, 105 American Journal of international 
law 2011, 649-693.
132 See for further reading: F. Bicchi, ‘Dilemmas of implementation: EU democracy assistance 
in the Mediterranean’, 17 Democratization 2010, 976-996.
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EU action, and in some years not all of the allocated budget has been used.133 
Remarkably, if anything, the EIDhR has become further marginalised in the 
EU’s Arab uprisings strategies. It was not significantly revised recently nor was 
it referred to in the Joint Communication on a Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity. This is noteworthy because the EIDhR is a programme fi-
nanced through the Commission’s EuropeAid, and EU delegations are involved 
in the monitoring of calls to support new local projects, which are now booming 
in the Arab region. The revised ENP merely refers to EIDhR activities as sup-
plementary to its own. The EIDhR Strategy Paper 2011-2013, adopted in April 
2010, states that the EIDhR is intended to complement geographical pro-
grammes such as ENP and ENPI.134 Notwithstanding new demands resulting 
from the rapidly changing realities in the Arab region, the EIDhR will continue 
to support projects and civil society in the region in the same manner as prior 
to 2011.
Generally, democracy support is also provided via EU Electoral Observation 
Missions and mechanisms to empower civil society.135 During the uprisings, 
the promotion of the new, though ill-defined, concept of ‘deep democracy’ found 
its way into European policies.136 A particular instrument to promote this deep 
democracy is the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), intended to 
help political parties, non-registered NGOs, trade unions, and other social 
partners striving for democratic change in their countries. The EED functions 
as a fund to enhance democracy building around the world. Originally proposed 
by Poland prior to the Arab uprisings, the EED was endorsed by the high 
Representative and the Council in the Spring of 2011.137 It ‘will seek to bring 
133 T. Behr, supra note 54, at 437; F. Bicchi, supra note 133, at 989. 
134 European Commission, ‘European Instrument for Democracy and human Rights (EIDhR) 
Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013’, C(2010)2432, 21 April 2010, para. 30.
135 The empowerment of civil society is a vital part of the renewed ENP, see infra. 
136 A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, at 3. In this respect, C. Ashton recalled 
that “Democracy is of course about votes and elections – but it is also about far more than that. 
What we in Europe have learned the hard way is that we need “deep democracy”: respect for the 
rule of law, freedom of speech, respect for human rights, an independent judiciary and impartial 
administration. It requires enforceable property rights and free trade unions. It is not just about 
changing governments, but about building the right institutions and the right attitudes. In the long 
run, “surface democracy”, democracy that floats on the top – people casting their votes freely on 
election day and choosing their governments – will not survive if “deep democracy” fails to take 
root”. See: C. Ashton, Speech on main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence policy, European Parliament Strasbourg, 
11 May 2011.
137 See: C. Ashton, ‘Empowered, Energised, Engaged’, Speech at the 6th Ministerial Confer-
ence of the Community of Democracies, Vilnius, 1 July 2011, where she states: ‘That is why, I put 
my support to the proposals put forward by Poland, by Radek Sikorski, for a “European Endow-
ment for Democracy” – flexible, non-bureaucratic tool, free of the imprint of government and free 
of EU bodies, which can help countries find their democratic voice’. See also Council Conclu-
sions on the ENP, 3101st Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 20 June 2011, para. 4. 
In December 2011, EU Member States agreed on a political Declaration on the establishment of 
a European Endowment for Democracy (COREPER, 15 December 2011). For further reading, 
see R. Youngs and K. Brudzinska, ‘The European Endowment for Democracy: will it fly?’, Fride 
Policy Brief Nº 128, May 2012, available at <http://www.fride.org/publication/1019/the-european-
endowment-for-democracy:-will-it-fly>.
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greater influence and consistency to the efforts of the EU, its Member States 
and several of the large European political foundations that are already active 
in this field’.138 From a EU policy strategy point of view, the creation of the EED 
– a purely political and intergovernmental creation – in itself contradicts the 
November 2009 Council Conclusions. These held that the EU is already rein-
forced by an extensive array of instruments related to democracy support and 
that neither new conditionality arrangements nor instruments were necessary. 
Instead, the focus should be on the consistent and effective implementation of 
policies.139 The EED does not replace the other instruments intended to finan-
cially support democratisation processes, but is a supplementary instrument 
with a specific objective that could have been included just as well in the EIDhR. 
It is therefore desirable for the EU to make further efforts, as was agreed in 
2009, to streamline the existing instruments and frameworks aimed at democ-
racy support in third countries.140 
In conclusion, it is doubtful whether these renewed (ENP), untouched (EI-
DhR), and somewhat redundant (EED) frameworks will have a significant 
impact in the Arab region. Despite new rhetoric, in human rights and democ-
ratisation policies, the EU has not been distancing itself from old politics and 
attitudes. Although it seems to have accepted the idea that no actual tool exist 
to open up societies and enhance democratisation from the outside, more can 
be achieved than what is the case today. Reducing the mutual incomprehen-
siveness of the recycled ENP, EIDhR, and EED programmes will be key in this 
regard as well as the comprehensive use of the different instruments at the 
EU’s disposal. 
IV. EU INSTRUMENTS TO ENhANCE MULTI-LEVEL 
COOPERATION
In its search for innovative approaches for enhanced collaboration in the MENA 
the EU needed to revise relations with global, regional, and local actors. More-
over, the high Representative and EEAS have made considerable efforts to 
build personal relationships and to involve different actors, at different levels, 
in post Arab Spring dialogues. The present section discusses these and indi-
cates where there is room for improvement. 
4.1. Cooperation with international organisations
The EU engaged with the UN in responding to the Arab uprisings. The EU 
cooperated with the UN Security Council on the situation in Libya. It has been 
138 A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, at 4.
139 Council conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations 2974th Exter-
nal Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 17 November 2009, para. 3.
140 Similar comments were made by Véronique De Keyser in the Report on EU external poli-
cies in favour of democratisation, 2011/2032(INI), Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European 
Parliament, 16 July 2011, para. 35.
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active in urging members of the UNSC to assume their responsibilities as well 
as in providing assistance in the writing of draft resolutions. Furthermore, in 
April 2012, the internal crisis platform established by the high Representative 
brought together different services of the EU specifically to better support the 
UN in the implementation of the Annan plan.141 The high Representative also 
takes part in the Action Group for Syria, a forum to support the implementation 
of UNSC Resolutions on Syria that is based at the UN Geneva Offices.142 
The Union’s engagement with regional multilateral organisations, including 
the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States (Arab League), the Or-
ganisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC)143 has been developing at different speeds. Particularly notable is the 
EU’s rapprochement to the Arab League which, led by Secretary-General Amr 
Moussa, had reinvented itself as an advocate of the protesters’ claims through-
out the Arab world.144 This is remarkable for an organisation that, although it 
aspires to goals similar to the EU,145 was primarily occupied with safeguarding 
the independence and sovereignty of its Member States. Moreover, until re-
cently, it operated in a climate of weak democratic practice, and as such, has 
little experience engaging in core democratic activities.146 Even so, the en-
hanced EU-Arab League cooperation did not entirely come out of thin air. The 
Arab League had been included in all meetings of the EMP since 2008.147 In 
addition, in March 2010, the high Representative visited the headquarters of 
the Arab League in Cairo, where she indicated her appreciation for the ‘grow-
141 Council conclusions on Syria, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 14 May 
2012; Council conclusions on Syria, 3183th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels 23 July 
2012. Prior to this, the Libyan case had also demanded increased internal coordination. An EEAS 
Crisis Platform was activated to conglomerate crisis response and crisis management structures 
of the EEAS, the Council, and the Commission. In July 2011, a Conflict Prevention Group and an 
EU Situation Room were launched to improve the early warning capacity, both of which were in-
tegrated in the newly established EEAS Crisis Response Department. The latter also coordinates 
the work of the EEAS Crisis Platform.
142 Other invitees are the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Arab League, the 
Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, UK, USA, Turkey and representatives of competent 
committees of the Arab League.
143 The EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council discussed topics of regional security and stabil-
ity at a Joint Council held in Abu Dhabi on 20 April 2011, in which they also underlined the need for 
close cooperation with the Arab League, the African Union, and the UN. See: 21st EU-GCC Joint 
Council and Ministerial Meeting Abu Dhabi, 20 April 2011, Joint Communique, available at <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/121610.pdf>. 
144 See, among others, its efforts in (i) convincing the Security Council to create of a flight ban 
over Libya (February 2011); (ii) suspending the Arab League membership of Syria (November 
2011); (iii) sending an observer team to Syria (January 2012); (iv) instructing President Bashar 
al-Assad to delegate power to the government of national unity (January 2012). 
145 These include the driving of closer relations between and coordination of political and 
economic activities of Member States. See also the above discussed efforts of the Arab League 
to further integrate markets. 
146 For further reading, see: E. R. McMahon and S. h. Baker, Piecing a Democratic Quilt? 
Regional Organizations and Universal Norms (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press 2006).
147 In 2008 the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers invited the Arab League to participate in all 
meetings at all levels of the Barcelona Process (prior to this decision, it participated in meetings 
at the Ministerial level only); Final Statement of the Marseille Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 3–4 November 2008, at 1. 
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ing co-operation with the Arab League, with programmes that are aimed at 
bringing us closer together’.148 Nonetheless, the EU and the Arab League have 
amplified their cooperative efforts during the last few months. The Council 
underlined its support for the Arab League’s efforts to end the cycle of violence 
in Syria, and for the deployment of its monitoring mission. Concrete cooperation 
modes furthermore include (i) the creation of the League of Arab States Situ-
ation Room to improve communications and real time response to natural di-
sasters or political crises; (ii) EU training of Arab League officials to develop 
analysis and the ability to respond to crisis situations; (iii) the establishment of 
permanent EEAS-Arab League focal points; and (iv) the implementation of 
projects by the EU-Arab League Liaison Office in Malta.149 In addition to more 
immediate political and operational support, the EU and the Arab League have 
engaged in exploratory talks regarding their medium and long-term cooperation 
in the economic, social, educational, cultural and legal fields.150 A structural 
redefinition of the EU-Arab League relationship to contribute to regional secu-
rity, stability, and prosperity has been announced. The increased cooperation, 
judged positively by both the EU and the Arab League, will furthermore be 
wielded with regard to other important dossiers: the Middle East Peace Process 
and Iran.151
The crisis situation has resulted in alternative forms of multi-organisational 
consultation as well. In February 2012, the high Representative joined in rath-
er unique deliberations with the Secretary Generals of the Arab League, UN 
and OIC on the Syrian matter.152 The Libya Contact Group, later re-named 
‘Friends of Libya’, was created following impulses from the high Representa-
tive. In addition to this, the EU is part of ‘Friends of Syria’, an informal contact 
group of 70 States, the opposition group ‘Syrian National Council’ and seven 
international organisations153 and is involved in a similar ‘Friends of Yemen’ 
initiative. These contact groups deliberately moved away from the UN Secu-
rity Council to discuss the highly political issues related to regime changes in 
the countries in question.154
148 C. Ashton, ‘A Commitment to Peace – the European Union and the Middle East The 
League of Arab States’, SPEECh/10/94, 15 March 2010.
149 C. Ashton, ‘Speech on Syria’, European Parliament Strasbourg, SPEECh/12/272, 17 April 
2012; Written answer of 26 march 2012 to question of MEP Simon Busuttil (PPE) to the Council 
of 20 January 2012, E-000167/2012.
150 Ibid. 
151 Cairo Declaration, adopted at the second European Union-League of Arab States Foreign 
Affairs Ministerial Meeting, 13 November 2012, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133465.pdf>, paras 10 and 12. 
152 The meeting was organised by the Arab League. See: European Union, Statement by 
high Representative Catherine Ashton following the EU-LAS-UN-OIC meeting on Syria, Brus-
sels, 23 February 2012, A 80/12.
153 The African Union, the Arab League, the Arab Maghreb Union, the EU, the GCC, the OIC, 
and the UN.
154 The high Representative stated in this regard: ‘I equally welcome and will play an active 
part in the Group of Friends of Syria, aiming at building an international consensus on Syria and 
putting forward urgent proposals to stop the violence, alleviate the suffering of the Syrian popula-
tion, seek a peaceful outcome to the current crisis and promote a new era of democratic change’; 
European Union, Statement by high Representative Catherine Ashton on the decisions by the 
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4.2. Cooperation with local non-State actors
The EU’s level of success in its interaction with non-State actors before the 
uprisings was relatively low. Admittedly, the circumstances did not allow for 
extensive interactions with businesses, civil society, NGOs, and opposition 
groups. In authoritarian societies, even civil initiatives are closely linked to the 
governing regimes.155 The recent changes in the domestic legal orders brought 
about opportunities in this regard. hence, goals of real engagement with local 
non-State actors were taken on board in the revisions of foreign policy instru-
ments. These included cooperation initiatives primarily intended to ensure the 
embracing of economic challenges (via the funding of local projects and busi-
nesses) and socio-economic and State-building challenges (via the funding of 
human rights NGOs). The first, economic, engagement draws on UfM initia-
tives.156 The second form of engagement, the strengthening of the role of 
civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, had already 
been included in the EIDhR and ENP.157 The EIDhR Strategy for 2011-2013 
states that projects will be implemented in the first place by civil society or-
ganisations.158 The ENP reaches out to non-State actors in different ways.159 
A new feature is the ENP Civil Society Facility to encompass and reinforce in 
a comprehensive way existing initiatives of support to non-State actors.160 The 
EU also prioritises the support for human rights defenders, which are regarded 
as key interlocutors for EU diplomatic missions in third countries. 
The motivation behind these forms of cooperation is twofold. The Union 
wants to provide a role for civil society in the local democratic and constitu-
tional reform processes. It also wants the people in the Southern Mediterranean 
to experience a visible change in their daily lives, by acting locally through ac-
tors with whom they are familiar.161 Although not expressly communicated, the 
fact that supporting NGOs is a convenient way to exercise influence locally 
without having to interact directly with government bodies, also may have played 
a role. Cooperation with civil society may therefore be used to rebalance forms 
of governance in the countries of the Arab region. It should be noted, however, 
that the use of aid instruments to pursue political objectives remains contested 
League of Arab States on Syria, Brussels, 13 February 2012. See also the continued support by 
the Council: Council conclusions on Syria, 3179th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Luxembourg, 
25 June 2012, para. 4; Council conclusions on Syria, 3183th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, 
Brussels 23 July 2012, para. 3. 
155 See for the Syrian example: J. Stacher, ‘Reinterpreting Authoritarian Power: Syria’s he-
reditary Succession’, 65 The Middle East Journal 2011, 197-212. 
156 See for example, the UfM Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, aimed at 
assisting existing entities in partner countries operating in support of small and medium-sized 
enterprises.
157 Art. 10, EIDhR Regulation No 1889/2006, makes, for example, private actors eligible to 
receive EU funding for human rights or democracy related projects. 
158 European Commission, ‘European Instrument for Democracy and human Rights (EIDhR) 
Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013’, C(2010)2432, 21 April 2010, para. 18.
159 It e.g. upgrades the role of civil society organisations, to promote democracy, human 
rights, and to assist in institution-building: A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood, at 3.
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid., at 5.
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and may not be the most effective way to reach out to the needs of the people 
of the countries in question. 
4.3. Diplomatic instruments to enhance bilateral and regional 
cooperation
As indicated above, a differentiated use of policies and instruments in MENA 
countries is considered crucial for the EU to achieve its foreign policy objec-
tives. One way to improve bilateral relations on a country-by-country basis is 
to reach out to its partners via the diplomatic instruments the EU has at its 
disposal. 
Throughout the last months, the EU has presented itself as a listening part-
ner, willing to communicate with Arab partners, to better understand local dy-
namics and build personal relationships. This is considered important in the 
Arab world, and can contribute to the rebuilding of trust. however, caution is 
also in order. The ‘overspending’ of diplomatic capital in personal relationships 
in this context – a region still in flux – may recall erroneous attitudes towards 
regimes in the past and complicate the European vision on the MENA’s future 
direction. Recent events in Egypt, in the fall of 2012, outline the complications 
of such policy choices. The constitutional trials, the referendum, and further 
tribulations have left the country in a deadlock state, reminiscent of ‘defeated’ 
Arab uprisings regimes. The high Representative approached the situation 
very cautiously, not wanting to jeopardize any relationships. hence, public 
statements were limited to ‘following with concern the events in Egypt’162 prior 
to the referendum and ‘I reiterate my previous calls for dialogue among all 
parties in Egypt […] I urge those concerned, in particular the President, to in-
tensify efforts in this regard’ following the vote.163 It is highly questionable 
whether the maintaining of personal interactions is preferred over putting pres-
sure on individuals or governments ignoring human rights and democratic 
principles and, if necessary, strongly condemning these. 
The building of diplomatic relationships has taken place in high-level task 
forces, co-chaired by the high Representative and respective leaders of the 
partner countries.164 The Union also has a permanent diplomatic presence on 
the ground in the form of EU Delegations.165 These Delegations operate as the 
162 Statement by EU high Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Egypt, Brus-
sels, 5 December 2012. 
163 Statement by EU high Representative Catherine Ashton on the referendum in Egypt, 
Brussels, 25 December 2012. 
164 The EU-Tunisia Task Force in September 2011, which gathered expertise from the Com-
mission, EEAS, EU Member States, the private sector, the EIB, the EBRD, and other international 
financial institutions has been set up to ensure better coordination of the country’s political and 
economic transition. This concept has been applied in Jordan (February 2012) and in Egypt 
(November 2012).
165 The EU has an active and passive jus legationis and relies on a worldwide bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic network to conduct international relations. For further reading, see J. Wout-
ers and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New horizons?’, 7 The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy 2012, 31-49. On 12 November 2011, the high Representative officially 
inaugurated the EU Delegation in Libya’s capital Tripoli. An EU Office had been operational in 
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diplomatic missions of the EU as a whole and serve as bilateral contact points 
with governments and civil society. The EU Delegations have proven to be an 
excellent instrument in the Arab region by allowing the EU to already have a 
foot on the ground. Tasks include the briefing of the Union, and more specifi-
cally the Brussels-based EEAS headquarters, on the situation on the ground.166 
As was foreseen in the 2010 EEAS Decision, the head of Delegation also has 
to implement operational credits in relation to the Union’s projects in the coun-
try of stationing.167 Many EU initiatives were launched, but have yet to be es-
tablished and kept running, and the Delegations are given the central task to 
comprehensively follow-up on these.168 It is yet unclear whether these tasks 
are being performed in the most effective way. First, EU Delegations have to 
maintain their role in promoting friendly relations with different sides in the 
conflict.169 To illustrate the complexity it can be recalled that in the midst of the 
Arab uprisings, heads of EU Delegations found themselves accredited to ‘old’ 
regimes (e.g. Morocco), transitional governments (Libya, Egypt), and newly 
elected governments (Tunisia). The situation in Syria is even more compli-
cated: the EU Delegation in Damascus remains operational and continues to 
host diplomats of Member States that decided to suspend the activity of their 
own embassies.170 Second, the diplomatic function of the Delegations must at 
all times be preserved. The Delegations form a network of embassies and 
fulfil a similar function: the representation of the EU with local governments.171 
As such, a reciprocal EU commitment to respect the 1961 Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR)172 terms and conditions in the application of 
privileges and immunities is vital to its diplomatic relations. EU Delegations 
have to respect Art. 41(1) VCDR regarding the non-interference in the internal 
affairs of the receiving State. Local laws and regulations have to be obeyed 
and thus a careful balancing act is needed between the tasks assigned under 
EU instruments and the diplomatic functions of the EU Delegations under in-
ternational law. 
the country’s second city Benghazi since 22 May 2011 to enable EU actors to interact with the 
Transitional National Council, civil society groups and international partners.
166 See also Art. 5 (9) which states that the Union delegations shall work in close cooperation 
and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States.
167 Art. 5 (4) EEAS Council Decision. 
168 As a side remark, given that delegations are staffed with diplomats, additional financial 
support is desired for the training and recruitment of staff to take up these tasks.
169 When regime change is taking place in a country, in general, diplomatic delegations cau-
tiously adhere to the principles of neutrality and impartiality. Today’s opposition group may be-
come tomorrow’s official representatives of a country. 
170 C. Ashton, EU high Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice Presi-
dent of the European Commission, Speech on Syria European Parliament Strasbourg, 17 April 
2012. By December 2012, following MS have closed their Damascus embassies: Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden 
and the UK.
171 Art. 221(1) TFEU.
172 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961, entry into 
force 24 April 1964, UNTS, vol. 500, at 95, no. 310. The EU is not a party to this convention but 
the latter’s provisions are widely considered as being part of customary international law.
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The EU’s policies and interests are also promoted by its network of Special 
Representatives. The Special Representatives are tasked to play an active role 
in efforts to consolidate peace, stability, and the rule of law. As a result of the 
Arab awakenings, the Council appointed the Spanish diplomat, Bernardino Leó 
n, as the EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean.173 his 
mandate includes, first, the vaguely formulated mission to support an orderly 
transition of the region to sustainable democracy, as well as human rights, and 
rule of law.174 Second, and on a more concrete level, he serves as the per-
sonification of the EU’s enhanced diplomatic cooperation with the region as a 
whole, with external partners, and bilaterally.175 Following the inclusion of local, 
non-State actors in all EU’s instruments and policies, the Special Representa-
tive is furthermore responsible for coordinating relations with these partners.176 
V. WhAT TO DO FOR ThE EU?
It has become clear that the EU, after a slow start, now assumes an active role 
in addressing the needs of the people of the MENA. Yet, it has been stuck in 
old habits of thought. The EU has chosen to answer the variety of challenges 
by adapting its existing instruments. hasty policy-making, especially in the 
period from March to October 2011, resulted in vague programmatic language. 
This is unsatisfactory, since, up until now, a majority of the medium- and long-
term measures are awaiting further implementation. Additionally, the lack of 
critical creative thinking about an EU strategy in the MENA hinders the more 
profound and much needed regeneration of EU attitudes. high stakes are 
nevertheless involved: if the EU fails in the region, this will have an impact on 
economic, human development, political, and even geo-strategically conditions. 
A comprehensive strategy for the EU requires an original way of re-thinking a 
number of issues, a selection of which are discussed here. 
(i) Find a good mix between multilateralism and bilateralism
A recurring challenge for the EU is the development of comprehensive, multi-
lateral policies while at the same time effectively differentiating its bilateral 
relations. As demonstrated above, one has witnessed a shift from the more 
multilateral EMP towards a policy of differentiation and bilateralism in the (re-
vised) ENP and UfM. When promoting domestic reforms, differentiated bilat-
eralism can be supported, but only to the extent that the multilateral basis it 
builds upon is well-defined. Differentiation in policies may not contribute to 
differences in the enjoyment of human rights and democracy, nor may it lead 
173 Council Decision of 18 July 2011 appointing a European Union Special Representative for 
the Southern Mediterranean region, 2011/424/CFSP, OJ L 188/24, 19 July 2011. 
174 Ibid., Art. 2 (b) and 3 (e).
175 Ibid, Art. 3 (d); The SR enhances the EU’s effectiveness, presence and visibility in the 
region and in relevant international fora. Art. 2 (c) names international organisations such as 
‘African Union, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference, the League of Arab States and the United Nations’.
176 Ibid., Art. 2 (c) and Art. 3 (a); (b).
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to the use of conditionality mechanisms. Concretely, the policy of ‘less for less’ 
conditionality warrants caution, especially since further isolation of countries 
may contribute to regional instability. 
It is interesting to compare the MENA strategy with the EU’s relations with 
other regions at this point. In the East, the EU is also confronted with a diver-
sity in country profiles. Some States are doing relatively better (Moldova, 
Ukraine) while others disapproved or even rejected a European rapprochement 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus).177 In this context, the EU has initiated a 
return to multilateralism via its Eastern Partnership (EaP). Yet, it does so with-
out abandoning existing bilateral structures. While the EaP is formally incorpo-
rated in the Eastern dimension of the ENP, an EU Neighbourhood East 
Parliamentary Assembly, Euronest, has also been launched. Not only does this 
reinforce multilateral structures, it also builds on the idea of a partnership rath-
er than unilateralist approaches.178 The Barcelona process also includes a 
parliamentary dimension. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly 
(EMPA) can be further consolidated into a forum in which democratically elect-
ed members of parliaments can discuss the changes that have been taking 
place in the countries. Accordingly, it provides for unique opportunities to ex-
change views in a multilateral arena on topics such as political reform and 
state-building. A return to multilateral solutions may not only be interesting to 
consider for this reason, but also because institutional support is needed to 
install an Euro-Arab free trade zone and to increase intra-Arab cooperation. If 
needed, a multilateral model could also take a more informal shape. The club-
like network established under the G8 Deauville Partnership offers an example 
of engagement by some of the most important neighbours, international or-
ganisations and development banks with the Arab region.
(ii) Make (the monitoring of) funding more coherent 
The EU lacks a mechanism to oversee the distribution of funds of the different 
ENP, EIDhR, UfM and EMP programmes. Financial support for the MENA 
region has been channelled through a wide variety of sources, including the 
ENPI, the EIB and the Refugee Fund. Although announced as a flagship initia-
tive, the Commission’s SPRING Programme is not the integrated instrument 
one may have hoped for. Funds continue to be incoherently distributed through 
a variety of instruments, of which SPRING is just one example. Among the 
most promising changes of the renewed ENP and EED is the treatment of 
civil society as full partners and receivers of European funding. 
Since 2011, the principle of conditionality has been (re)introduced in the 
SPRING, ENP, Mobility Partnerships and Association Agreements. Including 
conditionality in different instruments demands an integrated implementation 
177 For further reading see G. Christou, ‘Multilateralism, Conflict Prevention, and the Eastern 
Partnership’, 16 European Foreign Affairs Review 2011, 207-225 and S. Stewart, ‘EU Democracy 
Promotion in the Eastern Neighbourhood: One Template, Multiple Approaches’, 16 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 2011, 607-621.
178 See: Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, Constituent Act of the Euronest Parliamentary 
Assembly, April 2011. 
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mechanism. Additionally, the incentives in conditionality policies have to be 
defined precisely. Previous experience in the MENA has proven that using fi-
nancial assistance as a ‘carrot’ does not automatically generate sustainable 
human rights and democracy. Other offers that may be included to make the 
acceptance of European proposals more attractive are the long-promised re-
alisation of the ‘stake in the market’ for Arab countries and the conclusion of 
mobility agreements striving for broader labour-related mobility. In this regard, 
the EU should be aware that the public opinion prefers the pooling of efforts in 
these fields over the external support for State system reforms.
(iii) Enhancing EU-Arab cooperation
Progress has been made in the EU’s structural cooperation with States – mul-
tilaterally and bilaterally, e.g. with governments of Arab countries – as well as 
non-State actors. A clear shift in the EU’s policy towards its partners can be 
observed. First, the Euro-Med relationship has progressed from merely being 
a Commission-directed unilateral one to being more dialogue-based. Second, 
civil society is increasingly treated as a full-grown actor in all revisited EU 
programmes, although admittedly this trend had started before December 2010. 
Third, the EU deepened its relations with the Arab League and envisions further 
cooperation. It has been announced that in addition to joint crisis-management, 
collaboration will also be set up on economic and political themes in the longer 
term. Fourth, the systematic deployment of EU Delegations is relatively new 
to the EU. The EU Delegations, working closely with partner governments and 
civil society, are given a formal role in the implementation of EU policies. Under 
the SPRING programme, for example, EU Delegations are tasked to locally 
identify initiatives for the EU to sponsor. Yet, it is far from certain that the EU 
will be able to reach out to Arab society through the funding of civil society. 
Civil society often has close ties with governments and other funding organisa-
tions (international organisations, e.g. the Gulf Cooperation Council and States, 
e.g. Saudi-Arabia). Cooperation should be further enhanced with regard to the 
non-organised part of society in the Arab region, a group still generally ne-
glected in EU tools. The engagement of ‘society behind civil society’ should be 
more prominently put forward as a priority. Additionally, insufficient attention 
has gone to the establishment of relations with the military and religious groups, 
influential as political parties and as providers of social (health, education, and 
social security) services. 
(iv) Why does the EU need a strategy?
The EU’s actions in the MENA have been tools-based rather than strategy-
led.179 None of the renewed or launched instruments display an original and 
well-thought-out EU vision on the MENA. More concretely, it is unclear where 
the EU wants the MENA to be in twenty or thirty years and what it expects from 
local policy-makers and cooperation partners in this regard. Even when setting 
179 See supra and D. Greenfield and R. Balfour, ‘Arab Awakening: Are the US and EU Missing 
the Challenge?’, Atlantic Council Publication, (June 2012), available at <http://www.acus.org/files/
publication_pdfs/403/95825_ACUS_arab_awakening_us_eu.pdf.pdf>, at 19. 
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up cooperation structures, the lack of vision is striking. The EU has presented 
itself as a listening partner to the MENA. The Arab world has seen the high 
Representative coming clean with the past, listening to complaints and bringing 
outreach visits to the region. Self-effacement was in order for the EU, but is 
this sufficient? This approach was probably defendable in the first months of 
the awakenings, considering the failures of past policies. But it rapidly loses its 
strength if it is not backed up by a forward-looking strategy that comprises a 
vision on the future development of the region. In fact, feedback has been, if 
not indifferent, very mixed.180 Claims for European money, access to markets 
and increased mobility are more present than requests for European assistance 
in democracy- or institution-building. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Arab uprisings provide unique opportunities to revise the EU’s relations 
with countries in transition in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Caught by 
surprise at first, the EU has now embraced security, economic, socioeconom-
ic, political, social, and diplomatic challenges. The exact impact of the instru-
ments created or modified is hard to measure, especially since the region is 
still in the middle of one of the greatest changes it has seen in 50 years. As 
outlined, in countries such as Egypt, the political impasse is to be followed up 
very closely until present day. The use of different policy instruments did not 
result in the ambitious creation of a comprehensive strategy, partly because 
the EU has not been successful in prioritising the interests it has pursued. 
Ultimately, the EU’s quest for stability in the MENA region is still reflected in all 
its instruments, notwithstanding the re-orientation of programmes towards the 
engagement of civil society and the support of the democratic aspirations of 
the people of the region. 
The revision of the ENP and EIDhR, on the basis of preparations that had 
started before the recent changes in the region, and of the countless tools and 
projects concerned, have not been sufficiently thorough. The EU has made 
clear progress in using its diplomacy tools. The mobilisation of EU Delegations, 
the coordination by the EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediter-
ranean, the organisation of task forces, the intensification of partnerships, 
whether formal and informal, with local actors, regional and global interna-
tional organisations are all steps in the right direction. Yet, all these actions 
have to be guided by a long-term, coherent strategy. Now that the optimism of 
the early days of the Arab awakenings has ebbed, it has become all the more 
clear that the EU still lacks a long-term vision on the future of the MENA. 
180 See R. Youngs, ‘The EU and the Arab spring: from munificence to geo-strategy’, Fride 
Policy Brief No 100, (October 2011), available at <http://www.fride.org/publication/950/the-eu-
and-the-arab-spring:-from-munificence-to-geo-strategy>. 
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ThE Enp And ‘MoRE foR MoRE’ CondiTionALiTY:  
pLUS qUE çA ChAngE … 
Steven Blockmans
1. … PLUS qUE çA RESTE LA MêME ChOSE?
The revolutionary upheaval in the southern Mediterranean and the disparate 
reforms in Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries have pushed the EU to revise 
its approach to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). While EU institu-
tions and Member States were caught by complete surprise by the so-called 
‘Arab Spring’, a comprehensive discussion on the future of the ENP by the 
Council had – coincidentally – already been planned for the first half of 2011.1 
In March 2011, the European Commission and the high Representative pre-
sented some ideas on a new ‘partnership for democracy and shared prosper-
ity’ with the southern Mediterranean.2 In May 2011, they presented a full review 
of the ENP.3 Whereas these documents were presented as a strategic response 
to the sea change brought about by the revolts in the southern neighbourhood, 
the priority areas of the revised ENP are essentially the same as those of the 
‘old’ ENP, which was launched in 2003, revised at different intervals since, and 
widely regarded as unsuccessful by analysts.4 
With an emphasis on the promotion of democracy and the support for de-
mocratisation processes, reinforcing the rule of law, improving the respect of 
1 See Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, 27 July 2010, para 1.
2 Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, COM(2011) 200 final of 8 
March 2011, Brussels.
3 European Commission and high Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A New Response to a 
Changing Neighbourhood, COM(2011) 303 final of 25 May 2011, Brussels.
4 See J. Kelly, ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Adaptation in the European Neighbour-
hood Policy’, 44 JCMS (2006), 29-55; S. Blockmans and A. Łazowski, ‘Conclusions: Squaring the 
Ring of Friends’, in S. Blockmans and A. Łazowski (eds.), The European Union and its Neigh-
bours: A legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and integration (The 
hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2006), 613-639; M. Cremona and C. hillion, ‘L’Union fait la force? 
Potential and Limitations of the European Neighbourhood Policy as an Integrated EU Foreign and 
Security Policy’, EUi Working Papers lAW 2006/39; M. Cremona and G. Meloni, ‘The European 
Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation?’, EUi Working Papers lAW 2007/21 
(2007); G. Noutcheva, N. Popescu and M. Emerson, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years 
on: Time indeed for an ‘ENP Plus’’, CEPS Policy Brief No. 126, March 2007; G. Edwards, ‘The 
Construction of Ambiguity and the Limits of Attraction: Europe and its Neighbourhood Policy’, 
30 Journal of European integration (2008), 45-62; B. Van Vooren, ‘The European Union as an 
International Actor and Progressive Experimentation in its Neighbourhood’, in P. Koutrakos (ed.), 
European Foreign Policy: legal and Political Perspectives (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing 
2011), 147-171.
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human rights, judicial reform, administrative capacity-building, fighting corrup-
tion, and economic modernisation, the revised ENP is again based on the 
principle of positive conditionality: the more governments in neighbouring coun-
tries implement reforms in the sectors outlined in the EU strategy paper, the 
more assistance the EU will offer. Rebranding the incentive-based principle of 
conditionality as ‘more for more’ cannot disguise the fact that the EU is es-
sentially promising more of the same, thus reincarnating a weak pledge that 
has still not been reciprocated by commitments of the region’s leaders to de-
mocracy, the rule of law and political reforms. 
In real terms, the EU has allocated €700 million in new grants for the South-
ern neighbourhood, in particular through the SPRING programme (Support for 
Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) which provides additional funding 
to southern partners showing commitment to, and progress in, democratic 
reform: e.g., €90 million for Egypt to support the government’s socio-econom-
ic reform programme; €70 million to Jordan (to support the electoral process, 
to assist in reforming the justice system, to support efforts targeting public fi-
nance management, education and social security, and to help develop the 
private sector and foster job creation), in tranches of 30 and 40 million, with 
the second tranche linked to progress achieved in terms of democratic reform.5 
Arguably, the sums mustered on top of the existing envelopes under the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument are too small an incentive 
to bolster the change needed to secure a successful transition from authori-
tarianism to democratic rule in the southern Mediterranean.6
The revised ENP does offer one major innovation by indicating more clear-
ly than ever before that the EU will restructure or even reduce financial aid and 
sectoral support for those governments of neighbouring countries which delay, 
impede or abandon reform plans. With the categorical reference to the prin-
ciple of ‘less for less’, the EU has implicitly declared an end to the days that it 
would simply acquiesce to a retreat on reforms by ENP partners. however, 
while the introduction of negative conditionality cannot be dismissed out of 
hand, the problem with the less for less principle rests with its implementation 
of ‘other political measures’ ‘and targeted sanctions’. Two years on, the EU has 
unfortunately not a whole lot to show for in terms of implementing the ‘less for 
less’ principle, neither with regard to the eastern neighbourhood (e.g. Belarus, 
Azerbaijan),7 nor for the southern Mediterranean (with the exception of cutting 
5 For these and other details, see European Union, ‘EU’s response to the “Arab Spring”: The 
State-of-Play after Two Years’, Press release A 70/13, Brussels, 8 February 2013. Towards the 
eastern neighbourhood “more for more” has been applied in the visa liberalisation process, al-
lowing the EaP’s poster child Moldova to progress faster than the Ukraine of Victor Yanukovych.
6 This observation takes account of the sums generated through the EU-induced Task Forces 
for Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt, preferential loans granted by the EIB, and other collateral funding 
mechanisms. See J. Teorell, Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the 
World, 1972-2006 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010).
7 See P. Pawlak and x. Kurowska, ‘EU foreign policy: more for more, or more of the same?’, 
EU observer, 5 October 2011: The results of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw on 29 
and 30 September 2011 “clearly show that while the EU is taking a strong stance in its mid-Arab-
Spring southern neighbourhood, it is repeating its old mistake in the post-Soviet east. Rather than 
paying respect to ‘more for more’ the EU has again turned a blind eye to lack of reform in the 
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EU support to war-torn Syria, the ‘less for less’ principle has not been used to 
signal the EU’s dissatisfaction with, e.g., the ongoing abuse of human rights 
resulting from continued de facto rule by the military in Egypt and the lack of 
reform of a mistrusted police force and justice system in Tunisia).8 In its ap-
plication, the revised ENP must therefore be seen as a continuation of the EU’s 
inability and lack of political will to exert effective influence on (quasi-)authori-
tarian regimes to establish and maintain democratic reforms.
Politics aside, design is partly to blame for this. Both the joint communication 
of 8 March 2011 and the May 2011 strategy paper read more like blueprints for 
an assistance programme than strategic documents which offer a coherent 
approach to a clearly defined reform agenda designed to foster ‘deep democ-
racy’ (yet another new label to distinguish the ‘new’ approach from the EU’s 
hapless efforts at promoting democracy before the Arab revolts erupted). Go-
ing by its path dependency in the formulation of external relations,9 it is hardly 
surprising that in the revised ENP the Union again proceeds from the assump-
tion that governments in the southern Mediterranean are ready to embark on 
a path of reform accompanied by EU assistance.10 The ‘new’ ENP fails to ac-
knowledge the complexity of the transition processes in the Arab Mediterranean, 
the impact of the simmering conflicts between secular and religious movements, 
as well as the wide variety of other drivers for change in each of the countries 
concerned. This lesson took a while to sink in. Whereas the 2011 strategy 
paper still contained an unjustified assumption that the Tunisian development 
model could be projected to the other countries in the region, the 2012 ENP 
strategy paper’s references to the changed internal power structures in Tunisia, 
Morocco, Egypt and Libya show that the Commission and EEAS have learned 
to distinguish the countries’ different transition pathways.
Another structural shortcoming of the revised neighbourhood framework 
relates to what has already been noted in passing, i.e. that the EU’s key docu-
ments still pack the diplomatic langue de bois which characterised the ‘old’ 
ENP. Ill-defined terms (e.g. ‘deep democracy’,11 ‘rule of law’, ‘governance re-
region by promising more financial support and deeper political co-operation. The EU’s $9 billion 
offer to Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenko, in exchange for freeing political prisoners 
and holding free and fair elections (which do not require him to step down) is surprising, to say the 
least, and is an unfortunate reminder of the mistakes the EU has made in the southern Mediter-
ranean. This suggests that the EU has not learnt from the Arab Spring and will continue to repeat 
the same mistakes it has made in the past.” Another case worthy of the application of “less for 
less” concerns Azerbaijan. See J. Kobzova and L. Alieva, ‘The EU and Azerbaijan: Beyond Oil’, 
ECFR Policy Memo No. 57, May 2012.
8 There is a total absence of references to “less for less” in European Union, ‘EU’s response 
to the “Arab Spring”: The State-of-Play after Two Years’, Press release A 70/13, Brussels, 8 Feb-
ruary 2013.
9 See, e.g., T. Risse, S. Ropp and K. Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights. international 
Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999).
10 See E. Adler and B. Crawford, ‘Normative Power: The European Practice of Region Build-
ing and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, in E. Adler, F. Bicchi, B. Crawford and 
R. Del Sarto (eds.), The Convergence of Civilizations; Constructing the Mediterranean Region 
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press 2006).
11 According to the May 2011 Joint Communication, the notion includes “free and fair elec-
tions; freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of 
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form’) are sometimes used interchangeably (e.g. ‘democratisation’, ‘demo-
cratic transformation’, ‘transition’). Moreover, the EU’s mechanisms to assess 
whether the situation in neighbouring countries matches the revised terminol-
ogy, or is apt for the application thereof represent a return to the status quo 
ante of donor-driven aid policies based on programmatic priorities and levels 
of absorption capacity.12 Thus, the ‘new’ ENP stands in the tradition of ‘old’ 
bilateral action plans, representing nothing more than a vague and incomplete 
catalogue of reforms.
2. VISION IMPOSSIBLE?
Whether the ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’ conditionality can produce a 
leveraging effect and inspire wholesale reform as desired by the EU is, to a 
considerable extent, dependent on the prospects offered by the Union to neigh-
bouring states. Whereas the eastern neighbours have reason to be hopeful 
that they may be offered a membership perspective (perhaps as early as No-
vember 2013, at the EaP Summit in Vilnius),13 the southern neighbours have 
no such prospect as they are not considered ‘European’ in the sense of the EU 
membership clause in Article 49 TEU. Thus, the EU has to develop its strategic 
commitment to the South if it wants the ENP to steer the revolutionary momen-
tum in the direction of what is spelled out in Article 8 TEU, i.e. the creation of 
‘an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the 
Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’.
Whereas extending economic integration has been the EU’s method to beef 
up the ENP, slogans like ‘close relations’, ‘everything but the institutions’ and 
‘a stake in the internal market’ have in the past ten years proven to be too vague 
and bureaucratic to rally support from the people on the streets of Cairo, Tunis 
and Amman, or to inspire governing elites to engage in difficult and politically 
costly legal, administrative and economic reform.14 One way of resolving this 
law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; 
security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of demo-
cratic control over armed and security forces”. In February 2012, high Representative Ashton and 
European Commissioner Füle sent an unpublished letter to EU Foreign Ministers on the operation 
of conditionality that added “the respect of other human rights” to this shopping list.
12 N. Gros-Verheyde, ‘quand le «more and more» devient un «peu plus» c’est tout!’, Brux-
elles2, 8 July 2012 : “Sous couvert de préciser quelques termes et déplacer quelques mots, on 
place en fait la barre «démocratique» beaucoup plus bas. L’incitation différenciée liée aux critères 
d’avancée dans les réformes, en particulier à l’approfondissement de la construction démocra-
tique, fait ainsi place aux seuls critères, classiques, d’absorption et aux priorités «définies d’un 
commun accord». L’incitation démocratique est renvoyée à un soutien «additionnel». Un petit 
plus, simplement… En quelque sorte, on revient à la situation quo ante. L’aide européenne – 
pourtant fixée au titre de l’Instrument pour la démocratie – ne sera pas évaluée et conditionnée 
aux avancées démocratiques mais à des seuls critères techniques (l’absorption) ou program-
matiques (les priorités).” 
13 See R. Sadowski, ‘Commissioner Fule wants prospective EU membership to be offered to 
Eastern European countries’, Eastweek, 7 November 2012.
14 For a legal analysis, see K. Pieters, The Mediterranean Neighbours and the EU internal 
Market: A legal Perspective (The hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2010).
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lack of incentive is by offering neighbouring countries a real prospect of re-
gional integration. Inspired by projects such as the Energy Community Treaty, 
the European Common Aviation Area and the draft Transport Community Trea-
ty, the EU could explicitly inject ‘legally binding sectoral multilateralism’ into the 
ENP as a means to provide a tangible perspective of real long-term benefits 
from EU cooperation to Mediterranean partners and to reinvigorate the ENP 
for the next decade.15 The strong symbolism of such a well-defined project 
would enhance the political profile of EU relations with the southern neighbour-
hood where the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has faltered. While there is 
no silver bullet for EU engagement with the post-Arab Spring Mediterranean, 
the accession of Ukraine and Moldova to the Energy Community Treaty has 
already illustrated the potential of this approach in the Eastern Partnership.16
Another way to achieve those goals would be to increase the level of dif-
ferentiation between individual ENP partners. The ‘more for more’ and ‘less for 
less’ conditionality approaches lay the basis for a stronger differentiation be-
tween neighbouring countries, one not based on geographic criteria but on 
merit in individual performances. Ironically, the success of the revised approach 
would steer the EU further away from its constitutional obligation to create ‘an’ 
(i.e. a single) area of peace and prosperity that Article 8 TEU calls for.17 how-
ever, the revised strategy does not set out which precise cooperation and as-
sociation prospects might provide to the agents of reform in return for legal 
adaptation, administrative shake-ups and tightening belts. As said before, the 
EU continues to rely on the same instrument regardless of whether they are 
attractive to the recipient country. This applies to the bilateral ENP action plans, 
which may call for partly differentiated reform efforts at the micro level but which, 
due to their vagueness and the EU’s path dependency, fail to offer a framework 
for the implementation of fundamentally different policies. The same applies to 
the offer of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), the 
central component of the ‘more for more’ approach, whose structural distinc-
tions between EaP countries (compare the templates for, e.g., Ukraine and 
Moldova) and among southern Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Jordan, 
Egypt and Tunisia) remain to be explained by the European Commission. The 
fact that the EU claims to differentiate between neighbouring countries through 
a merits-based approach, but is instead pushing model characteristics in the 
DCFTAs, irrespective of different conditions in partner countries, serves to 
confirm accusations of duplicity levelled against the ENP over the years.18 
15 See S. Blockmans and B. Van Vooren, ‘Revitalizing the European ‘Neighbourhood Eco-
nomic Community’: The Case for Legally Binding Sectoral Multilateralism’, 17 European Foreign 
Affairs Review (2012), 577–604.
16 See S. Blockmans and B. Van Vooren, ‘Strengthening the Strategic Choice Offered to the 
EU’s Southern Mediterranean Neighbours’, CEPS Commentary, 7 February 2013.
17 For a legal commentary on the EU’s mandate under Article 8 TEU, see the contribution of 
Christophe hillion to his working paper.
18 See T. Schumacher, ‘New Neighbors, Old Formulas? The ENP One Year After the Start of 
the Arab Spring’, in A. Garcia Schmidt and J. Fritz-Vannahme (eds.), The Arab Spring: One Year 
After Transformation Dynamics, Prospects for Democratization and the Future of Arab-European 
Cooperation (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012), 87-104, at 92-3.
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Despite declarations to the contrary, the EU has continued its ‘one size fits all’ 
policy since the outbreak of revolutionary upheaval in the southern Mediter-
ranean. Arguably, prevailing conflicts of interest between Member States, among 
themselves and with the Commission, EEAS and EP, only lead to the continu-
ation of the lowest common denominator and affect the effectiveness and 
credibility of the revised ENP. Thus, much like earlier editions of the ENP strat-
egy paper, the implementation of the revised neighbourhood policy is hampered 
by a variety of inherent structural weaknesses and contradictions. These are 
especially evident in the area of political transformation and also apply upstream, 
when considering the binding language of Article 8 TEU.
3. MITIGATING ThE POTENTIALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
IMPACT OF “LESS FOR LESS”
The success of political reforms and democratic transformation in neighbouring 
countries is inextricably linked to improving the micro- and macro-economic 
situation, i.e. people’s living conditions. In the light of the prevailing socio-
economic problems in almost all Arab Mediterranean states, a concern about 
the implementation of the revised ENP therefore pertains to the potential ap-
plication of a “less for less” approach. Given that the reduction or cancellation 
of external support negatively impacts societal welfare, it is worth considering 
the option of partially detaching the application of negative ENP conditionality 
from those economic and social sectors that are most affected by structural 
(e.g. urban vs. rural; touristic coastal regions vs. agrarian interior) discrepan-
cies: transport, energy, communication, distribution of water, health care, and 
others.19 Arguably, negative conditionality does not have to apply to all policy 
fields. The logic of “more for more” and “less for less” could be more deftly 
evoked in those non-negotiable sectors in which reforms primarily affect the 
(abuse of the) power monopoly of the ruling authoritarian regime: political ac-
countability, independence of the judiciary and freedom of expression. Exclud-
ing certain socio-economic and humanitarian areas from the application of “less 
for less” may prevent potential veto players from exploiting socio-economic 
hardship to block those transformation processes already underway.20 Although 
the ENP is – in all but in constitutional vocation – based on the principle of 
differentiation, the application of negative conditionality is expendable in the 
above-mentioned areas, not only because it would generate more socio-eco-
nomic problems and contradictions without necessarily generating greater 
political and societal influence over local transition processes, but also because 
the basic socio-economic deficiencies are comparable in all Arab Mediterranean 
neighbouring states.
In sum, the revised ENP seems unsuitable as the sole agent for the imple-
mentation or support of democratic and socio-economic reforms and carries 
19 Ibid.
20 See N. Witney and A. Dworkin, ‘A Power Audit of EU-North Africa Relations’, ECFR, Sep-
tember 2012, at 58.
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the risk of counteracting the normative objective which the EU has pursued for 
the last decade, that of transforming the outer periphery into one area of peace 
and prosperity built on democratic principles. A bolder revision is needed if the 
EU is to make good on its own promises, as indeed the expectations from both 
neighbouring countries and strategic partners.
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ThE Union foR ThE MEdiTERRAnEAn:  
ChALLEngES And pRoSpECTS
José Manuel Cortés Martín and Gloria Fernández Arribas
1. A NEW ENTITY IN ORDER TO REINFORCE ThE BARCELONA 
PROCESS
The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is a new entity founded in July 2008 
aimed at improving the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This entity confirms 
the continuation of the Barcelona Process, launched in November 1995 with 
the objective of reinforcing its most successful elements.1 This multilateral 
partnership encompasses 43 countries from Europe and the Mediterranean 
basin: the 27 Member States of the European Union (EU) on the one hand, 
and 16 Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and 
the Western Balkans on the other. Among this group of 43 countries all EU 
Member States are included, even though most of them do not have a Mediter-
ranean character. Precisely, this diverse membership has been considered to 
be one of the main constraints the UfM has faced so far, due to the difficulties 
of reaching consensus between countries with so many different interests.2  
Promoting peace, stability and prosperity throughout the Mediterranean region 
are the objectives of this new entity, which are postulated on three main pillars3: 
(a) Equality among members within a context of strong co-ownership and 
effective joint action;
(b) A mostly inter governmental approach, based on traditional diplomacy and 
political realism; 
(c) A focus on selected economic and social projects, which present a trans-
versal and strategic perspective, and whose success is expected to rein-
force political dialogue and promote political cooperation.
Despite the interest raised by this organisation at its onset, its developments 
and results have been fairly modest up to date, and it has not come up with 
the desired outcomes yet. The reasons could surely be found in the European 
1 F. Granell Trias, ‘La Unión por el Mediterráneo como organisación internacional y como cat-
alizadora de cooperación europea’, 44 Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo (2013) Forth-
coming. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, doc. COM (2008) 319 
final, 20.5.2008, at 4; L. huici Sancho, ‘La participación de la Unión Europea en la Unión por el 
Mediterraneo’, 28 Revista General de Derecho Europeo (2012), at 6.
2 F. Bicchi, ‘The Union for the Mediterranean, or Changing Context of Euro-Mediterranean 
Relations’, 16 Mediterranean Politics (2011), at 9.
3 R. Aliboni and F.M. Ammor, ‘Under the Shadow of ‘Barcelona’: From the EMP to the Union 
for the Mediterranean’ 77 Euromesco Paper (2009), at 24.
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financial crisis or the revolutions emanating from the Arab Spring. Be that as it 
may, the idea behind the establishment of the UfM was a positive one – that 
of a high level partnership between the two shores of the Mediterranean. how-
ever it must be recognised that its endowment did not deliver the expected 
results, thus failing to fulfill its initial expectations.4 Given these moderate 
achievements, this paper will be focused on exploring the reasons of such an 
outcome, raising several questions as well as evaluating its future prospects.
First and foremost, it will be necessary to analyse the objectives of the UfM 
and the instruments at its disposal to accomplish these goals. Secondly, this 
reflection will address both the changes in the region as well as in the institu-
tional architecture of the EU and the UfM. To conclude, some hints about the 
capacity of action of this entity will be presented.
2. IS ThE UNION FOR ThE MEDITERRANEAN A REAL UNION?
Some authors have categorised the UfM as an International Organisation.5 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to observe that the UfM does not self-denominate 
like an International Organisation, but as a multilateral partnership.6 On the one 
hand, some misgivings remain about its real autonomy, even though, it is pos-
sible to affirm that the UfM is gradually becoming an international organisation. 
On the other hand, it is doubtful whether it could be categorised as such at the 
moment, at least, if the International Law Commission definition in the frame-
work of the responsibility of International Organisations7 is taken into consid-
eration. First of all, due to the fact that the UfM is the continuity of the 
Barcelona Process, it does not have a Founding Treaty. however it is worth 
stressing that in its Final Statement, while Ministers and delegates established 
the institutional architecture of the UfM and granted legal personality to the 
Secretariat,8 they did not bestow international legal personality to the whole 
entity as such. Moreover, the Final Statement established the UfM objectives, 
but no reference was made to the creation of an International Organisation 
whatsoever, which makes it difficult to consider that such an idea was the inten-
tion of the States. Secondly, the only entity the Statutes of the UfM is provide 
it with is the Secretariat, which incorporates the structure of an International 
4 Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Partnership 
for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. COM (2011) 200 final, 
8.3.2011, at 11.
5 F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1. 
6 “The Union for the Mediterranean is a multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the 
potential for regional integration and cohesion among Euro-Mediterranean partners”. http://www.
ufmsecretariat.org/en/who-we-are/
7 “International organisation” means an organisation established by a treaty or other instru-
ment governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality. Inter-
national organisations may include as members, in addition to States, other entities. Draft articles 
on the responsibility of international organisations, 2011.
8 “have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status”. Final Statement. Marseille, 
3-4 November 2008, at 5.
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Treaty. In this Treaty, the legal personality bestowed to the Secretariat in the 
Final Statement and in its Statutes,9 and the recognition of privileges and im-
munities10 mentioned in these legal texts, are elements that could allow the 
UfM to be considered as an International Organisation, but only in relation with 
its Secretariat.
Thirdly, in this respect, the Secretariat has signed a headquarters agreement 
with Spain, in which the latter recognised the legal personality of the former.11 
But this is internal personality, exclusively. Therefore it is difficult to affirm that 
the UfM has international legal personality or, that it is a mere permanent in-
tergovernmental conference or a conference of governments.
however, taking into account the implied powers doctrine, the UfM could 
acquire this nature as it goes in the exercise of its competences. In this direc-
tion, in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the case 
‘Reparation for injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations’ from 1949, 
the Court appeared to support the view that the legal personality of an or-
ganisation exists when: it has been given competences in order to achieve 
certain objectives; it exercises them; and, in particular, when such an exercise 
shows a separate will of the organisation.12
“The Organisation was intended to exercise and enjoy, and in fact is exercising and 
enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the pos-
session of a large measure of international personality.”13 
 9 Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean. Article 1. 
10 “A headquarters Agreement between Spain and the Secretariat will grant the Secretariat 
the privileges and immunities for carrying out its activities” Statutes of the Secretariat of the Union 
for the Mediterranean. Article 1. See also Final Statement. Marseille, 3-4 November 2008, at 7.
11 España reconoce la plena capacidad jurídica del Secretariado de la Unión por el Mediter-
ráneo para contratar, adquirir o enajenar bienes muebles e inmuebles, recibir y desembolsar 
fondos públicos y privados, y entablar acciones judiciales y/o realizar cualquier acto necesario 
para desempeñar sus obligaciones y cumplir sus objetivos. BOE Nº 145, 15/6/2010. The rest of 
the participant States are reluctant to recognise that legal personality. L. huici Sancho, supra n. 
1, at 12.
12 J.M. Cortés Martín, las Organisaciones internacionales: Codificación y Desarrollo Progre-
sivo de su Responsabilidad internacional (Sevilla, Instituto Andaluz de Administración Pública, 
2008), at 91.
13 ICJ, Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion 
11 April 1949, ICJ Rec. 1949, at 179. See C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the institutional law 
of international Organisations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1996); P.h.F. Bekker, 
The legal Position of international Organisations. A Functional Necessity. Analysis of Their legal 
Status and immunities, (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994); M. Bettati, 
‘Création et Personnalité Juridique des Organisations Internationales’, in R-J Dupuy, Manuel sur 
les Organisations internationales, (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998); 
J.M. Cortés Martín, supra n. 12.; G. Fernández Arribas, las capacidades de la Unión Europea 
como sujeto de Derecho internacional, (Granada, Educatori 2010); J Klabbers, ‘Presumptive Per-
sonality: The European Union in International Law’, in M Koskinniemi (ed.)., international law 
Aspects of the European Union (The hague, Kluwer International Law 1998); M Rama-Montaldo, 
‘International Legal Person and Implied Powers of International Organisations’, 44 The British 
Yearbook of international Organisations (1970), at 11; F Seyersted, ‘International Personality on 
Intergovernmental Organisations. Do their capacities really depend upon their constitutions?’, 4 
The indian Journal of international law (1964), at 1; F Seyersted, ‘Is the International Personality 
of Intergovernmental Organisations valid vis-à-vis Non-Members?’, 4 The indian Journal of inter-
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Consequently, it should be necessary to prove whether the UfM is effec-
tively exercising such a kind of functions and rights.14 Should this be the case, 
it could be appropriate to speak about the UfM as an International Organisation, 
something that at present times seems to be difficult to assert. Furthermore, 
concerning the nature of the UfM, it is worth mentioning that this entity has 
been conceptually referred to as a Union of projects,15 although some of its 
institutional developments point more to a Union of agencies. In this sense, 
the activities carried out by the UfM are in the framework of projects concern-
ing technical cooperation, although the objectives enshrined in its Statute are 
of political nature. Ultimately, the UfM has also been defined as an institution-
alised intergovernmental cooperation structure.16 
Regardless this complex set of definitions, it has been claimed that this 
entity is a first stage in the path towards a genuine political cooperation17. 
Besides, should the case be that the UfM finally develops projects that truly 
affect in a positive way the life of the population, it could be possible for the 
UfM entity to secure an effective political leverage. In general terms however, 
it seems that the beginning of defining a policy, in which the sequence and 
effectiveness of the instruments at stake, as well as the question of how they 
will be assigned to achieve its intermediate goals, remains unspecified.
The current state of affairs seems to demonstrate that the UfM could be 
perceived as an entity which does not take into account the reality of Mediter-
ranean region. This argument is based on the substantial differences to be 
found regarding the few shared interests and opposite aspirations between the 
countries on the two shores of the Mediterranean. For instance, Albania’s and 
Montenegro’s future are said to be within the EU family, while the same cannot 
be assumed for the North African countries. In addition, Monaco and Turkey 
(which initially did not even wish to be part of the UfM) or finally Mauritania and 
Slovenia may have quite rather divergent national interests so to say. The high 
number of participants has been criticised because of the difficulties of reach-
ing consensus. It has been noted, that, ‘by increasing the range of diverse 
interest that must be accommodated, it amplifies the need to focus on sub-
regional projects and the related impossibility to achieve any substantial result 
by a group of over 40 members’.18 In any case, it has been pointed out that the 
contrary option — including only European countries whose interests lie in the 
Mediterranean area — would have broken the focus of attention of the EU into 
two diverging directions: one directed towards the southern neighbourhood, 
national law, (1964) at 233; N. D. White, The law of international Organisations (huntingdon, 
N.Y. Juris Publishing; Manchester, Manchester University Press 2005).
14 It can be inferred that these rights come to manifest the capacity to operate upon interna-
tional plane. G. Fernández Arribas, supra n. 13, at 63.
15 F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
16 L. huici Sancho, supra n. 1, at 11.
17 Ibid. at 5.
18 F. Bicchi, supra n. 2, at 9.
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and other pointing to the East, thus undermining the role of the EU as a civil 
power in these geographic areas, respectively.19
Pertaining to the number of participants issue, the French proposal should 
be analysed. The proposal did not foresee the participation of all EU countries 
at the launching of a joint project or action. however, it included a model which 
tried to mitigate the consequences of the high number of eventual participants: 
the variable geometry method.20 This method allowed different degree of im-
plications by the participants depending on their interests in the projects or 
actions at stake. Nevertheless, the final decision for the approval of a project 
was subject to an agreement among all participants, which would have made 
the success of the UfM inevitably difficult .21
One of the immediate consequences of this architecture is that the UfM only 
keeps the appearance of a Union on one side of the Mediterranean, namely 
the EU: a proper union of States, that, most of times, speaking with one voice. 
On the other side, an agglomeration of States with complex or limited relations 
among themselves is to be observed; including certain countries of the south-
ern shore involved in internal conflicts, together with the different countries of 
the Adriatic Sea. As a result, it seems that this conglomerate of member coun-
tries does not correspond properly with the term Union. There are two radi-
cally different blocs, instead. As it has been stated: on the one hand, a real 
unity, the EU. On the other, a large number of countries with no real link between 
themselves and, consequently, no common voice to negotiate as a bloc.
This situation however could have found a turning point with the arrival of 
the new Secretary General in early 2012, who has expressed fresh, clear and 
tangible ideas. One of these new proposals includes the possibility of making 
a distinction between Western and Eastern Mediterranean countries, which 
are facing different realities and pursuing different goals. Mr. Fathallah Sijil-
massi, UfM’s Secretary General since February 2012, launched the idea of 
focusing the UfM’s work at the sub-regional level and making a broad distinc-
tion between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean countries from the south 
shore. The aim would be to take into account their specific constraints and 
particular problems, including political obstacles. Nonetheless, this division 
between East and West is not the only contrast among Southern-Mediterranean 
countries. In this regard some remarkable differences inside the sub-regions 
are to be observed. One example is the disparity of GDP/per capita among 
countries of the western area: Morocco (31 million population and €3,800 per 
capita), and Tunisia (10 million population and €6,800 per capita).22 Furthermore, 
some more divergences can be identified: in relation with their exports, integra-
tion of women in the labour market, education, etc. however, the main differ-
ences between them are the political transformations that have already taken 
place or, those which are meant to occur across the region. No distinction 
19 G. Escribano and L. Rodríguez, ‘After Partnership, Neighbourhoods and Advanced Sta-
tus… Who fears the Union for the Mediterranean?’ 21 Papeles de Europa (2010), at 32.
20 L. huici Sancho, supra n. 1, at 5
21 Ibid., at 29.
22 F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
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between West and East can be made here, since these political upheavals are 
taking place in both parts of the region. As a valid example, the cases of Tuni-
sia or Syria can be mentioned. In addition, there are some conflictive areas 
that could be complicating the activity of the UfM. Indeed, the Middle East 
conflict has come to affect the UfM’s agenda.23
The proposal of the Secretary General could be probably the first step for 
an effective application of the variable geometry method: the number of coun-
tries participating in projects will vary in line with their real interest in those 
specific ventures. The problem remains however, as it would be still necessary 
to count with the green light of all members in order to implement these actions.
3. ARE ThE AIMS OF ThIS UNION CLEAR? 
As has been stated the main objectives of the UfM are the establishment of 
peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean countries. however, these 
objectives are rooted in the particular interests of the EU in some areas as 
security, migration or energy.24 These interests, however, might be distant to 
the specific interests of the South-Mediterranean countries. For example, the 
Arab countries are developing relations amongst themselves which, in many 
cases, bear no relation to their Mediterranean shoreline. In this context, the 
position of the countries of the other side of the Mediterranean differs greatly 
from the aspirations held on the EU side. 
For the achievement of the UfM’s political objectives, technical projects in 
six priority areas have been established: (1) de-pollution of the Mediterranean; 
(2) maritime and land highways; (3) civil protection; (4) alternative energies, 
like the Mediterranean Solar Plan; (5) higher education and research, like the 
Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) project; and (6) the Mediterranean 
Business Development Initiative.25 It has been accepted that the development 
of the region can foster democracy and good governance and, consequently, 
it would lead the region to peace and stability. Nevertheless, advances on 
projects of technical nature exclusively, without a political strategy accompany-
ing them do not guarantee the success of the UfM. The EU has been acting in 
this area throughout several decades, providing tailor-made plans for each 
country, and also by the means of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Assessing its results, the EU has been some-
how involved in the region without getting important political changes in those 
countries. Therefore, the economic problems of the Southern Mediterranean 
23 F. Bicchi, supra n. 2, at 11-12.
24 F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1; Bicchi, supra n. 2, at 4.
25 Final Statement. Marseille, 3-4 November 2008. Together with the projects that the UfM 
has approved, there are some areas where the UfM should focus its activities. Rural develop-
ment is considered for experts and scholars one of the priority areas due to half of the population 
depends on farming so it is necessary “to modernize the agriculture and prepare for it competi-
tion”; and also strengthening the small and medium size company should be one of the main 
initiatives of the UfM with the objective of improving business productivity. See G. Escribano and 
L. Rodríguez, supra n. 19, at 35-37.
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countries still persist, also due to the existence of deep structural problems. As 
a consequence, the impact of the EU’s cooperation policies has been lowered, 
thus making political dialogue necessary. 
however, political dialogue is not the only method to move forward, since 
the mentioned projects are also crucial to the development of the growth po-
tential of the Mediterranean countries. Nevertheless, several questions can be 
raised in relation to these projects:
Firstly, it seems doubtful if there are synergies between the projects designed 
by the Union for the Mediterranean and those featuring in the objectives of the 
EU’s policy for the Mediterranean. The UfM is neither part of the EU’s develop-
ment and cooperation policy nor of the European Neighbourhood Policy.26 
however, the UfM is acting in the same area where these EU’s policies are 
performing their activities. Therefore, from this perspective, it seems necessary 
to increase the interaction between the actors, aimed at establishing a closer 
relationship with the European institutions. In this direction, the UfM could be 
more in line with the institutional policies that affect the Mediterranean, thus 
creating synergies. As a matter of fact, the EU as a whole fulfills the co-presi-
dency of the UfM since 2012.27 Thus, it will be necessary to coordinate its 
activities in order to avoid the overlapping of projects and areas of performance.
Secondly, as stated above, political and economic development must go 
hand in hand. Democracy and involvement of civil society into the political life 
will not materialise without improvement in the population’s socio-economic 
situation. The recent transformations in the Mediterranean countries, namely 
riots, upheavals and changes of government, have demonstrated again that 
economic aid itself does not have an impact on the population. It does not 
contribute to the real development of the country either, nor to peace, security 
or stability. For that reason, the UfM must contribute through its cooperative 
instruments to the consolidation of democracy and lasting stability in all the 
Southern Mediterranean countries. To accomplish this, it is imperative to 
strengthen the cooperation with Mediterranean partners and their civil societies, 
who have chosen the road to democracy and who expect significant support, 
particularly in financial terms, from the European Union.
The clarification of aims and competences of the UfM, considering the im-
plications of the new political changes across the Mediterranean, and the ne-
cessity of a renewed approach to the region, which ought to take into account 
civil society and its preferences,28 will allow the UfM to play the role of a cata-
lyst to help and support the ongoing process of reconstruction and transforma-
26 But half of the budget of the UfM come from the European Commission’s budget of Neigh-
bourhood Policy. See F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
27 Concerning the EU institutions and organs which assumes this task see Conclusions of the 
Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the Northern 
Co-Presidency of the UfM, doc. 6981/12, 27 February 2012; and infra n. 45, at. 10.
28 “The dynamics of not dealing with relevant issues in order not to bother MPCs governments 
(democracy, human rights, institutional and economic reforms, civil society…) nor EU’s sensitive 
sectors (agriculture, labour movements, funding increases…) to focus on EU’s Member States 
immediate interests (energy, environment, university education) is not sustainable in the long 
run”, G. Escribano and L. Rodríguez, supra n. 19, at 39.
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tion in the region. Last but not least, it is important to ensure that the UfM will 
not be kept to be used by the Mediterranean elites as an instrument to retain 
power.29
4. hAVE All FACTORS BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION?
The EU’s vision has been somewhat illusory and possibly even a bit self-
centered as regards the possible future transitions of these countries.30 The 
EU has promised to support countries which make a serious commitment to 
democracy. however in practice, not so long ago the EU was demanding these 
countries to adopt ‘European society values’, with the principles and beliefs 
that this entails. In this regard Article 8 TEU can be highlighted, that calls for 
the respect of European values as a condition for participating in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. These requirements have been linked with the policy 
of conditionality that could provide the EU with a very important instrument to 
promote democratic changes in the partner countries. But this policy has had 
a limited application.31 This is particularly true in the Euromed relations, where 
this policy has been characterised for being ineffective, arguing that its agenda 
focused basically on security and trade.32
The UfM does not intend to change this practice. however, the Paris Dec-
laration does not contain references to conditionality. Even though its objective 
is to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social 
and cultural understanding, it is stated that this should be ‘accomplished on 
the basis of equality and mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty.’33 Taking 
into account that the conditionality policy has been viewed as an asymmetric 
relationship34 this reference to ‘equality’ brings the idea of the elimination of 
conditions. This lack of conditions can be observed on the projects of the UfM, 
where no conditionality has been imposed in order to develop them.
29 Ibid. at 34. The recent European Commission Communication concerning ‘A partnership 
for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’ could be an important 
proposal and way of action for the new approaching to the Mediterranean region. In this sense 
the Communication, among economic or trade objectives, introduces the democracy and institu-
tion building objective, based on: expanding support to civil society; establishing a Civil Society 
Neighbourhood Facility, and support Social Dialogue Forum. These objectives must be assumed 
and implement by the UfM in order to accomplish its mission, see COM(2011) 200 final, 8.3.2011. 
30 Concerning the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean countries see. A. Blanc 
Altemir, La Unión Europea y el mediterráneo. De los primeros acuerdos a la primavera árabe 
(Madrid, Tecnos, 2012)
31 In this sense, the European Parliament has expressed its concern because of violation of 
human rights in some of these countries and the narrow response of the EU, and as an exam-
ple, in 2002 the European Parliament demanded to suspend the EU-Israel Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreement because of the activities of Israel in the Palestinian territories getting 
a negative answer from the Council. European Parliament Resolution on the Middle East, 
P5_TA(2002)0173. 10/04/2002.
32 A. El Maslouhi, ‘Une conditionnalité dépourvue d’effectivité: clause démocratique et ges-
tion des risques dans les relations Euromed’, 1 EuroMeSCo Paper (2011) at 10.
33 Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris 13 July 2008, at 9.
34 A. El Maslouhi, supra n. 32, at 10 -15.
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Despite the characteristically limited success of this conditionality policy, its 
elimination from the UfM framework will create obstacles to demand the fulfill-
ment of requirements in terms of democracy and respect for human rights. This 
proves again that the UfM seems to be focused on economic matters without 
paying special attention to the social demands of the population.
Proceeding with the analysis of factors affecting the Euro-Mediterranean 
relations, it is also necessary to remark the weight of traditions, mainly religious 
ones. In this respect, the EU has been somewhat disappointed to realise that 
the population of these countries has largely voted on the basis of their own 
religious beliefs and traditions. This has driven Islamic political parties to pow-
er, generating a sense of mistrust among European countries. These transfor-
mations, however, seem to present a new opportunity for the European Union 
to back a real democratic change in these countries, although it is important to 
mention that the outcomes could be unpredictable at the moment, owing to the 
absence of political culture and of new political leaders in the region.35
5. IN-DEPTh GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ChANGES
Concerning this question, it is necessary to focus on the role of the UfM in the 
present context. The global environment has changed substantially since the 
Paris Summit of 2008, as both areas of the Mediterranean basin, North and 
South, have been the subject of a radical transformation. In the North, the EU’s 
room of maneuver is restricted by the limitations arising from the economic 
crisis, in particular since 2008. It has neither the resources or the determination 
to make any further commitments to countries on the Southern shore of the 
Mediterranean. In this difficult budgetary context, it seems essential to achieve 
more with less, and to determine priorities clearly, especially those actions that 
could contribute to the economic recovery and tackling high unemployment. 
One should also take into account that the UfM’s attempt to address the prob-
lems of the Mediterranean region with less financial resources than those of 
the cooperation policy of the EU is a utopia.36
In any case and despite the difficulties, it seems that in order to achieve this 
objective, the European Commission’s overall approach concerning the eco-
nomic and financial dimensions of the European Neighbourhood Policy goes 
in the right direction in particular with the launching of the Neighbourhood In-
vestment Facility.37 Moreover, the idea of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Invest-
ment Bank38 has been mentioned, but the current financial crisis makes the 
implementation of this project quite a difficult one. On the one hand, according 
35 F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
36 Ibid. 
37 It is financial mechanism aimed at mobilising additional funding to cover the investment 
needs of the EU Neighbouring region for infrastructures in sectors such as transport, energy, the 
environment and social issues (e.g. construction of schools or hospitals). The NIF also supports 
the private sector particularly through risk capital operations targeting Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises. 
38 G. Escribano and L. Rodríguez, supra n. 19, at 38.
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to the mentioned projects of the European Commission, it could be observed 
that the EU is increasing the level of funds allocated to the Mediterranean 
partner countries. This could be interpreted as a way of incorporating in its 
portfolio the needs arising from the Arab Spring and the consequences of the 
economic crisis. As a matter of fact, half of the funding of the UfM in 2011 came 
from the European Commission.39 On the other hand, it looks like the Euro-
Mediterranean region suffers from a lack of investors’ confidence. Even though 
one of the objectives included in the French proposal was to gather private 
funding to develop projects,40 the success of this initiative has been limited. It 
is necessary to bear in mind that there are only some projects that could ben-
efit from private funding, as energy or public services; while others as civil 
service reform need the allocation of public funding.41 In this framework, it 
seems that confidence can only be achieved by improving the economic and 
legal environment through major structural reforms, in order to make the region 
more attractive. To this end the use of public funding needs to be materialised.
In relation with the southern basin, the so-called Arab Spring has created a 
new political reality that has brought winds of democracy to the front line of 
politics. At the same time, it requires urgently the dutiful management of the 
transition processes and quick responses to the needs of the population. There-
fore, the relations between the EU and the countries of the Southern shore of 
the Mediterranean cannot leave aside and ignore the new reality. Particularly, 
it is necessary to take into account some concrete factors that may determine 
the political character of the region despite the latest events: 
(a) The links between the countries of this Southern shore and the rest of the 
Arab world; 
(b) The growth of Turkey’s presence and importance in the region as a geo-
political actor has also affected the UfM’s activity. Worth mentioning is the 
opposition of Greece and Cyprus to a Turkish candidate for the post of 
Deputy Secretary General in the UfM’s Secretariat.42
(c) Finally, the Arab–Israeli conflict has politicised and disrupted the agenda 
of the UfM, as national interests have come to the forefront and democ-
racy and human rights have come to a second place.43
Mediterranean countries also need to send a positive message to Europe. They 
are not external partners similar to the rest of countries which have a relation-
ship with de EU; they are natural partners, instead. Due to the geographical 
proximity, they are linked commercially, economically and in human terms. In 
fact, the majority of migrants coming from these countries do indeed live in 
Europe. As a matter of fact, migration movements, the colonial past or the 
39 Together with the European funding the UfM has also received public funding from the 
World Bank and the Gulf countries. See F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1.
40 L. huici Sancho, supra n. 1, at 6.
41 G. Escribano and L. Rodríguez, supra n. 19, at 38.
42 F. Bicchi, supra n. 2, at 14.
43 Ibid. at 11-13.
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geographical proximities have been some of the reasons for the implication of 
the EU with these southern Mediterranean countries.44
6. IMPACT OF RECENT EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONAL 
INNOVATIONS ON ThE UNION FOR ThE MEDITERRANEAN 
The evolution of the EU’s institutional architecture has also had a remarkable 
influence on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Indeed, the UfM is now di-
rectly connected to the European institutions, as a result of the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
Concerning this aspect, the northern co-Presidency of the UfM has been 
transferred to the EU as a whole, in line with the Lisbon Treaty objectives. In 
other words, instead of EU Member States exercising the northern UfM co-
Presidency individually, this task has been entrusted to the EU in its entirety. 
At the moment the co-Presidency is held by the EU and Jordan. According to 
the Conclusions adopted by the EU Foreign Affairs Council, the high Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, 
will take over the co-presidency for meetings of Foreign Ministers. The Euro-
pean Commission will take over for Ministerial Meetings that solely concern 
matters falling within areas of exclusive EU competence. For other Ministerial 
Meetings, the Commission will also do so, in cooperation with the Member 
State holding the rotating Presidency of the EU Council, except when such 
meetings deal exclusively with matters falling within the scope of actions and 
responsibilities of the Member states. Should this be the case, then the chair 
will be held by the rotating presidency only. The EU’s External Action Service 
will take over the UfM’s northern co-Presidency for Senior Official Meetings.45 
This internal set-up gives a clear illustration of the European Union’s central 
role in the UfM. Enhancing the role of the EU and elevating its profile in the 
governance of the UfM means that the former, by means of its European Neigh-
bourhood Policy, will provide greater support to specific UfM projects.
Despite these institutional innovations in the EU, it remains doubtful wheth-
er this new supranational approach will be enough to overcome the standstill 
of the UfM. The paralysis of the co-Presidency and the election of programmes 
motivated by States’ preferences, instead of by populations needs have been 
criticised; as well as the UfM’s complex and oversized structure, regarding its 
functions and objectives.46 Other critics point to the Secretary General, which 
is considered to be a politicised organ. In this respect, tensions between States 
have also arisen, culminating in the election of six deputy Secretaries. The 
great difficulties presented by the election of the Secretary General also dem-
onstrated the States’ reservations and misgivings.47
44 F. Granell Trias, supra n. 1; F. Bicchi, supra n. 2, at 4.
45 Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States on the Northern Co-Presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 27 de febrero de 
2012, doc. 6981/12 MED 9 PESC 245. 
46 G. Escribano and L. Rodríguez, supra n. 19, at 39.
47 Ibid. at 31.
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7. FINAL REMARKS
This paper has asserted that the UfM still faces problems that do not enable it 
to accomplish its objectives. however, one must recognise the success of the 
projects and joint actions approved and implemented so far, i. e.: the de-pol-
lution of the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean Solar Plan, the Trans-Maghreb 
Motorway axis, or the EMUNIU University in Slovenia.48
Nevertheless, in spite of these activities, it is not possible to properly talk 
about an international organisation regarding the UfM, although its Secretariat 
may seem to incorporate some characteristics of an international organisation. 
Be that as it may, the most harmful constraint affecting the action of the UfM 
is the lack of internal unity, due to the presence of different countries with di-
verging interests. The difficulties of the UfM do not lie in its objectives per se, 
but in the implementation and the approach that ought to be taken to reach 
them. As this reflection has laid out, the objectives of the UfM are peace, stabil-
ity and prosperity, attaching to all of them a political as well as a social char-
acter. The activities of the UfM, however, are focused on economic matters 
leaving apart the political and social dimensions. Once again, this is not the 
right approach. Otherwise, it must have been wrongly assumed that the eco-
nomic success will exclusively bring the desired political and social changes. 
In any case, it is worth pointing out that the elimination of the policy of condi-
tionality in the UfM’s framework will complicate the process of obtaining the 
necessary changes to really improve the lives of the population.
Implementing these objectives is not the only problem that the UfM needs 
to tackle. The UfM has to take into consideration other factors that come to 
complicate the difficult relationship between its members, like their religious 
traditions. In the broader context and importantly, the economic crisis and the 
Arab Spring have also imposed several hurdles to the work of the UfM. The 
budgetary limitations, despite the efforts taken by the European Commission 
to allocate more funds to these projects, will affect the success of the UfM. 
Furthermore, private investors’ lack of confidence, as a result of the region’s 
political instability after the riots and upheavals, will surely not contribute to the 
improvement of the work of the UfM. The action of the UfM is orchestrated by 
an institutional structure that has been defined as complex and oversized, which 
come again to hinder the activities of the UfM. It is therefore necessary to stress 
that the complicated representation of the EU in the UfM will hardly improve 
this situation. Despite the complexity of this scenario, on both sides of the 
Mediterranean basin, the necessity of creating a beneficial relationship has 
been assumed, because of its potential for economic growth, its economic 
complementarities, its energy market and human exchanges. As a result, the 
Union for the Mediterranean has the potential to become more useful, relevant 
and necessary than ever. It may be an appropriate tool to improve the new 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
48 22 million euros to de-pollution of the Mediterranean; 5 millions euros to the solar plant; 7,5 
millions euros to the Trans-Maghreb Motorway Axis; and 1 million euros to the Euro-Mediterrane-
an University. A. El Maslouhi, supra n. 32, at 23.
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Priorities and methods need to be amended and adapted, however, in order 
to search for the possible synergies between the UfM’s projects and the EU 
policy for the Mediterranean. Therefore, important decisions and steps have 
to be taken in the right direction. After having agreed upon procedures, institu-
tions and headquarter’s location, the UfM has to abandon the Eurocentric 
diplomatic bargaining exercise and incorporate a renewed approach urgently. 
This approach should concentrate on: (i) implementing the selected projects 
effectively; (ii) extending its scope of action to more significant domains for the 
Mediterranean countries and its population; and (iii) posing a credible and 
recognisable final goal that allows economic agents to effectively fulfill their 
expectations.
Finally, it is necessary to remark once again that even though the intergov-
ernmental method has largely prevailed in the Euro-Mediterranean relations, 
the European Union is exercising the northern co-Presidency. This puts an end 
to the intergovernmental approach followed so far, giving a new perspective of 
action to the UfM.
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The term ‘region’ is a polysemous concept. ‘historically, the concept of the 
region has evolved primarily as a space between the national and the local 
level within a particular State. These types of regions are referred to as sub-
national regions or micro-regions.’1 however, the very same concept ‘can also 
refer to macro-regions, which are larger territorial units or subsystems, between 
the State level and the global system level such as the EU’.2 The present paper 
focuses on the latter understanding of the term, by mainly asking whether the 
EU policies towards the Southern Mediterranean do aim at building such a 
macro-region.
It is important to reply to this question not least because some of the most 
prominent scholars of regionalism have consistently argued that one of ‘EU’s 
main foreign policy objectives is to […] promote a world order where regions 
gain increasing legitimacy as actors in international affairs’.3 In other words, 
fostering region-building and promoting inter-regionalism are really crucial in-
gredients of the EU’s foreign policy. Evidence of such view can be found in 
statements of EU officials and documents of Union institutions where the will 
and intention to use the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a medium 
for region-building has been declared. In fact, the establishment of an eco-
nomic community emerging between the EU and its ENP partners is the long-
term goal of the Neighbourhood Policy.4 Such a vision was very much present 
from the beginning of this endeavour as Solana and Patten were foreseeing ‘a 
gradually evolving framework for an economic and political space surrounding 
the Union, which would nevertheless stop short of full membership or creating 
shared institutions’.5 Similarly, the then president of the Commission Romano 
Prodi clarified, in a speech on December 2002, that the ENP concept ‘sharing 
everything but the institutions’ does not exclude the possibility of developing 
1 P. De Lombaerde, F. Söderbaum, L. Van Langehove and F. Baert, ‘The Problem of Com-
parison in Comparative Regionalism’, 36 Review of international Studies 2010, 731-753, at 736.
2 Ibid.
3 F. Söderbaum, P. Stålgren and L. Van Langenhove, ‘The EU as a Global Actor and the 
Dynamics of Interregionalism: a Comparative Analysis’ 27 Journal of European integration 2005, 
365-380, at 373.
4 European Union, Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, COM 
(2006) 726, 4 December 2006; European Union, A New Response to a Changing Neighbour-
hood, Brussels, COM (2011) 303, 25 May 2011. 
5 Solana-Patten letter on Wider Europe, 7 August 2002, available at <ec.europa.eu/world/
enp/pdf/_0130163334_001_en.pdf>.
76
CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2013/3 Skoutaris
new structures with our neighbours at a later stage, if necessary.6 hence, it 
seems that there is an understanding among EU political elites that has also 
been reflected in academia: ‘if the ENP is to develop into something substan-
tial and long-term, thought needs to be given to the nature of its own institu-
tional framework, and in particular whether to maintain the bilateral approach 
[...] or to seek to establish either a two-pillar approach (like the EEA) or a mul-
tilateral/regional framework (like the Barcelona Process)’.7
The aim of the proposed paper is exactly to problematise the view according 
to which the EU ‘promotes a world order where regions gain increasing legiti-
macy as actors in international affairs,’8 by focusing on whether the Union does 
foster in reality region-building through the overlapping policy frames of ENP, 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EuroMed) and the Union for the Mediterra-
nean (UfM). The thesis of the paper is that, firstly, the chiefly bilateral character 
of the ENP questions the region-building dimension of this policy. Secondly, 
the ENP multilateral dimension with regard to the Mediterranean area, consist-
ing mainly out of overlapping policy frames of EuroMed and the UfM, could be 
better understood in sub-regionalist (marked by dependence of countries on 
the fringe of Europe on the EU) rather than inter-regional (an interaction between 
supposedly diplomatic equals) terms.9 
To achieve its aim, the paper discusses the term ‘region’ and questions 
whether the Mediterranean basin could be understood as such. having estab-
lished tensions between the definition and the political and historical reality, it 
then analyses the different overlapping policy frameworks that exist with regard 
to the Mediterranean. In particular, the paper focuses on the ENP instruments 
and methodologies for region-building including the aforementioned multilat-
eral initiatives of EuroMed and UfM and the new Neighbourhood Initiative. In 
the last part, the paper shows that the ENP multilateral dimension could be 
better understood in sub-regionalist rather than inter-regional terms. Such a 
critique is coupled by an analysis that sheds light on the tension between region-
building and inter-regionalism.
2. ThE MEDITERRANEAN AS A MACRO-REGION?
In order to examine whether the overlapping policy frameworks of ENP, EuroMed 
and the UfM indeed foster region-building in the Mediterranean, we should first 
define the term ‘region’ and examine whether the Mediterranean area falls 
under the definition. Contested as the term ‘region’ may be, it seems that in 
order to be characterised as such, a certain group of States must present a 
6 R. Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability’, Brussels, 
SPEECh/02/619.
7 M. Cremona and C. hillion, ‘l’Union fait la force? Potential and limits of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy as an integrated EU foreign and security policy’, European University institute 
law Working Paper No 39 (2006), at 18. 
8 F. Söderbaum et al. supra note 3, at 373. 
9 M. Comelli, ‘Sub-regional Cooperation around the Mediterranean and the role of the EU’ 15 
European Foreign Affairs Review 2010, 385-401, at 394.
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certain geographical proximity. however, it seems that geographical relationship 
and territorial contiguity are necessary but not sufficient conditions in order to 
call a group of States a ‘macro-region’. A degree of mutual interdependence 
should also be exhibited.10 Such degree of interdependence could vary between 
different fields. In fact, Nye distinguished between political integration (the 
formation of a transnational political system), economic integration (the forma-
tion of a transnational economy) and social integration (the formation of a 
transnational society).11 By the same token, a number of scholars have em-
phasised the function of regions either as integrated market places12 or as 
political ideas and administrative units.13 Finally, some have also stressed the 
characteristics of cultural homogeneity,14 sense of community15 or ‘regionness’.16 
Overall, ‘regions’ consist of a number of geographically proximate countries 
that are perceived as having a certain internal coherence in social, economic, 
political, linguistic and or institutional terms.17
So, the question is whether the Mediterranean basin could fall under such 
definition. Starting from the geographical component, it is clear that the States 
around the Mediterranean Sea are geographically proximate countries. Still, it 
seems that under the different EU policy frameworks, the geographical limits 
of the region are far from clear. In 1995, the Barcelona conference brought 
together the then 15 EU Member States with 12 invited ‘Mediterranean partners’: 
Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestin-
ian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Almost 10 years later, the newly 
launched ENP obviously did not include Cyprus and Malta that meanwhile 
became EU Member States but also excluded Turkey, because Turkey is a 
candidate for EU accession. Libya, which was not invited to participate at the 
moment of the Barcelona Declaration because it was under a UN sanctions 
regime, was also added to the catalogue of the ENP countries.18 Finally, when 
during the French presidency of 2008, Sarkozy relaunched EuroMed as the 
10 J. S. Nye, Peace in Parts. integration and Conflict in Regional Organisation (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company 1971), at vii.
11 Ibid., at 26-27.
12 J. Bhagwati, ‘Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview’ in J. de Melo and A. Pana-
gariya (eds.), New Dimensions in Regional integration (New York: Cambridge University Press 
1993), at 22; E. D. Mansfield and h. V. Milner, ‘The New Wave of Regionalism’ 53 international 
Organization 1999, 589-627.
13 T. A. Börzel, L. Goltermann, M. Lohaus and K. Striebinger (eds.), Roads to Regionalism: 
Concepts, issues and Cases (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate 2012).
14 B. Russett, international Regions and the international System. A Study in Political Ecology 
(Chicago: Rand-MacNally 1967).
15 K. W. Deutsch, S. A. Burrell and R. A. Kann, Political Community and the North Atlantic 
Area: international Organization in the light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press 1957). 
16 B. hettne and F. Söderbaum, ‘Theorising the Rise of Regionness’ 5 New Political Economy 
2000, 457-474.
17 E. Johansson, ‘Subregionalization in Europe’s Periphery: The Baltic and Mediterranean 
Dimensions of EU’s Foreign Policy’, Institut Universitari d’ Estudis Europeus, Quaderns de Treball 
2000/36, 9-10. 
18 P. J. Cardwell, ‘EuroMed, European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediter-
ranean: Overlapping Policy Frames in the EU’s Governance of the Mediterranean’, 49 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 2011219-241, at 225.
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‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’, Albania, Bosnia-herzegov-
ina, Croatia, Mauritania, Monaco and Montenegro were also invited to sign the 
joint Paris Declaration apart from the 27 EU Member-States and the original 
Barcelona Declaration partner States’.19 
But it is not only the territorial scope of the different policy frameworks that 
questions whether the Mediterranean is a region as a whole. The extent of the 
political, economic and cultural differences between the different groups of 
Mediterranean States have made some commentators argue that the basin is 
‘more of a frontier’ than a region.20 ‘Arab countries are Arab before they are 
Mediterranean; similarly, Southern European countries are European first and 
then Mediterranean.’21 Despite its exaggerating tone, such aphorism sheds 
light on the fact that characteristics such as the cultural homogeneity, the sense 
of community and the ‘regionness’ might not be present in the region in ques-
tion. having noted that, the next issue that we have to discuss is whether the 
overlapping policy frameworks of the EU intend to and could create a region 
characterised by mutual interdependence in political and economic terms. The 
thesis of the paper is that on the one hand the ENP has very few elements of 
region-building while the EuroMed and the UfM are better understood as sub-
regionalist frameworks in the sense that they are marked by the dependence 
of the non-EU Mediterranean countries on the EU.
3. ThE EU POLICY FRAMES TOWARDS ThE MEDITERRANEAN 
AREA
3.1. The barcelona process
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was officially launched in 1995. The then 
15 EU Member States and the 12 invited ‘Mediterranean partners’ signed the 
Barcelona Declaration that signified their agreement ‘to establish a compre-
hensive partnership […] through strengthened political dialogue on a regular 
basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater 
emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension’.22 In order to achieve 
this aim, the EuroMed was structured around three main dimensions (‘baskets’ 
of co-operation) which remain today as the broad working areas of the partner-
ship under the UfM umbrella: political and security dialogue, economic and 
financial partnership and social, cultural and human partnership. Under the 
framework of each ‘basket’, general and sectorial ministerial meetings were 
taking place at least on an annual basis. The work programme of those minis-
terial conferences was prepared by the EuroMed committee, which is comprised 
19 Ibid., at 229.
20 M. Comelli, supra note 9, at 389 quoting S. Calleya, ‘European Union Policy towards the 
Mediterranean: The Euro-Med Partnership and Region Building’, paper presented at the confer-
ence ‘The Convergence of Civilisations? Constructing a Mediterranean Region’ (Lisbon, 6-9 June 
2002).
21 Ibid.
22 Barcelona Declaration available at <http://tinyurl.com/8dj2ydt>.
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of senior officials from both sides. Finally, the multilateral dimension of this 
initiative was also underlined by the existence of the EuroMed Parliamentary 
Assembly, the EuroMed Civil Forum and the Anna Lindh Foundation for the 
Dialogue of Cultures.
Next to the progressive institutionalisation of the multilateral cooperation, it 
is also important to note for the purposes of the present paper that the Barce-
lona Process envisaged the creation of a vast Euro-Mediterranean free trade 
area for the exchange of goods, services and capital between the EU and the 
non-EU Southern Mediterranean countries. Such a free trade area was pro-
claimed to be achieved by 2010. According to the Barcelona Declaration, it 
would have been established through the new EuroMediterranean Association 
Agreements and free trade agreements between Mediterranean countries 
themselves. however, the establishment of such a free trade area has been 
challenged as ‘unrealistic and even counter-productive’,23 while at the same 
time it has been questioned whether it would actually result in improved eco-
nomic performance for the region.24
Despite those criticisms, it is noted that the EuroMed appears to ‘demonstrate 
the EU’s preference for multilateral, region-based frameworks’.25 The asym-
metrical relationship between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean partners 
in both political and economic terms, however, undermines the interregional 
characteristics of this policy framework. To put it differently, it is recalled that 
interregionalism is marked by the interaction among supposedly diplomatic 
equals. however, in the case of the multilateral dimension of EuroMed, the 
Commission and the Council act as ‘central points’ channeling the interests of 
the EU Member States. But no such channeling exists on the other side, since 
the non-EU Mediterranean partners have not formed a fora that would allow 
for something similar. It is even questionable that they should consist of a co-
herent regional grouping of States, as we pointed out in the previous section. 
It seems rather that the strong bilateral dimension of the EuroMed combined 
with a multilateral dimension dominated by the strong presence of the EU sug-
gests the creation of a relationship that is characterised by the dependence of 
the Southern Mediterranean countries from the Union.
3.2. Enp
Before the tenth anniversary of EuroMed, the EU officially launched the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy in 2003 as a new framework of its relations with a 
number of neighbouring countries, including most Southern Mediterranean 
23 R. Balfour and A. Missiroli, ‘Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European 
Policy Centre (EPC), issue Paper No 54 (2007), at 7, available at <http://www.epc.eu/documents/
uploads/963724382_EPC%20Issue%20Paper%2054%20-%20Reassessing%20the%20ENP.
pdf>.
24 D. Müller-Jentsch, ‘Economic Prospects for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: deeper 
Integration and Trade in Services’, World Bank and European Commission Programme on Pri-
vate Participation in Mediterranean Infrastructure, PPMi Paper (2003), at 3. See the contribution 
of K. Pieters on liberalisation through free trade agreements later in this volume.
25 P. J. Cardwell, supra note 18, at 231.
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ones. In fact the only EuroMed partner State that is not covered by the ENP is 
Turkey, which is candidate for EU accession. The ENP’s genesis, however, 
could be traced back to the later stages of the ‘Big-bang’ Enlargement process. 
References to a more substantive ‘proximity policy’ were contained in Strategy 
Papers attached to the pre-accession country reports in 2001 and 2002, in a 
joint position paper in the form of a letter from Javier Solana and Chris Patten26 
and in a speech made in December 2002 by the then President of the Com-
mission, Romano Prodi. In this speech Prodi referred to a proximity policy based 
on ‘mutual benefits and obligations, which is a substantial contribution by the 
EU to global governance’.27 he also underlined the link between Enlargement 
and ENP by mentioning that the new policy was to be based on the idea that 
‘accession was not the only game in town’. ‘We have to be prepared to offer 
more than partnership and less than the membership’. The overall long-term 
goal of this new policy is to create a ‘ring of friends’ in the periphery of the 
enlarged Union by incorporating the neighbours into an EU-led economic re-
gion.28 
Despite the existence of a long-term goal that points to region-building, the 
ENP is chiefly a bilateral process that involves the EU on the one side and the 
relevant partner country on the other. This is apparent if one looks at the 
mechanism that the Union has used in order to realise the vision of an increas-
ingly closer relationship with the neighbouring countries and a zone of stability, 
security and prosperity for all. At the outset of the process, the Commission 
had to prepare Country Reports analysing the political and economic situation 
in every partner State as well as institutional and sectoral aspects. It did so in 
order to assess when and how it is possible to deepen relations with the rel-
evant country. The next stage was the development of ENP Action Plans with 
each country. Those are non-binding instruments that are agreed between the 
EU and the ENP States. They are tailor-made for each country based on the 
country’s needs and capacities as well as their and EU’s interests. In those 
Action Plans, the EU and the partner States jointly define an agenda of political 
and economic reforms by means of short and medium-term priorities pointing 
to the ‘joint ownership’ character of the ENP. The incentives on offer in return 
for progress on relevant reforms are greater integration into European pro-
grammes and networks, increased assistance and enhanced market access. 
The implementation of the mutual commitments and objectives contained in 
the Action Plans is regularly monitored through sub-committees with each 
country, dealing with those sectors or issues.29
The nature and structure of the Action Plans underline the fact that the ENP 
is mainly a framework of soft law. however, the relationship with its Southern 
26 Solana-Patten letter on Wider Europe, 7 August 2002.
27 R. Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe: A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability’, Brussels, SPEECh/
02/619.
28 M. Pace, The Politics of Regional identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean (Abingdon: 
Routledge 2006), at 106.
29 For a detailed analysis of the Action Plans and the methodologies of the ENP, see 
M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy. More than a Partnership?’ in M. Cremona 
(ed.), Developments in EU External Relations law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008), 245.
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Mediterranean partners is still based on legal agreements, being the Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreements. Those are a type of association agree-
ments which contain legally binding provisions in each of the three 
aforementioned areas covered by the Barcelona Declaration. So, in a way the 
ENP with its policy documents and the Action Plans that provide for a ‘framework 
of modernisation’30 is complementary to the bilateral contractual relationships 
that have been created within the framework of Barcelona Process. According 
to Commissioner Wallström,
“It is not a matter of recasting Barcelona but rather rereading it, rediscovering it and 
realizing, as certain analysts have said, its potential. […] Whilst the action plans 
already agreed with the first signatory Mediterranean countries contain differences, 
they are also the bedrock of shared values and objectives which the Commission 
deems indispensable if we are to avoid divergent paths.”31
The bilateral character of the ENP is also very much visible in the ‘new ap-
proach’ of ENP towards the Southern Mediterranean that was launched in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring. In the Joint Communication with the title ‘A Part-
nership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterra-
nean’32 the high Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (hR) speaks about an ‘incentive-based approach based on more dif-
ferentiation (‘more for more’): those that go further and faster with reforms will 
be able to count on greater support from the EU.’33 It is true that differentiation 
is a principle underlying the ENP from its very beginning together with condi-
tionality. however, such tailor-made approach based on a ‘more for more’ 
policy strengthens even more bilateralism as the main characteristic of ENP 
and thus undermines its region-building characteristics.
Given the bilateral nature of both the Action Plans that consist of the main 
ENP instruments and the pre-existing Euro-Mediterranean Agreements that 
are supplemented by the Neighbourhood Policy, it is rather clear that the ENP 
does not have a strong region-building element. Still, a few elements of re-
gional cooperation are present in the ENP and especially in its current financial 
instrument. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI 
hereafter)34 replaced existing financial instruments (TACIS and MEDA) for the 
ENP countries and Russia for the period 2007-13. According to Article 2 of the 
30 See, M. Cremona and G. Meloni (eds.), ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: A frame-
work for Modernisation?’ EUi Working Paper law No. 2007/21, available at <http://cadmus.eui.
eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6976/LAW-2007-21.pdf;jsessionid=7A7946AA7E11EB7AE0CBEB678
76E49FE?sequence=1>.
31 M. Wallström, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship’, Cairo, SPEECh/05/171.
32 Joint Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, Brussels, 8. 3. 2011 COM 
(2011) 200 final.
33 Ibid., at 5. On instruments of conditionality, see the contribution of S. Blockmans in this 
volume.
34 Regulation 1638/2006/EC laying down general provisions establishing a European Neigh-
bourhood and Partnership Instrument [2006] OJ L310/1.
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Regulation, the overall scope of this programme is to ‘promote enhanced co-
operation and progressive integration between the European Union and the 
partner countries’. Approximately 1 billion EUR out of the overall 12 billion EUR 
budget has been specifically provided for cross-border cooperation.35 Cross-
border cooperation allows for the implementation of joint programmes covering 
regions from the Member States and the partner countries sharing a common 
border.36 There are two main categories of programmes: the ones covering a 
common land or short sea crossing; and the ones covering a sea basin such 
as the Mediterranean.37 however, only two of the 15 ENPI cross-border coop-
eration programmes relate to the Southern Mediterranean and concern a sea 
crossing (Italy-Tunisia) and basic-crossing programmes (The Mediterranean 
Sea programme).38 Analogous provisions concerning cross-border cooperation 
are also included in the proposed European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 
that will replace ENPI.39
Despite the existence of those cross-border cooperation elements, it is clear 
that the multilateral dimension of the ENP is rather weak. This becomes even 
more apparent if one takes into account that there is no institutionalised forum 
where all the heads of governments of the EU Member States and the ENP 
partner States would meet as it happens within the EuroMed framework. So, 
overall, we could argue that while in the case of the EuroMed the rather asym-
metrical relationship between the EU and the partners questions the interre-
gional dimension of the framework suggesting a rather sub-regional character, 
in the case of the ENP its chiefly bilateral dimension sheds light to the almost 
absolute absence of region-building characteristics.
3.3. UfM
Ironically enough, the project that entailed most region-building characteristics 
has been a rather failed endeavour. During his election night press conference 
on 6 May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy announced his intention to found Union de la 
Méditerranée. his initial aim was to ‘develop a Mediterranean region through 
intra-sub-regional cooperation between the Northern and Southern shores’40 
loosely resembling that of the early European Economic Community (EEC) 
and based around an economic free trade area. The new organisation ‘would 
have developed outside an EU context and would have therefore excluded all 
35 Arts. 6(2) and 9 of the ENPI.
36 Note the difference with Regulation 1082/2006 on a European grouping of territorial co-
operation (EGTC) that regulates cross-border cooperation between EU Member States and their 
sub-state entities, [2006] OJ L210/19. According to this relatively new legislative instrument, sub-
state entities from different Member States may also establish an EGTC, which enjoys legal 
personality under EU law. Such an option is not available under the ENPI.
37 Art. 9 of the ENPI.
38 <http://www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/en/regional-updates/cross-border-cooperation.
html>.
39 Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument, Brussels, 
7. 12. 2011, COM(2011) 839 final.
40 M. Comelli, supra note 9, at 399.
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non-Mediterranean EU Member States’.41 Pursuant to Article 207 TFEU (ex 
133 TEC), however, the EU enjoys exclusive competence in the area of exter-
nal trade. Thus, it would have been legally impossible to create such a free 
trade area only with the Mediterranean EU Member States. So the Sarkozy 
project had to be reformulated.
The project in its final format is a compromise and its title points to the fact 
that it consists of a repackaging of the EuroMed: ‘Barcelona Process: Union 
for the Mediterranean’. As such, it has brought together 43 Mediterranean 
countries including the 27 EU Member States, Balkan countries bordering on 
the Mediterranean Sea such as Albania, Bosnia-herzegovina, Croatia and 
Montenegro, small States like Monaco plus a few non-littoral States like Jordan 
and Mauritania. Thus, this new initiative includes States covered by existing 
policy frameworks and bilateral agreements. To facilitate its role, it has a Sec-
retariat that focuses on the coordination of concrete projects such as the de-
pollution of the Mediterranean, the establishment of maritime and land highways, 
civil protection, alternative energies etc.
As it is the case with the EuroMed, its predecessor, the UfM consists of a 
forum that it is not characterised by the interaction of diplomatic equals. On the 
one side there is the EU speaking with one voice while on the other there are 
the Mediterranean partners each with its own contractual relationship with the 
Union and its very different political aspirations. Again, it seems that this frame-
work nourishes relations that are marked by the dependence of the partner 
States on the EU. At the same time, the political difficulties of the endeavour 
should not be ignored. To this end, it is noted that in the aftermath of the Is-
raeli attacks in Gaza, the Arab countries blocked the political activities of UfM.42 
This led the EU to acknowledge that the urgent progress on the Middle East 
process is vital for the success of the UfM.43 Despite such recognition, it seems 
that in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the emphasis is not placed on a region-
building approach through UfM. The EU has decided to strengthen the ENP 
through an incentive-based approach based on more differentiation as we have 
noted in the previous section of the paper. This undermines even further the 
region-building characteristics of the EU overlapping policy frameworks for 
Southern Mediterranean.
4. (IN PLACE OF A) CONCLUSION
It has become clear from the analysis that despite the statements of EU officials 
and institutions declaring ENP as a medium for the region-building, the reality 
is somewhat different. The mainly bilateral character of the Neighbourhood 
Policy as underlined by its soft-law mechanism and its ‘new approach’ towards 
the Southern Mediterranean entailing even more differentiation questions the 
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. 
43 high Representative, ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the South-
ern Mediterranean’, supra note 32, at 11.
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engagement of the EU in region-building in the area. At the same time, the 
asymmetrical relations between the EU and the partner States with the dif-
ferentiated contractual relations with the Union and the very different political 
ambitions suggest that the multilateral dimension of the overlapping policy 
frameworks could be better understood in sub-regionalist (marked by depen-
dence of countries on the fringe of Europe on the EU) rather than inter-region-
al (an interaction between supposedly diplomatic equals) terms. 
having mentioned that, one should also keep in mind the possible tensions 
between region-building and inter-regionalism. By this, I mean that if a certain 
entity engages in efforts to build the mutual interdependence of a certain group 
of States, there is a considerable possibility that the relationship between the 
two entities –the one that engages in region-building and the other that it is to 
be built– will acquire hierarchical characteristics. The process of region-build-
ing by definition entails that the two entities will not be diplomatically equal at 
least in the beginning of the relationship. So, it should not raise any eyebrows 
that the multilateral dimension of the EU overlapping policy frameworks towards 
Southern Mediterranean mainly has sub-regional characteristics. It is to be 
expected that until the moment that the Southern shore of the Mediterranean 
basin acquires a level of interdependence that would be at least comparable 
to the one of the EU, inter-regionalism is out of the question and the relation-
ship will be one of dependence from the Union.
In the meantime, we note that the current policy frameworks correspond to 
a certain extent to the constitutional requirements of Article 8 TEU. The EU 
indeed through the ENP and its multilateral dimension tries to ‘develop a spe-
cial relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of 
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union.’44 
For those purposes it has concluded ‘specific bilateral agreements with the 
countries concerned’45 within the frameworks of EuroMed, ENP and UfM. It 
remains to be seen whether all those different contractual relationships will also 
evolve towards the creation of a region at a later stage.
44 Art 8(1) TEU.
45 Art 8(2) TEU.
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EU’S poST-ARAb SpRing RELATionS wiTh SoUThERn 
MEdiTERRAnEAn CiViL SoCiETY ACToRS:  
ConTinUiTY oR ChAngE?
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués
The popular uprisings in several southern Mediterranean countries during the 
2011 Arab Spring caught the European Union (EU) – along with most other 
observers – off-guard. After decades of stagnant authoritarianism, the scale, 
spontaneity and dynamism of the demonstrations and the accompanying intense 
political activity in social networks in countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, 
Jordan and elsewhere was indeed unexpected. Regional autocrats had for 
years helped fuel the (never verified, but still lingering) Western perception that 
Arab culture was to some extent incompatible with democratic practices1. The 
‘Arab street’ was therefore to a majority of outsiders not associated with po-
litical initiative and the resulting protests appeared to spring from nowhere. 
The conclusion which the EU apparently immediately drew was that the 
popular uprisings indicated the birth of an independent Arab civil society. The 
EU therefore offered a mea culpa for having in the past predominantly concen-
trated on supporting government- and regime stability in the southern Mediter-
ranean countries and not focused enough on helping non-state actors. To 
remedy such shortcomings in light of the changing circumstances, the Union 
has discursively shifted civil society actors from a rather marginal status prior 
to 2011 to becoming portrayed as an important component of what the EU 
refers to as ‘deep democracy’.2 On the whole thus, in the post-Arab Spring era 
the Union appears to seek to intensify its engagement with civil society in the 
Euro-Mediterranean area.
The purpose of the present paper is, however, to ask whether the strength-
ened EU rhetoric and new associated measures truly constitute a before and 
after in terms of the Union’s engagement with southern Mediterranean civil 
society actors. The first section will provide definitions and a historical backdrop 
for the European Union’s attempts to engage with such actors in the southern 
Mediterranean area. The second section will describe some of the Union’s new 
initiatives related to civil society actors which the Arab Spring has triggered. 
The final section will ponder whether the emerging EU initiatives will constitute 
a truly new chapter in EU-southern Mediterranean civil society relations or not. 
1 R. Alenius Boserup and F. Tassinari, ‘The Return of Arab Politics and Europe’s Chance to 
Engage Anew’, 17 Mediterranean Politics 2012, at 99.
2 See European Union, high Representative Ashton visits Tunisia and wider Middle East, 
Brussels, A 052/11, 14 February 2011; European Commission and high Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication. ‘A New Response 
to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy’, Brussels, COM 
(2011) 303, 25 May 2011.
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1. CIVIL SOCIETY IN EURO-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS 
‘Civil society’ is a widely used concept whose exact meaning nonetheless 
continues to be contested in academic literature. We will here define civil so-
ciety as referring to actors independent from the state, independent from private 
business and independent from ‘primordial structures’, i.e., family, clan or tribe.3 
More concretely we find civil society actors to be characterised by voluntary, 
non-lucrative, associative activity in the spirit of the three ‘independencies’ 
noted above.4 This would entail referring to a group of actors which a recent 
EU document describes as including, for example, non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), independent political foundations, community-based organisa-
tions, and private-sector non-profit agencies.5 
The European Union’s engagement with civil society is nothing new. The 
EU has shown notable off-and-on interest for promoting civil society actors 
beyond its borders in the past decades. The end of the Cold War and the Vel-
vet Revolutions in the Central and Eastern European countries revealed the 
important role of (often clandestine) associative networks for organising politi-
cal resistance and eventually for bringing down the sitting Communist regimes. 
The events which came to pass in the late 1980s and early 1990s therefore 
encouraged the EU and its member states to engage with civil society actors 
for their perceived role as catalysts of democracy and/or direct contributors to 
democratic transitions processes. The Union therefore took up civil society 
promotion as a foreign policy objective in its relations with most geographical 
regions of the world as the bipolar era came to an end and the ‘end of history’ 
appeared to roll out democracy as the only viable political system across the 
globe. 
In terms of the Mediterranean, the EU’s efforts to further civil society action 
would first be channeled into the Renewed Mediterranean Policy of the early 
1990s and then, more concertedly, into the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. The 
Barcelona Declaration put its faith to ‘the essential contribution civil society can 
make in the process of development of the Euro -Mediterranean Partnershipʼ 
3 A. Jünemann, ‘From the Bottom to the Top: Civil Society and Transnational NGOs in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, in R. Gillespie and R. Youngs (eds.), The European Union and 
Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa (London: Cass 2002), 87-105.
4 We recognize, however, at the outset that this threefold set of ‘independencies’ do not pro-
vide us with an entirely satisfactory conceptual clarity. A typical example would be that such a 
definition does not allow us to properly distinguish between a regular NGO and a so-called ‘gov-
ernmental non-governmental organisations’ (GONGOs), especially when such GONGOs fail to 
be forthcoming about their state patronage and/or the implications of such patronage. We also 
note that in certain countries (e.g., Egypt under Mubarak) NGOs at times registered as for-profit 
organisations in that the national legislation given that scrutiny of such entities was less strict than 
of non-profit voluntary associations, see F. Bicchi, ‘Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: 
An Overview’, 14 Mediterranean Politics 2009, at 61.
5 European Commission, ‘European Instrument for Democracy and human Rights (EIDhR) 
Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013’, Brussels, C(2010)2432, 21 April 2010.
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and even made civil society dialogue the centerpiece of the Partnership’s third 
basket devoted to the social, cultural and human affairs partnership.6 
however, the EU was soon to discover that, although a worthy objective, 
fomenting civil society was not going to be an easy task. While some northern 
EU governments championed a fairly free and self-sustained interaction be-
tween civil society actors across the Mediterranean basin, most North African 
and Middle Eastern countries insisted upon that control was needed. having 
drawn their own conclusions from the democratic revolutions in Central and 
Eastern Europe they were not eager to allow an independent civil society which 
might later transform into effective political opposition and undermine their 
regimes. The EU, on its hand, was struggling with consolidating itself as a 
political actor and with its post-Maastricht institutional reconfiguration was in a 
relative weak position to impose the views of the more ambitious pro-civil so-
ciety advocates among the EU’s member states.7 The combined effect was 
that the third basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would never become 
fully operative.8 
Then, 11/9 would once more put the issue of democratisation and hence 
civil society into the limelight. As a consequence. at the 2002 Valencia Euro-
Mediterranean minister meeting, the EU members fairly unanimously pushed 
for good governance, democracy and human rights and the Arab Mediterranean 
governments saw no alternative this time but to acquiesce.9 New bold plans 
were made for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s third basket and distinct 
accent was placed on the added value of civil society action. The main ideas 
underpinning the Valencia Action Plan were also later mainstreamed into dif-
ferent EU policies. A first example would be the launch of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, in which civil society cooperation is given 
a more prominent role. In particular, the ENP aspired to make civil society 
cooperation a central aspect of a reinforced political dialogue with partner 
governments (top-down). Another example would be the Commission’s Com-
munication titled Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisa-
tion with Mediterranean partners – Strategic guidelines.10 The Communication 
set out ten concrete recommendations for how the EU should pursue these 
issues, many of these recommendations relating to boosting civil society action. 
The EU’s civil society promotion appeared therefore to pick up speed in the 
period between 2002 and 2005. however, at the tenth anniversary meeting 
held in Barcelona in November 2005, all progress appeared to come undone. 
 6 Euro-Mediterranean minister meeting, ‘Barcelona Declaration’, Barcelona, 27-28 Novem-
ber, 1995. 
 7 E. Johansson-Nogués, ‘Civil Society in Euro-Mediterranean relations: What success of 
EU’s normative promotion?’, 40 RSCAS Working Paper (2006), available at ˂http://cadmus.eui.
eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6386/RSCAS-2006-40.pdf?sequence=1˃. 
 8 Although a few areas did register activity, like, e.g. Euromed heritage, Euromed Audio-
visual, Euromed Youth, see A. Jünemann, supra note 3.
 9 R. Gillespie, ‘The Valencia Conference: Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process?’ 7 Mediter-
ranean Politics 2002, at 105.
10 European Commission, ‘Reinvigorating EU actions on human Rights and democratisa-
tion with Mediterranean partners – Strategic guidelines’, Brussels, COM(2003) 294 final, 21 May 
2003.
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The British and (above all) the Spanish co-hosts of the anniversary meeting 
had worked hard towards finding a consensus in regards to the final declaration 
and the Work Program amongst all Euro-Mediterranean partners in the months 
before the summit. however, in the end they had to concede defeat on sev-
eral fronts.11 In terms of civil society cooperation, the declaration and the five 
year Work Program would appear to a large extent as a restatement of the 
(very limited) objectives in the third basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. 
The Work Program was to be lamentably vague on how the objectives set for 
civil society dialogues for the period 2005-2010 were to be achieved.12 These 
set-backs can be said to be as a result of that the global impetus which existed 
after 11/9 in terms of democratisation (and hence focus on civil society) was 
lost in the latter half of the 2000s. The insurgency and difficulties in winning the 
peace in Afghanistan, Iraq and the dithering US foreign policy sapped the 
strength out of Western democracy promotion. European civil society actors 
and the European Parliament have attempted with various initiatives to keep 
the EU torch on civil society high, however, EU governments appeared unwill-
ing to follow suit. A good example of EU governments’ lack of stomach for 
civil society promotion in this period was the launch of the Union for the Medi-
terranean in 2008 whose sector-specific focus abandoned any pretensions to 
specific democratisation promotion or to foment civil society.13 
2. ThE ARAB SPRING
The onset of the Arab Spring would, however, once again force civil society 
onto the center stage of EU policies. The changing conditions in the southern 
Mediterranean countries warranted new dynamics in the relations. Only days 
after Mubarak was ousted, the EU Foreign Affairs Council therefore stated that:
“[t]he Council expresses its support to the peoples of the South Mediterranean and 
their legitimate hopes and aspirations for democratic change, social justice and 
economic development. The EU stands ready for a new partnership in its relations 
with the countries of the region to support the process towards democracy, rule of 
law, socio-economic development and strengthened regional stability, on the basis 
of shared principles, cooperation and local ownership”.14
Catherine Ashton, the European Union high Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, further 
elaborated that such a new partnership should be based on the southern Med-
iterranean countries’ aspirations to achieve ‘deep democracy’, i.e., regularly 
11 R. Gillespie, ‘Onward but not Upward: The Barcelona Conference of 2005.’ 11 Mediter-
ranean Politics 2006, at 271.
12 Council of the European Union, ‘10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit: Five Year 
Work Programme’, Brussels, 15074/05, 28 November 2005.
13 E. Johansson-Nogués, ‘The UfM’s Institutional Structure: Making Inroads towards “Co-
Ownership”?’ 16 Mediterranean Politics 2011, at 21.
14 Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions on Developments in the South-
ern Neighbourhood (Egypt/Tunisia), Brussels, 6774/11, 21 February 2011.
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held pluri-party elections, freedom of association and expression, the rule of 
law, the fight against corruption and democratic control over security forces. 
Ashton has also emphasised that ʽ[d]eep democracy can only take root and 
flourish through and with the participation of all civil society stakeholdersʼ.15 
The European Commission in a set of Communications therefore pronounced 
that the Union would henceforth seek to establish good working relations with 
civil society to ʽsupport this greater political role for non-state actorsʼ, helping 
such actors in particular ʽto develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to 
monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmesʼ.16 
The Union’s frequently noted rationale for engaging with such actors is that ̔ [a] 
thriving civil society empowers citizens to express their concerns, contribute to 
policy-making and hold governments to accountʼ.17
EU funding for civil society agency is to be channeled principally through a 
new Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility. The Facility is a specific financial 
envelope inside the more general ‘SPRING’ (Support for Partnership, Reform 
and Inclusive Growth) program which the Union created in May 2011 and which 
is open to all the Union’s neighbouring partners in Eastern Europe and in the 
southern Mediterranean. Out of the total €350 million for the 2011-2012 bien-
nium, €22 million of the SPRING program are specifically earmarked for the 
Civil Society Facility. The Civil Society Facility will in coming years set aside 
€11 million for three large areas of action in relation to the southern Mediter-
ranean civil society: (1) capacity-building; (2) support for regional and country 
projects; and (3) ʽincreasingʼ the civil society ʽinvolvementʼ in the dialogues 
between EU and partner country government on EU programs and priorities.18 
Additional sums for civil society actors will be made available from other instru-
ments, such as the Civil Society Regional Programme,the Non-state Actors 
and Local Authorities in Development program, the European Instrument for 
Democracy and human Rights, the Good Governance program and others. 
Another novel feature in the EU’s outreach to southern Mediterranean civil 
society actors is the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) ʽto help po-
litical parties, non-registered NGOs and trade unions and other social partnersʼ.19 
The political declaration supporting the EED’s set-up was issued by EU Mem-
ber States in December 2011. however, at the time of writing very little is known 
about the specific institutional set-up and purpose of the Endowment.20
15 European Union, supra note 2.
16 European Commission and high Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, supra note 2.
17 ibid.
18 European Union, ‘EU response to the Arab Spring: the Civil Society Facility’, Press Re-
lease, Brussels, MEMO/11/638, 27 September 2011.
19 European Commission and high Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, supra note 2.
20 For an insightful reflection on the potential and added value of the European Endowment 
for Democracy cf. R. Youngs and K. Brudzinska, ‘The European Endowment for Democracy: will 
it fly?’, FRiDE, Policy Brief No 128 (2012), available at <http://www.fride.org/publication/1019/the-
european-endowment-for-democracy:-will-it-fly>.
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3. EU CIVIL SOCIETY PROMOTION IN ThE SOUThERN 
MEDITERRANEAN: CONTINUITY OR ChANGE?
As we have seen, the Arab Spring appears to have triggered a re-think in Brus-
sels on the importance of civil society. The events of the popular uprisings in 
the southern Mediterranean have also put into motion a set of EU civil society 
initiatives which must be seen as the Union’s most ambitious ones to date. 
however, are we witnessing a genuine change in the EU’s approaches to 
civil society?
The EU’s engagement with southern Mediterranean civil society is a long-
standing one, as noted above. The accent, then as now, was always placed 
on that civil society should perform the function of watchdog of their govern-
ments, of holding their governments accountable. This is the great value of 
civil society in mature democracies. however, prior to the Arab Spring, this 
function of civil society was effectively undermined by authoritarian govern-
ments. Civil society organisations were closely monitored by their governments 
and independent associations were often outlawed. harassment and violence 
were the order of the day for those southern Mediterranean activists who dared 
to speak up and demand change and/or to hold governments accountable. The 
EU, on its part, would only on numbered occasions speak up against repression 
and in favor of civil society actors or seek to protect them prior to Arab Spring.21
In the post-Arab Spring setting it is difficult to see that the EU has truly 
changed its ways in order to help strengthen the alleged civil society ‘pillar’ of 
‘deep democracy’. In early 2012 there was a crackdown on civil society in Egypt, 
including the raids on foreign22 and Egyptian NGOs, excessive use of force on 
demonstrators and criminal proceedings opened on some human rights activ-
ists.23 On top of this, a new Egyptian NGO draft law has been introduced in 
parliament which local associations describe as even more restrictive than that 
under the Mubarak regime. Against the backdrop of such events, the EU 
ʽreiterates its deep concern with regard to restrictions on civil society organisa-
tions in Egyptʼ,24 but still launched negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (in December 2011) without any pre-condition – and even 
before a democratically elected Egyptian government had taken position. Sim-
ilarly, an April 2012 governmental repression of demonstrators in Tunisia did 
not warrant any EU response.25 Elsewhere in southern Mediterranean area, 
for example in Algeria, parliamentary bills to further restrict civil society activity 
have also been introduced in the midst of ongoing EU consultations with the 
country for an ENP Action Plan. The lessons drawn from this by southern 
21 See h. Malmvig, ‘Security through Intercultural Dialogue? Implications of the Securitiza-
tion of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures’, 10 Mediterranean Politics 2005, at 349.
22 Including US Freedom house and German Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
23 ‘Civil society groups are the new spies, says Egypt official, as UN warns NGO curbs un-
dermine transition’, Democracy Digest, 26 April 2012, available at ˂http://www.demdigest.net/
blog/2012/04/civil-society-groups-are-the-new-spies-says-egypt-official-as-un-warns-ngo-curbs-
undermine-transition/˃
24 Council of the European Union, supra note 14.
25 Democracy Digest, supra note 23.
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Mediterranean activists is that in spite of EU post-Arab Spring rhetoric, EU-
civil society relations are essentially back to square one again.
Second, as noted above, the EU’s new Civil Society Facility, inside the 
SPRING program, offers new additional funds to southern Mediterranean civ-
il society actors for capacity-building. In absolute terms, the sums are also 
fairly generous for the period 2011-2012. however, the pre-requisite is the same 
as it was under the Barcelona Process and the ENP, i.e., that recipient civil 
society organisations be ‘registered’ (legal and fiscal personas) before the 
national law in their respective host countries. The registration process was 
employed by the southern Mediterranean government as an additional means 
of control of civil society actors operating on their territory. For example, in Ben 
Ali’s Tunisia, associations were required to present a detailed description of 
their activity plans and budget to the authorities before being given the green 
light to operate legally and must, in addition, have all their elections, leaders 
and members cleared by the security apparatus. For this reason, the 2004 ENP 
Country Report for Tunisia estimated that out of the approximately 8000 NGOs 
operating in Tunisia only a small fraction can be considered genuinely inde-
pendent.26 What is more, foreign funding, like that from the EU, destined to 
southern Mediterranean NGOs had, as a rule, to be channeled through the 
state or through intermediary bodies approved by the host government. South-
ern Mediterranean governments were therefore in an unparalleled position to 
grant or deny funding to local and foreign registered associations even if the 
latter were fully entitled to the money. The European Union’s insistence on that 
projects be co-funded by the host government was an additional obstacle for 
NGOs to receive money for their activity, especially those associations dedicat-
ing themselves to issues which might be sensitive for the southern Mediter-
ranean government. Finally, it is worth noting that although in theory the EU 
had at its disposal one financial instrument, the European Instrument for De-
mocracy and human Rights (EIDhR), which was created to be able to get 
around such restrictions and channel funds directly to NGOs, the Union was 
reluctant to use it. In practice the European Union has always shown itself 
sensitive to its partner governments’ preferences and on the whole consulted 
with the target country’s government over which projects to fund.27 As a result, 
only those civil society organisations approved by the Mediterranean partner 
governments have been eligible for Barcelona Process/ENP/EIDhR money. 
This susceptibility of the EU vis-à-vis the wishes of the partner governments 
has regularly been criticised. however, indignation in the NGO community 
would run especially high when the Commission in 2003 withdrew the funding 
of already approved projects to civil society actors in Egypt. The withdrawal 
was due to the insistence of that country’s authorities that some of them were 
linked to Islamic terrorism.
26 European Commission. ‘European Neighborhood Policy Country Report – Tunisia’, Brus-
sels, SEC(2004) 570, 12 May 2004.
27 Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, ‘No Lasting Peace and Prosperity without 
Democracy and human Rights: harnessing Debates on the EU’s Future Financial Instruments’, 
Report Commissioned by the European Parliament, July 2005.
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The situation for civil society actors in most southern Mediterranean countries 
is not that different today compared to prior to the Arab Spring. The Egyptian 
authorities – the Egyptian armed forces transition government supported by 
the Muslim Brotherhood and even the Salafist Nour Party – have imposed 
limits to what post-Arab Spring NGOs would be allowed to register. Civil soci-
ety actors linked to Coptian or Nubian communities or to other minority rights 
organisations have had their application to register denied.28 The claim is that 
ʽ[a]ll the organisations that have been rejected [are those which] steer up fa-
naticism and sentiments hostile to the national spiritʼ.29 In other southern Med-
iterranean countries like Morocco or Jordan continue undeterred their use of 
restrictive registration/notification procedures on NGOs.
Finally, the EU has made it an objective for the Civil Society Facility to in-
crease the civil society involvement in the dialogues between EU and partner 
country governments on EU programmes and priorities.30 The trilateral dialogue 
(EU-partner government and NGOs) has in the past been undermined by au-
thoritarian governments unwilling to engage in direct discussions with civil 
society actors out of fear that, such contacts would circumscribe governmental 
power and/or its freedom of action. At the moment, as we have seen above, it 
is difficult to gauge how much this governmental reluctance has changed, even 
in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. We nonetheless leave the door open to 
that governments might at a later stage of the political transition process be 
more positively inclined towards such dialogues. A much more feasible prospect 
in the short to medium term would be for the EU to foment a bilateral EU-civil 
society dialogue instead. Indeed, both the Barcelona Process and the ENP 
envisioned exchanges of ideas between the EU and southern Mediterranean 
civil society actors and this is the spirit to which the Civil Society Facility ap-
pears to return. This would also cater to a longstanding demand from southern 
Mediterranean NGOs to be consulted by the EU when Brussels designs na-
tional framework programs or aid strategies of different kinds. In terms of the 
SPRING Program, actors such as the Arab NGOs Network for development 
and ten affiliated associations therefore welcome EU’s intention of giving civil 
society a central role and propose that ʽcivil society groups should be at the 
core of consultations around SPRING allocations, identification and use of 
benchmarksʼ ʽincluding at all stages of policy design, project and program 
identification, implementation, and evaluationʼ.31 Other civil society activists 
broaden such consultations to encompass future Association Agreements, 
DCFTAs, etc., between the EU and relevant governments. Still, the NGO com-
munity in these countries drily notes that in terms of the SPRING program 
ʽconsultations with civil society have not yet taken place, and [as far as they 
28 Democracy Digest, supra note 23.
29 Ibid.
30 European Union, supra note 18. 
31 Arab NGO Network for Development et al., ‘A Letter from Civil Society Groups in the Arab 
Region to EU Officials: “What Does ‘More’ Stand for and how to Ensure Economic Policy Condi-
tionality is not Exercised?”’, unpublished open letter, 18 October 2011, available at <http://www.
annd.org/userfiles/file/latestnews/General-%20CS%20reaction%20to%20CSF_SPRING%20ini-
tiatives-%20October%202011-%20FINAL.pdf> (accessed 9 August 2012).
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are aware of] none are publically plannedʼ.32 They therefore await their invita-
tion to participate further in the dialogues between EU and partner country 
governments on EU programs and priorities.33
4. CONCLUSIONS
The European Union has expressed an interest for civil society organisations 
since the early 1990s for their role in the democratic overturn which swept 
across the Central and Eastern Europe. The Union has created several mech-
anisms and allocated significant sums to civil society promotion. The Arab 
Spring stimulated the EU to put forth an ambitious set of initiatives. The EU 
has also upped its rhetorical ante on the civil society with its various Commu-
nications emerging in connection to the Arab Spring. 
however, it remains to be seen whether the EU’s new rhetoric and financial 
instruments amount to a true change in EU-southern Mediterranean civil soci-
ety relations. We have noted that the Union continues to be lamentably timid 
in view of speaking up against aggressions on civil society actors. It has yet to 
learn the pertinent lessons of the insistence on working with registered NGOs, 
many of which have fallen into disarray or disrepute as a consequence of the 
fall of their former authoritarian governmental patrons. Finally, there is also 
uncertainty surrounding whether the Union will (or can) engage in direct dialogue 
with civil society actors over objectives in the different national assistance plans. 
Southern Mediterranean civil society actors are awaiting the EU’s cue to become 
policy makers in areas related to their operation and not simply policy takers. 
Thus, there is much which points to that the EU’s ‘new’ approach toward 
southern Mediterranean civil society represents more re-packaging than nov-
elty. While the new Arab Spring EU measures have amounted to an important 
political message for civil society actors, the way the Union follows up on its 
propositions in the years ahead will now become key. A genuine change in EU 
policy would require some assertiveness from Brussels and other EU capitals 
in terms of defending civil society activists and some readjustments of the 
policy currently proposed the Union. Let us hope that with time, 2011 will prove 
to having been a pivotal year for the European Union’s engagement with south-
ern Mediterranean civil society. 
32 Ibid.
33 European Union, supra note 18. 
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dEEp And CoMpREhEnSiVE fREE TRAdE AgREEMEnTS: 
LibERALiSATion of goodS And SERViCES bETwEEn ThE 
MEdiTERRAnEAn nEighboURS And ThE EU 
K. Pieters
1. INTRODUCTION 
The current Euro-Med Association Agreements (AAs) between the European 
Union (EU), the Member States on the one hand and the Mediterranean part-
ners on the other hand are, amongst others, designed to lead to the establish-
ment of a Euro-Med free trade area of goods, services and capital.1 Besides 
the establishment of a free trade area, the AAs also contain provisions on 
competition, intellectual property rights, financial and economic cooperation, 
agriculture, investments, transportation, telecommunications, energy, science 
and technology, environment, tourism, statistics and the fight against illegal 
drugs. The Euro-Med free trade area is not yet complete, since free trade 
agreements between the Mediterranean countries themselves are lacking. 
Nevertheless, the EU has the intention to take the Euro-Med liberalisation 
process of goods, services and capital to a higher level through the conclusion 
of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) between the 
EU and the Mediterranean countries which will form part of the existing Euro-
Med AAs. The DCFTAs will cover three of the four freedoms of the EU internal 
market: free movement of substantially all goods, many services and capital.2 
DCFTAs will have an enormous impact on the Mediterranean countries involved 
and the entire region since their markets will be open to the European markets, 
including European multinationals, which will increase competition between 
1 The Mediterranean neighbours in this paper are the countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, 
Algeria, Libya and Tunisia), the Mashreq (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinian 
Authority (PA)) and Israel. At present there are seven Euro-Med AAs and one Euro-Med Interim 
Agreement. Before the Summit in Barcelona in November 1995, the EU and its Member States 
had already signed a Euro-Med AA with Tunisia on 17 July 1995, which came into force on 1 
March 1998 after being ratified by all 15 EU Member States. In the framework of the Barcelona 
process, the EU and its Member States signed an AA with Morocco on 26 February 1996, which 
entered into force on 1 March 2000, with Israel, which entered into force on 1 June 2000, with 
Jordan on 24 November 1997, which entered into force on 1 May 2002, with Egypt on 25 June 
2001, which entered into force on 1 June 2004, with Algeria on 22 April 2002, which entered into 
force on 1 September 2005, and with Lebanon on 17 June 2002, which entered into force on 1 
April 2006. An Interim Association Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the EU 
and the PA has been in force since 1 July 1997. At the end of 2004, the AA with Syria had been 
submitted to the political authorities on both sides for final approval and signature. The EU Coun-
cil has never signed the proposed EU-Syria AA.
2 P. M. Wijkman, ‘Fostering Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements for the East-
ern Partners’, Eastern Partnership Review, no. 8, December 2011, p. 5.
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the Mediterranean countries with the EU and other parts of the world.3 This 
paper offers legal recommendations for an intensified Euro-Med liberalisation 
of goods, services and capital.
2. DEEP AND COMPREhENSIVE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
FOR ThE MEDITERRANEAN NEIGhBOURS
2.1. origins and purpose of the dCfTAs 
The concept of ‘DCFTA for the Mediterranean area’ is found in several docu-
ments of the Commission on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) since 
2006.4 It has been envisaged that the DCFTAs will form a part of the existing 
Euro-Med AAs, and will thus be based on Article 217 TFEU.5 Many agreements 
concluded on the basis of Article 217 TFEU refer to the prospect of accession 
to the EU and are called Accession Agreements, but the Euro-Med AAs never 
embodied the idea of future accession to the EU, nor will the new DCFTAs with 
the Mediterranean countries do so. Accession Agreements aim at accession 
and thus at full acceptance of the EU acquis. Since the DCFTAs with the 
Mediterranean countries do not aim at EU accession, but only at association, 
the Mediterranean countries are not obliged to align all their legislation with the 
EU’s acquis. 
With the conclusion of the DCFTAs, the EU aimed at a better competitive 
position of the EU and the Mediterranean countries in the world through the 
‘highest possible degree’ of Euro-Med liberalisation of goods, services and 
capital.6 however, the EU’s purpose of the DCFTA changed ever since the EU 
3 M. Cermak, A. Canonne and R. Knottnerus, EU Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agree-
ments: A Threat to the Aspirations of the “Arab Revolutions”, A Seattle to Brussels Paper, avail-
able at www.s2bnetwork.org.
4 Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 4 De-
cember 2006 on strengthening the ENP, COM (2006) 726. On 15 November 2007, the European 
Parliament adopted a report on the 2006 Communication (P6_TA (2007)0538). The Commission 
stated in its Strategy Paper of December 2006 that trade with its neighbouring countries should 
also include ‘behind the border’ issues, meaning progressively achieving comprehensive conver-
gence in areas, such as technical norms and standards, sanitary and phytosanitary rules, com-
petition policy, enterprise competitiveness, innovation and industrial policy, research cooperation, 
intellectual property rights, trade facilitation customs measures and administrative capacity in the 
area of rules of origin, good governance in the tax area, company law, public procurement and 
financial services. In its Communication of 5 December 2007, the Commission again proposed 
measures towards further economic integration, such as tailor-made FTAs, which should include 
strong legally-binding provisions on the implementation of trade and economic regulatory issues, 
COM (2007) 774 final.
5 E. Zapater, El Fundamento juridico de la actuacion exterior de las Comunidades Europeas 
en el ambito de la cooperacion energetica internacional (Catalunya, Universidad Autonoma de 
Barcelona 2000) p. 389, cited by D. Miralles Sole, An instrumental Analysis of the European 
Union’s Capability to Act in Conflict Response (Catalunya, Grup Artyplan-Artympres 2004) p. 27; 
C-12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719, para. 9-10; C-12/86 Demirel v 
Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719, para. 9-10; R. Leal-Arcas, ‘The European Commu-
nity and Mixed Agreements’, 6 EFA Rev. (2001) pp. 483-513.
6 Communication of 4 October 2006 on a Global Europe.
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has fallen into an economic and financial crisis. The Commission clearly states 
that priority will be given to the conclusion of DCFTAs with rapidly growing 
economies, such as Korea, the Mercosur countries, the countries that belong 
to ASEAN,7 India and Russia. These countries maintain high trade barriers to 
European imports which the EU intends to abolish through the conclusion of 
DCFTAs.8 Free trade with these emerging economies will result in huge eco-
nomic benefits for the EU. The DCFTAs with developing countries, such as the 
Mediterranean countries, will not offer the EU the same economic benefits, and 
become less important for the EU. 
2.2. Criteria and steps to fulfill before the launch of the 
negotiations of the dCfTA 
The launch of the negotiations for a DCFTA is possible only after assessment 
of multiple economic indicators by the Commission.9 Firstly, accession of the 
(Mediterranean) country to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an absolute 
requirement for the conclusion of a DCFTA. Secondly, the size and growth of 
the country will be assessed.10 Thirdly, protective measures against European 
exports such as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) or regulatory barriers, sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards (SPS), technical barriers to trade (TBT) will be evalu-
ated. Fourthly, European access to resources such as energy, metals and 
primary raw materials play an important role. Finally, the impact of the DCFTA 
on European markets and economies will be considered. Besides economic 
standards, also political criteria are taken into account: the respect for democ-
racy and human rights, the adherence to key multilateral instruments and the 
geostrategic relevance of the Mediterranean country.11 A final criterion concerns 
the possible detrimental effect of the DCFTA on other neighbours of the EU. 
This means that preferential access currently enjoyed by the neighbouring 
countries of the EU, should not be eroded by the future DCFTA.12
If all conditions are fulfilled, the Commission will launch a feasibility study 
on the scope of the DCFTA and will verify the (Mediterranean) country’s willing-
ness to negotiate on the various topics of the future DCFTA. On 14 December 
2011, the EU Council of Foreign Affairs authorised the opening of trade nego-
tiations with four willing Mediterranean countries: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia.13 The EU Commissioner of Trade, Karel De Gucht said: ‘We are offer-
 7 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See A.C. Robles Jr., Negotiating Services with the 
ASEAN: The EU between WTO and Japan, EFAR 16: 379-400, 2011.
 8 Communication of the Commission of 4 October 2006, Global Europe: Competing in the 
World. p. 9.
 9 Annex to the Communication of the Commission of 4 October 2006, Global Europe: Com-
peting in the World (A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, SEC (2006) 1230.
10 The assessment of market potential has never been a condition for concluding Euro-Med 
AAs.
11 Annex, p. 17.
12 Communication of 4 October 2006 on a Global Europe, p. 9.
13 Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia signed a free trade agreement amongst themselves, 
called the Agadir Agreement in February 2004, which came into force in March 2007.
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ing Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia progressive economic integration into 
the EU single market and want to improve the conditions for market access to 
the EU for these four WTO members as they engage in a process of demo-
cratic and economic reform.’ The Commission made recommendations for the 
negotiations between the EU and those four Mediterranean neighbours. The 
Ministries of Economy of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have to submit 
an Action Plan for the implementation of these recommendations in the future. 
2.3. Content of the dCfTAs
The terms ‘deep’ and ‘comprehensive’ indicate that the Mediterranean countries 
and the EU want to establish a form of integration which goes beyond the 
level of integration established through free trade agreements. Deep integration 
refers to the removal of legal, regulatory and institutional barriers between the 
EU and the Mediterranean countries. Comprehensive integration does not 
imply a full harmonisation of laws, regulation and institutions, but implies an 
appropriate degree of regulatory and institutional convergence. The extent to 
which harmonisation will take place will be analysed for each Mediterranean 
country separately. The Working Group on Services, established by the Euro-
Med Ministers of Trade in 2003, for example, is assessing the extent to which 
liberalisation in the field of services with the Mediterranean countries should 
take place. 
The DCFTAs should largely cover all trade, including energy, and aim at the 
‘highest possible degree’ of liberalisation.14 The criterion of the ‘highest pos-
sible degree’ signifies that the agreements will only exclude a number of areas, 
for example, some agricultural products, from full liberalisation. The DCFTAs 
will encompass several chapters of which the most important are the free 
movement of goods and further liberalisation of trade in services and capital.15 
Free movement of goods (industrial goods, agricultural products, processed 
agricultural products and fishery products) will be established through a system 
of well-functioning Euro-Med rules of origin, Agreements on Conformity As-
sessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs), the mutual recogni-
tion of SPS standards for agricultural and food products, standards and 
conformity assessment procedures etc.. Next, further liberalisation of services 
and capital will be obtained via provisions on mutual recognition of legal and 
institutional frameworks, better conditions for establishment of companies, more 
opportunities for persons to be temporarily present in the territory of the parties 
for business and recognition of diplomas.16 Other chapters include horizontal 
issues and institutional provisions. horizontal issues will include provisions on 
competition issues and state aid, on intellectual, industrial and commercial 
property, on public procurement, safeguards, anti-dumping and countervailing 
14 Communication of the Commission of 4 October 2006, Global Europe: Competing in the 
World (A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy), COM (2006) 567 final.
15 Based on the expected outline for the DCFTA with Georgia. 
16 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, East-
ern Partnership, COM (2008) 823/4, p. 4-5.
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measures. The chapter on institutional provisions will include amongst others 
a dispute settlement mechanism.17 
3. ThE EURO-MED LIBERALISATION OF GOODS IN ThE 
DCFTAS
3.1. The current state of play: (free) movement of goods between 
the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours 
All Euro-Med AAs ensure the import and export of goods between the Mediter-
ranean countries and the EU.18 The AAs make a distinction between trade in 
industrial products, on the one hand, and agricultural, fishery and processed 
agricultural products, on the other hand. industrial goods originating in a Med-
iterranean country which are imported into the EU are completely free of ‘cus-
toms duties’ and ‘charges having equivalent effect’ (similar to article 30 TFEU) 
upon entry into force of the AAs. Industrial goods originating in the EU which 
are imported into a Mediterranean country are still subject to ‘customs duties’ 
and ‘charges having equivalent effect’, but a lot of these duties and charges 
have been progressively abolished according to the timetables in the Annexes 
to the Euro-Med AA. As concerns trade in agricultural, fishery and processed 
agricultural products, the EU and all Mediterranean countries will progres-
sively establish greater liberalisation, according to agreed schedules included 
in the Euro-Med AAs. At this moment many agricultural, fishery and processed 
agricultural products remain subject to customs duties.19 The Mediterranean 
countries and the EU examine on a regular basis in the Association Council, 
product by product, the possibilities of granting each other further concessions. 
There is no ‘free’ movement of agricultural products, fishery products and in-
dustrial products with an agricultural component between the Mediterranean 
countries and the EU. 
The prohibition of quotas and equivalent measures (similar to article 34 
TFEU) only applies to fully liberalised goods, namely industrial goods. Agricul-
tural products, fishery products and industrial products with an agricultural ele-
ment and some industrial products can still be subject to quantitative restrictions 
or measures having the same effect. The prohibition of quantitative restrictions 
and equivalent measures encompasses direct or indirect obstacles to trade 
between the EU and the Mediterranean country. ‘Direct’ restrictions concern 
17 For the establishment of a Euro-Med free trade area, a network of bilateral agreements 
needs to be established between the Mediterranean partners itself, inspired at the model of the 
European Economic Area and will be called Neighbourhood Economic Community (NEC), see 
Non-paper ENP – a path towards further economic integration’ of spring 2007. This non-paper is 
expanding on the proposals contained in the Communication of the Commission of 4 December 
2006 COM (2006) 726 final.
18 PA: 2001; Tunisia: 2010; Morocco: 2012, Jordan: 2014; Egypt: 2016; Algeria: 2017 and 
Lebanon: 2018.
19 The Communication of the Commission on its new neighbourhood policy in an enlarged 
Europe also points out that there is still room to deepen the Euro-Med AAs in the domain of trade 
in agricultural products.
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quotas or other bans related to the quantity of trade in industrial goods. ‘Indirect 
restrictions’ or ‘measures having the same effect as quantitative restrictions’ 
result from contradictory technical and regulatory standards between the Med-
iterranean country and the EU.20
3.2. Recommendations for deeper and comprehensive Euro-Med 
trade of goods 
With the establishment of the EU Internal Market, the Member States realised 
that free movement of goods entailed the risks which differ by product sector: 
allowing medicines, for example, presents higher risks than allowing bread. 
Low-risk products were not subjected to harmonisation at European level. Trade 
as regards ‘non-harmonised’ goods, relies on the ‘mutual recognition’ principle.21 
For high-risk products, the EU introduced detailed technical rules. The har-
monisation process based on detailed technical rules proceeded extremely 
slowly and was replaced by a new harmonising tool, called the ‘New Approach’.22 
The New Approach directives define essential requirements related to health, 
safety and environment issues. Products must meet these requirements in 
order to be placed on the European market. 
The DCFTAs aim at the highest degree of liberalisation of movement of 
goods, which will practically result in the establishment of Euro-Med Internal 
Market of goods. The establishment of the Euro-Med Internal Market of goods 
takes place along the same principles used in the EU Internal Market.
3.2.1. The mutual recognition principle in non-harmonised areas
In the EU Internal Market, the mutual recognition principle emerged from the 
Cassis de Dijon case of the ECJ: EU Member States must allow all products 
from other Member States to their territory if these products have been law-
fully produced in the exporting Member State.The Member State of destination 
may refuse the marketing of a product when this is strictly necessary for the 
protection of, for example, public safety, health or environment.23 The applica-
20 All Euro-Med AAs contain the possibility of derogations from the (free) movement of goods. 
All AAs contain an infant industry clause for industrial products which can only be invoked by 
the Mediterranean countries that want to restrict imports from the EU to protect new and infant 
industries or sectors undergoing restructuring or facing serious difficulties in their country. See 
‘Anti-dumping and Safeguards in the Euro-Mediterranean AAs’, study carried out in collaboration 
with UNCTAD Technical Cooperation Project on Trade Relations and Economic Cooperation in 
the Mediterranean Region (INT/93/A34), April 1998.
21 See 3.2.1. Mutual recognition principle in non-harmonised areas.
22 P. Brenton and M. Manchin, Trade Policy Issues for the Euro-Med Partnership, Working 
Paper published by the CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Project (2003) p. 8 and paragraph 
3.2.2. Euro-Med movement of products harmonised at EU level.
23 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 
649. See also Regulation No 764/2008 of 9 July 2008 laying down procedures relating to the ap-
plication of certain national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State 
and repealing Decision No 3052/95/EU, OJ 13.08.2008, L 218/21.
101
Deep and comprehensive free trade agreements: liberalisation of goods and services
CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2013/3
tion of the principle of mutual recognition for goods in the Euro-Med context in 
non-harmonised areas requires a substantial amount of confidence in the 
other party. The development of trust in the Euro-Mediterranean relationship 
will take time.24 Trust can be improved by setting up test facilities and inspec-
tion services that ensure and certify the quality of products for which there is 
no harmonisation in the EU. Still, different views and practices used in the 
testing facilities on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea might lead to dis-
agreements as concerns the testing of goods. Study visits of members of 
European testing facilities to their Mediterranean colleagues and vice versa 
might mean a step forward in improving confidence. Encountered problems 
and different practices on-site can be resolved during Euro-Med workshops. 
Another solution is the conclusion of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). 
The MRA is an international agreement by which countries recognise one 
another’s conformity assessments procedures, such as testing methods, sur-
veillance methods, inspections services, certification services for goods for 
which there is no harmonisation. MRAs will not involve any legislative alignment 
to European norms, but concerns the guarantee of quality of products through 
the acceptance of conformity assessment procedures of other countries. Only 
Israel signed a MRA on Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) with the EU, which 
entered into force in May 2000, by which some goods enter the EU without 
need for double testing.25
3.2.2. Euro-Med movement of products harmonised at EU level
The Euro-Med AAs do not offer interesting concepts as how to enhance Euro-
Med trade in goods for which harmonisation (New Approach) is necessary. 
They only stipulate that the Mediterranean countries should approximate their 
legislation to that of the EU in the areas covered by them but do not explain 
how this approximation process should be initiated and developed. For ex-
ample, in the case of the Maghreb countries, the Euro-Med AAs state that ‘the 
cooperation shall be aimed at helping to bring the legislation closer to that of 
the EU’.26 In the case of Lebanon and Jordan, they stipulate that ‘the Parties 
shall use their best endeavours to approximate their respective laws in order 
to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement.’ The Euro-Med AAs define 
that the Mediterranean countries will make use of EU rules in standardisation, 
metrology, quality control and conformity assessment.27 Aligning to EU stan-
dards and technical requirements will lower double testing and certification 
24 M. Jakubiak et al., Countries Bordering the EU and Enhanced Economic integration (War-
saw, Centre for Social and Economic Research 2006, pp. 22-23. 
25 Agreement on mutual recognition of OECD principles of good laboratory practice (GLP) 
and compliance monitoring programmes of 9 October 1999 between the European Community 
and the State of Israel, OJ L263/7. 
26 Art. 48 AA Egypt, for example, stipulates: ‘The Parties shall use their best endeavours to 
approximate respective laws in order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement.’ Art. 52 
AA Morocco, for example, stipulates: ‘Cooperation shall be aimed at helping Morocco to bring its 
legislation closer to that of the Community in areas covered by this Agreement.’
27 Art. 55 AA Algeria; Arts. 40 and 51 AA Morocco, Arts. 40 and 51 AA Tunisia, Art. 47 AA 
Egypt; Art. 48 AA Lebanon; Art. 68 AA Jordan.
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costs, which will lead to an increase in Euro-Med trade. At present, a number 
of important harmonisation steps across the Euro-Mediterranean region have 
been taken. A working group on trade measures started the approximation of 
legislation in the field of standards, technical regulations and conformity as-
sessment procedures in 2003.28 Since the Mediterranean countries have no 
prospect of accession to the EU, they are not obliged to implement all EU 
standards and technical requirements. 
3.2.2.1. industrial goods
The Mediterranean countries should implement those EU standards and re-
quirements that will lead to economic development of the Mediterranean coun-
tries, namely those that cover industrial goods which constitute a significant 
part of Mediterranean countries’ export to the European market. Each Mediter-
ranean country has to indicate which EU harmonisation directives it wants to 
implement. The Mediterranean countries have already identified priority areas 
for harmonisation and have started adopting some relevant EU. 
harmonisation is closely related to standardisation. The setting of standards 
will help the Mediterranean manufacturers to comply with the essential health 
and safety requirements in the EU directives. In practice, the Mediterranean 
importer to the European market provides the attestation of conformity which 
ensures that his product is in conformity with the European technical specifica-
tions. Manufacturers will need to be aware of the content of EU norms which 
apply to their products. For the Mediterranean manufacturer of construction 
products this means that he needs to know the content of the Construction 
Products Regulation (CPR)29 according to which it is mandatory for manufac-
turers to apply CE-marking to products which comply with the EU standards. 
The organisation of specialised training courses for manufacturers, authorised 
representatives and their trade associations of the Mediterranean countries will 
contribute largely to the improvement of understanding of the EU standards 
and requirements in particular fields in the region. 
28 Conclusions of the Euromed Trade Ministerial Conference in Palermo of 7 July 2003, 64 
Euromed Report (2003) para. 6. The Ministers instructed the working group to implement a six-
point work programme that defines the steps required to approximate legislation in this field: (1) 
identification of priority sectors; (2) acquaintance with the applicable EU legislation and conduct a 
gap analysis on the basis of the existing legislation; (3) transposition of the necessary framework 
legislation and sectoral legislation; (4) creation/reformation of existing institutions; (5) set up nec-
essary certification and conformity assessment bodies; (6) identification of technical assistance 
needs and make most of existing programmes. For an overview of the progress of approximation 
of legislation in the field of standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment proce-
dures, see Annexes A, B and C of the Report on the Approximation of Legislation of 15 July 2004, 
available at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/ enterprise_policy/ind_coop_programmes/
med/doc/f1947_en.pdf>.
29 Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 March 2011 
of 9 March 2011 laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products 
and repealing Council Directive 89/106/EEC, OJ L 88/5, 4.4.2011 was adopted on 9th March 2011 
and published as regulation No 305/2011. The first parts of the Regulation will come into force 20 
days after publication. The provisions on human health and environment (dangerous substances) 
shall apply as from 1st July 2013.
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After the adoption of the relevant EU acquis, the Mediterranean countries 
should establish an adequate infrastructure in the field of standardisation, ac-
creditation and conformity assessment (metrology, certification, analyses and 
tests) as well as market surveillance. Testing of products of the Mediterranean 
countries is necessary for export of these products to the EU. The standardi-
sation, accreditation, conformity assessment bodies and market surveillance 
authority in the Mediterranean country must meet several requirements.30 If no 
such institution is present in a Mediterranean country, institutions from neigh-
bouring countries can be asked to deliver certification services.31 Further, the 
Mediterranean countries should participate in European and international stan-
dardisation bodies.
This approximation process and the establishment of the necessary infra-
structure will lead to negotiations about the establishment of Agreements on 
Conformity Assessment and Acceptance (ACAAs) for industrial products.32 
ACAAs are a specific type of a MRA and will probably be included as an ad-
dendum to the DCFTA.33 An ACAA is an MRA but based on the alignment of 
the legislative system of the Mediterranean country with the EU legislation and 
establishment of infrastructure that fulfills all EU requirements. ACAAs are 
currently being prepared with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the 
PA and Tunisia in industrial sectors where the legislation is harmonised at EU 
level. A first ACAA for medicinal products, active pharmaceuticals excipients 
or mixtures thereof, for human and veterinary use has been concluded with 
Israel in the form of a Protocol annexed to the Euro-Med AA.34 The ACAA 
30 <http://www.industrie.gov.tn/marquage-ce/www/en/doc.asp?mcat=59&mrub=150>.
31 S. Rawdan and J.-L. Reiffers, FEMiSE Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
2006: Analysis and Proposals of the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic institutes (Mar-
seille, Institut de la Méditerranée 2006) p. 33.
32 See Commission Staff Working Paper of 25 August 2004 on Agreements on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs), SEC (2004)1071.
33 See V. Movchan and V. Shportyuk, EU-Ukraine DCFTA: the Model for Eastern Partner-
ship Regional Trade Cooperation, No. 445/2012, for CASE (Centre for Social and Economic 
Research), 2012, Warsaw, p. 15.
34 Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of a Protocol to the 
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part, on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (CAA); OJ L 145 of 11/06/2010, p. 1. There 
are objections claiming that the ACAA must be rejected because Israel violates human rights in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, legally based on Article 2 EU-Israel AA defines that the rela-
tions between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based 
on respect for human rights and democratic principles. Example of a reservation to the Protocol: 
Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 13 June 2012 for the Committee on International 
Trade. “At the present israel applies all the agreements concluded with the EU in the whole of 
“the territory of the State of israel” as defined in israeli national law, including the territories she 
has occupied since 1967. The EU does not recognise israel’s application of these agreements 
to the occupied territories, nor does it recognise any israeli legislation advocating the annexation 
and settlement of those territories (e.g. the Basic law: Jerusalem, Capital of israel adopted by 
the Knesset on 30th July 1980 annexing East Jerusalem), which it considers to be contrary to in-
ternational law. EU authorities, therefore, are required to refrain from giving effect to them in any 
way whatsoever, since it is prohibited by current Community law and by the EU’s international 
obligations. in this context, the terms of the proposed text might allow israel to implement the 
Protocol on the basis of its national law defining the territorial scope of its domestic market, hence 
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provides for two mechanisms, first, alignment of the specific EU acquis by Is-
rael. Israel aligned its legislation to EU law that sets essential requirements for 
medicinal products in harmonising directives (New Approach) and participates 
in the European organisations in the sector covered by it.35 Thus the ACAA 
allows medicinal products, which fulfil all essential requirements, to be placed 
on the Israeli market without needing any further authorisation, and vice versa.36 
A second mechanism is the mutual acceptance of medicinal products that are 
lawfully placed on the market in one of the parties. For medicinal products for 
which there exist no harmonising directives, these products may be traded 
between Israel and the EU on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition: 
a product lawfully traded on the Israeli market, will be lawfully imported in the 
EU and vice versa.37 
3.2.2.2. Agricultural products, processed agricultural products and fish and 
fishery products
The Mediterranean area is very depending on imported agricultural products 
to feed its population. Therefore, further liberalisation in trade in agricultural 
products, processed agricultural products and fish and fishery products is of 
utmost importance and will happen in accordance with the Euro-Med Roadmap 
for agriculture (Rabat Roadmap) adopted by the Euro-Med Ministers of Foreign 
including the territories she has occupied since 1967 which are not under Palestinian economic 
administration. if that were to happen, the EU would be failing to comply with its Community law 
and its obligations under international law. in addition, when conducting its foreign policy, the EU 
must not deviate from the provisions of the Treaty of lisbon which imposes an explicit require-
ment on the EU to ensure consistency between different areas of its external action and between 
these external policy areas and other policies. With this regard, the EU’s common commercial 
policy shall be conducted in the context of the objectives of the Union’s external action, in the spirit 
of the principles the EU is founded on, including the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. These obligations also apply to the EU’s revised Neighbourhood Policy, which relies on 
positive conditionality (“more for more”). Against this background, current israeli government poli-
cies, with special regard to the continued building and expansion of settlements in East Jerusalem 
and the West Bank and the blockade of the Gaza Strip, as well as the situation of Arab citizens of 
israel and the increasing pressure on human rights NGOs in the country raise serious concerns 
about the political context of this agreement.”
Israel serves as a good example as how to integrate further in the EU market of industrial 
products: Israel created an infrastructure in the field of standardisation, accreditation, conformity 
assessment and metrology; EU sectoral legislation was transposed in the priority sectors: i.e., 
pharmaceuticals legislation and standards in the areas of pressure equipment and medical de-
vices. There is convergence with certain EU sanitary and phytosanitary rules and Israel became 
a member of the European standards bodies CEN and CENELEC. This should be the end goal 
of all Mediterranean neighbours.
35 Israel serves as a good example as how to integrate further in the EU market of industrial 
products: Israel created an infrastructure in the field of standardisation, accreditation, conformity 
assessment and metrology; EU sectoral legislation was transposed in the priority sectors: i.e., 
pharmaceuticals legislation and standards in the areas of pressure equipment and medical de-
vices. There is convergence with certain EU sanitary and phytosanitary rules and Israel became 
a member of the European standards bodies CEN and CENELEC. This should be the end goal 
of all Mediterranean neighbours.
36 On 23 October 2012, the European Parliament (EP) approved the ACAA. The protocol is 
not yet published in the OJ and thus has not entered into force.
37 Cf. supra 3.2.1 the mutual recognition principle in non-harmonized areas. 
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Affairs on 28 November 2005.38 The liberalisation agreement will take the form 
of an Exchange of Letters which amends the Euro-Med AA and its Protocols. 
Also here, the Mediterranean countries should implement EU directives 
covering agricultural goods which constitute an important part of Mediterranean 
countries’ exports to the European market in order to establish trade corridors 
for agricultural goods. In the future this approximation process should lead to 
the establishment of trade corridors, in the form of Agreements on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance (ACAAs) for agricultural products, processed 
agricultural products and fish and fishery products. The Mediterranean country 
involved will have to align its legislation to harmonising EU directives which 
contain essential requirements for agricultural and fishery (New Approach). 
Agricultural products, processed agricultural products and fish and fishery 
products for which there exist no harmonising directives in the EU, may be 
traded between the Mediterranean country and the EU on the basis of the 
principle of mutual recognition.
Agricultural products, processed agricultural products and fish and fishery 
products must comply with all sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules such as 
additives and toxic substances in food or drink, and technical barriers to trade 
(TBT) measures, such as labelling of composition of food; quality requirements 
for fresh food; volume, shape and appearance of packaging etc. These are 
also tested upon conformity by strong independent institutions before they 
enter the EU. At present a Common Declaration on SPS and TBT issues is 
added to the Euro-Med AAs.39 Some Euro-Med AAs mention the need for 
harmonisation of SPS standards40, such as article 46 of the Israel/EU AA. 
Other Euro-Med AAs such as the Morocco/EU AA do not mention anything 
about SPS measures.Only the EU and Morocco concluded a special Agree-
ment concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products 
and fishery products in which it is clarified which SPS and TBT measures should 
be implemented before trade can start.41 The EU and Morocco have to apply 
the following SPS measures: those that derive from the ‘WTO Agreement on 
38 Five Year Work Programme adopted at the 10th Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Summit, Barcelona 27-28 November 2005, see http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/archive/
documents.htm.
39 See for example Annex III of the EU/Egypt Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Let-
ters between the European Community and the Arab Republic of Egypt concerning reciprocal 
liberalisation measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural products and fish and 
fishery products, the replacement of Protocols 1 and 2 and their annexes and amendments to the 
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communi-
ties and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part, 
28/04/2010, L 106, p. 41.
40 Annex A of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement). The SPS Agreement entered into force with the establishment of the World 
Trade Organization on 1 January 1995. It concerns the application of food safety and animal and 
plant health regulations.  
41 Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the 
Kingdom of Morocco concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products, proc-
essed agricultural products, fish and fishery products, the replacement of Protocols 1, 2 and 3 and 
their Annexes and amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an associa-
tion between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the King-
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the Application of SPS Measures42 and the standards, procedures and recom-
mendations of international standards organisations.43 As concerns the TBT 
standards, the EU and Morocco must oblige with standards, technical regula-
tions, and conformity assessments of the WTO Agreement on Technical Bar-
riers to Trade. The European Parliament welcomed this EU/Morocco special 
Agreement, yet emphasised that access of Morocco and other Mediterranean 
neighbours to the EU’s internal market should not only be subject to compliance 
with SPS and TBT standards but also to environmental standards.44 Neverthe-
less, the special Agreement does not mention environmental standards.
For the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the EU designed a different Agreement 
in order to support the building of a Palestinian state. The agreement gives 
immediate access and full liberalisation, for a transitional period of 10 years to 
the EU market, with possible further extension in time, to all agricultural prod-
ucts, processed agricultural products and fish and fishery products originating 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.45
3.2.3. Derogations in the DCFTA and the Rule of Reason concept in the  
  Euro-Med context
3.2.3.1. Provision in the DCFTA, its interpretation and some illustrations
Similar to what is stated in the TFEU,46 the parties to the DCFTAs may derogate 
from the principle of free movement of goods on the grounds of: (i) public mo-
rality, public policy or public security; (ii) the protection of life and health of 
humans, animals or plants; (iii) the protection of national treasures possessing 
dom of Morocco, of the other part, 7.9.2012, OJ L 214/4, p. 4. This Agreement can be seen as the 
result of Morocco’s steps to democracy by reforming its constitution and conducting fair elections.
42 All Mediterranean neighbours should adopt all EU SPS standards on the protection of: (a) 
animal or plant life or health from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, 
diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; (b) human or animal life or 
health from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in 
foods, beverages or feedstuffs; (c) human life or health from risks arising from diseases carried by 
animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or (d) to 
prevent or limit other damage from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, see articles 12-14, 
Annex A to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, available 
at www.wto.org.
43 These international standards organisations are the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the 
World Organisation for Animal health, the International Office of Epizootic Diseases, the Inter-
national Plant Protection Convention and the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Or-
ganisation.
44 European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2012 on the Agreement between the EU 
and Morocco concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products and fishery 
products (2012/2522(RSP) P7_TA-PROV(2012)0055.
45 Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union, of the one 
part, and the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, provid-
ing further liberalisation of agricultural products, processed agricultural products and fish and 
fishery products and amending the Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade 
and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, of the other, 10.12.2011 OJ L 328/5.
46 Article 36 TFEU.
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artistic, historic or architectural value; (iv) the protection of intellectual, indus-
trial or commercial property; (v) rules related to gold and silver; and (vi) the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.47 The national measure which 
derogates from the free movement of goods must be the least restrictive on 
the free movement of goods.48 
This provision applies to industrial goods as well as to agricultural, fishery 
and agricultural processed products. When a Mediterranean country believes 
that religion or culture are undermined by certain trading activities, they are 
likely to impose trade restrictions, especially on the grounds of public morality 
and public policy, and are given wide liberty by the EU to do so.49 An interest-
ing case of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is that of Omega Spielhallen 
of 14 October 2004.50 In this case, the ECJ ruled that a restriction on the free 
movement of goods between the Member States was possible to protect fun-
damental values laid down in the national German constitution. If the same 
principle is also applied in the Euro-Med relationship, many goods will be pro-
hibited from entering the Mediterranean region because of their strict national 
constitutions.51 Also according to the ECJ, the concept of ‘public policy’ in the 
EU context must be interpreted strictly; public policy may be relied on only if 
there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of 
society.52 But the interpretation given by the ECJ to the derogation provision 
Article 36 TFEU is not necessarily valid for the derogation principles in the 
Euro-Med AAs. The ECJ ruled that a similarity of terms is not a sufficient reason 
for transposing ECJ case law to the provisions of the international agreement. 
The interpretation in the Euro-Med context is different; more restrictions are 
allowed in the Euro-Med context, since the DCFTA do not aim at full acceptance 
of all EU acquis, but at deep and comprehensive integration.53 however, the 
deeper and more comprehensive the Euro-Med integration in the field of goods, 
the fewer exceptions will be tolerated. Derogations from the Euro-Med move-
47 Art. 27 Algeria AA; Art. 28 Morocco AA; Art. 28 Tunisia AA; Art. 26 Egypt AA; Art. 27 Jordan 
AA ; Art. 27 Israel AA and Art. 27 Lebanon AA. The derogation regarding the conservation of the 
exhaustible natural resources is only provided for in the Lebanon AA (Art. 27 Lebanon AA).
48 See for example Art. 27 EU/Algeria AA: Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude prohibi-
tions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, 
public policy or public security, of the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants, 
of the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, of the 
protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property or of regulations concerning gold 
and silver. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties.
49 hakura, EU-Mediterranean and Gulf Trade Agreements (Isle of Wight, Palladian Law Pub-
lishing 2000) p. 12.
50 C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberburgermeisterin 
der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.
51 See C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris [2002] ECR I-1335.
52 Cf. supra n. 51 at para. 17.
53 According to settled case law, a mere similarity in the wording of a provision of the EC 
Treaty and an international agreement between the EC and a non-member country is not suf-
ficient to give to the wording of that agreement the same meaning as it has in the EC Treaty, see 
Polydor case, paras. 14 to 21; Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, paras. 29 to 31, and 
C-312/91 Metalsa [1993] ECR I-3751, paras. 11 to 20.
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ment of goods will no longer be possible after the Mediterranean countries and 
the EU have concluded the ACAA.54 In the EU, article 114 TFEU provides re-
strictions by Member States even after harmonisation at the European level. 
The exception defines that, after the adoption of a harmonisation measure, a 
Member State deems it necessary to maintain national provisions on grounds 
of major needs referred to in Article 36 TFEU, or relating to the protection of 
the environment or the working environment, the Member State will notify the 
Commission of these provisions as well as the grounds for maintaining them. 
Such an additional exception is not (yet) available under the Euro-Med relation-
ship.
In the Euro-Med relationship, goods will be prohibited from entering the 
Mediterranean region because of their strict national measures inspired by 
religion, tradition and culture in the Middle East and North Africa. When Medi-
terranean countries believe that religion or cultures are undermined by trading 
activities, they are likely to impose trade restrictions, especially on the grounds 
of public morality and public policy.55 Trade in alcohol (wine, beer, spirits) for 
example between the EU and the region will be subject to restrictive measures 
in many Mediterranean countries. Another illustration concerns the protection 
of national treasures. The EU Internal Market led to an increase of stolen art 
goods since stolen goods could be transported between the Member States 
without border control. To prevent this, the EU took some measures to protect 
national artistic, historic or archaeological treasures,56 such as Directive 92/280 
on the procedure of restitution of treasures that have been taken illegally from 
one EU country to another which includes a basic list of protected national 
treasures.57 Beyond this list, EU Member States are free to take restrictive 
national measures under the article 36 TFEU exception and add other 
54 Case C-1/96 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte: Compas-
sion in World Farming ltd [1998) ECR I-1251.The ECJ made it clear that a Member State could 
not rely on the views or behaviour of a section of national public opinion in order to unilaterally 
challenge a harmonising measure (in this case a directive) adopted by the EC institutions.
55 hakura, supra n. 49 at p. 12.
56 Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully re-
moved from the territory of a Member State, OJ L 74, 27.3.1993, p. 74. See also C. Barnard, The 
Substantive law of the EU, the four freedoms (Oxford, 2010), p. 163; Council Regulation (EC) No 
116/2009 of 18 December 2008 on the export of cultural goods, OJ L 39, 10.2.2009, p. 1–7; C. G. 
Jernigan, Protecting National Treasures in a Single-Market EC, Boston College international and 
Comparative law Review (B.C. int’l & Comp.l. Rev.) (1994), Volume 17, Issue 1, 153.
57 The annexes 14-15 set out 14 categories of items ranked as national treasures: (1) ar-
chaeological discoveries more than 100 years old; (2) objects (including furniture) from artistic, 
historical, or religious monuments more than 100 years old; (3) paintings executed prior to 1600; 
(4) engravings and prints; (5) sculpture; (6) constructions and composite works; (7) photographs; 
(8) manuscripts more than 100 years old; (9) books more than 200 years old; (10) archives over 
50 years old; (11) philatelic specimens; (12) fauna, flora, minerals, or anatomy of historical, ar-
chaeological, paleontological, ethnographic, or numismatic interest; (13) motor vehicles over 75 
years old; (14) antiques over 100 years old. A second list indicates minimum monetary value for 
an object to be considered a national treasure: paintings dated between 1600 and 1900 with a 
value of at least 75,000 ECUs; paintings dated after 1900 with a value of at least 150,000 ECUs; 
engravings and prints worth at least 7,500 ECUs; sculpture worth at least 50,000 ECUs; construc-
tions and composite works worth at least 100,000 ECUs; photographs worth at least 7,500 ECUs; 
philatelic specimens worth at least 25,000 ECUs; furniture or musical antiques worth at least 
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national treasures. The Netherlands has compiled an additional list of approx-
imately 300 objects that need governmental permission to leave the country. 
The Mediterranean countries consider much more objects as a part of the 
cultural heritage. In Greece, anything dating back before 1830 is considered 
state property. Italy considers over 30 million works of art as falling within the 
article 36 TFEU category.58 The protection of national artistic, historic or ar-
chaeological treasures in the Mediterranean area will be a challenging task 
due to the general lack of documentation and information in the cultural and 
artistic field.
3.2.3.2. The concept of the Rule of reason in the Euro-Med context
In the Cassis de Dijon case about the rule of reason, the ECJ stated that other 
restrictions to the free movement of goods within the EU were also possible.59 
Restriction of free movement of goods is allowed, in anticipation of harmonisa-
tion of laws in particular fields at EU level, if a mandatory requirement or pub-
lic interest needs to be satisfied such as the protection of public health, the 
protection of consumers, the protection of the environment, the protection of 
traffic safety, or the proper functioning of telecommunication services.60 The 
national measure that restricts trade must be of a non-economic nature, ap-
plicable without any distinction at the national level as to imported products. 
Also the proportionality principle must be met. The rule of reason can only be 
applied in the Euro-Med relations in anticipation of harmonisation of particular 
fields if a mandatory requirement or public interest needs to be satisfied. The 
Mediterranean countries and the EU aim at aligning their legislation in certain 
fields only, such as areas where the Mediterranean countries have vital export 
interest to the EU.61 In such fields, in anticipation of harmonisation of laws, it 
can be argued that the rule of reason also applies between the Mediterranean 
countries and the EU. 
20,000 ECUs; or any other antique under category 14 worth at least 50,000 ECUs. id. see also 
annex with list of possible treasures.
58 Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee on the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) n° 3911/92 on the ex-
port of cultural goods and Council Directive 93/7/EEC on the return of cultural objects unlawfully 
removed from the territory of a Member State, COM/2000/0325 final.
59 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 
00649.
60 This list in not exhaustive. 
61 For example, Jordan has vital export interests to the EU as concerns pharmaceuticals; 
Morocco exports mainly agricultural products to the EU and Egypt exports energy, chemicals and 
textiles and clothes to the EU.
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4. ThE EURO-MED LIBERALISATION OF SERVICES ThROUGh 
ThE DCFTAS
4.1. The current provisions of movement of services in the 
Euro-Med AAs
All Euro-Med AAs, except for the PA-EU Interim AA, include provisions on the 
movement of services.62 The provisions in the AAs with Morocco, Tunisia, Is-
rael and Egypt differ from those in the AAs with Algeria, Lebanon and Jordan 
since these countries were members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
at the time the AAs were drafted. These countries basically refer to the ser-
vices provisions as provided for in the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in 
Services) in general and the MFN (Most Favoured Nation) treatment in par-
ticular.63 The MFN treatment will not apply when WTO parties decide to conclude 
a ‘preferential economic integration agreement on services’ as provided for in 
Article V of the GATS.64 In the event of such a preferential agreement, the 
partners to the agreement will grant each other preferential treatment, which 
is different from the treatment of all other countries.65 Jordan, Algeria and 
Lebanon were not a member of the WTO at the time the AAs were drafted.66 
These Mediterranean countries had to create a legal framework concerning 
the movement of services themselves, since they could not simply refer to the 
GATS and the MFN treatment. Jordan and the EU included a best endeavour 
clause which should lead to a gradual supply of services by European and 
Jordanian companies.67 Algeria grants treatment to European cross-border 
service suppliers no less favourable than that accorded to companies of any 
third country.68 Lebanon only included a reference to the obligations under the 
GATS, which will take effect from the date of accession of Lebanon to the 
62 On 23 June 2005, the Commission adopted a proposal to open negotiations on the liberali-
sation of services and investment with the Mediterranean countries. This marks an important step 
towards the creation of the free trade area between Europe and the Mediterranean. 
63 Art. II(1) GATS and Art. 32 Morocco AA; Art. 30 Tunisia AA; Art. 31 Israel AA and Art. 29 
Egypt AA.
64 See, for example, Art. 30(2)(a) Tunisia AA.
65 The ‘preferential economic services agreement’ must fulfill all conditions set out in Article 
V of the GATS.
66 It must be noted that Jordan has become a member of the WTO in 2000. For Jordan, the 
GATS provisions and the Euro-Med provisions apply. As regards the interaction between the 
relevant services provisions in the Jordan/EU AA and the GATS, article 44 of the Jordan/EU AA 
stipulates that treatment granted by a party to the other shall, as from the day one month prior 
to the date of entry into force of the relevant obligations of the GATS, in respect of sectors or 
measures covered by the GATS, in no case be more favourable than that accorded by such first 
party under the provisions of the GATS and this in respect of each service sector, subsector and 
mode of supply.
67 Art. 37 Jordan AA. 
68 Art. 31 Algeria AA. 
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WTO.69 Jordan, Algeria and Lebanon also included the possibility of concluding 
a preferential agreement on services.70 
The AAs with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel refer to the GATS and its 
‘derogation from the movement of services’ provisions. The Lebanon-EU AA 
does not provide for derogations from the movement of services. The Jordan 
and Algerian AAs offer several possibilities to derogate from the movement of 
services, such as restrictions on grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health;71 restrictions as regards services connected to the exercise of 
official authority;72 measures for prudential reasons to protect investors, de-
positors or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system;73 par-
ticular rules concerning the establishment and operation in one party’s 
territory of branches of companies justified by legal or technical differences.74
4.2. Towards a deeper and more comprehensive integration as 
regards services between the EU and the Mediterranean area 
Most Mediterranean countries and the EU wish to create a preferential integra-
tion agreement on services. Contrary to the Euro-Med movement of goods, 
there are almost no binding provisions in the Euro-Med AAs as regards the 
Euro-Med movement of services. To become DCFTAs, the Euro-Med AAs 
should encompass binding legal provisions; a mere referral to the provisions 
in the GATS will not be sufficient anymore. The future agreements must include 
similar provisions on services for all Mediterranean countries in order to ensure 
consistency of the legal framework. however, also specific provisions will be 
inserted in the agreements which will take into account the special economic 
situation and financial needs of the least-developed Mediterranean countries. 
After the inclusion of binding provisions in the Euro-Med AAs, it should be as-
sessed whether further liberalisation of the movement of services is feasible 
via approximation of legislation and/or the application of the mutual recognition 
principle in the field of services. The Istanbul Framework Protocol serves as a 
non-binding basis for negotiations about the liberalisation of services between 
the Mediterranean countries and the EU.75 The EU and the different Mediter-
69 Art. 30 Lebanon AA: Treatment granted by either party to the other with respect to the 
rights of establishment and the supply of services shall be based on each party’s commitments 
and other obligations under the GATS. This provision shall take effect from the date of the final 
accession of Lebanon to the WTO. The parties shall not, between the date of entry of into force 
of this agreement and Lebanon’s accession to the WTO, take any measures or actions which will 
render the conditions for the supply of services by the EC or Lebanese service suppliers more 
discriminatory than those existing on the date of entry into force of this Agreement.
70 Art. 65 Jordan AA.
71 Art. 35, para. 1 Algeria AA and Art. 41 Jordan AA.
72 Art. 35, para. 2 Algeria AA and Art. 41 Jordan AA. 
73 Art. 46 Jordan AA and Art. 35 para. 4 Algeria AA. 
74 The Jordan and Algerian AAs also stipulate that the movement of services do not apply to 
air transport, inland waterways transport and maritime transport: Art. 34 Algeria AA and Arts. 31 
and 39 Jordan AA. 
75 Negotiating Trade in Services: A Practical Guide for Developing Countries, International 
Trade Department of the World Bank, May 2009, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1248204247129/Negotiating_Trade_in_Services.pdf.
112
CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2013/3 Pieters
ranean partners will negotiate about the liberalisation of services on the ‘vol-
untary participation’ model. Negotiations will be opened with Mediterranean 
partners ‘willing’ to enter into such an agreement.76 The negotiations with the 
‘willing’ partners will be made public to the non-willing countries. This allows 
all Mediterranean partners to be aware of and acquire the best offer made by 
the EU in any sector to any country. The future preferential services agreement 
as part of the DCFTA includes a vertical dimension meaning that Mediterranean 
countries open their sectors to the EU and vice versa, but includes also a 
horizontal dimension meaning that the different Mediterranean partners open 
their services markets to each other. The horizontal dimension is reflected in 
the regional Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause: a Mediterranean country, 
which maintains a preferential treatment with the EU, should grant the other 
Mediterranean countries a preferential treatment that is not be less favourable 
than the one granted to the EU. This principle will be difficult to apply in practice, 
since there are almost no written agreements amongst the Mediterranean 
partners. 
4.2.1. legal concepts as regards the Euro-Med movement of services  
  in the DCFTAs
The free movement of services is defined as the right of self-employed persons 
to move freely between Member States in order to provide services on a tem-
porary basis. According to hakura, a service within the scope of the Euro-Med 
AAs is an economic activity which is intangible and involves an element of 
commercial motivation, such as transport, advertising, construction, engineer-
ing, distribution, education and the transmission of television signals. For in-
stance, situations where a French professor offers his educational services in 
Tunisia; where a Swedish constructor builds roads in Jordan; and where a 
Moroccan professional football player offers his services in the EU. It does not 
apply to state education and sports purely based on sporting interests, since 
these involve no economic element.77 An economic activity in the Euro-Med 
AA means an activity of an industrial, commercial or professional character.78 
The Istanbul Framework Protocol adds that services include any service in any 
sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.79 
76 This approach mirrors the Framework Protocol on Services, which was adopted by the 
Ministers of Trade in Istanbul in July 2004 and which served as a template in further negotiations.
77 F.S. hakura, supra n. 49 at p. 35. Films are considered as goods.
78 Definitions are based on Art. 36 Algeria AA.
79 In the EU, the movement of services resorts under articles 51–62 of the TFEU and the 
harmonisation Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 De-
cember 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ L 376/36) aims at further dismantling of re-
maining barriers. There are many services are excluded from the scope of this EU Directive such 
as electronic communications; transport (urban transport, taxis, ambulances); financial services; 
audiovisual services; gambling; social services (housing, childcare, family support); taxation; pub-
lic and private healthcare provided by professionals to patients; and pharmaceutical services. For 
those excluded services the general provisions on the free movement of services (articles 51– 62 
of the TFEU) apply.
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A provision on temporary presence should be inserted in the DCFTAs. Tem-
porary presence relates to persons of one country temporarily entering the 
territory of another country to supply a service (for example, circus artists, 
lawyers, sportsmen or teachers). This concept is narrowly related to the move-
ment of persons. Freedom to provide services across borders within the mean-
ing of the EU Directive on Services means that a provider who is established 
in one EU Member State may temporarily or occasionally provide its services 
within the territory of another member state without having to settle there. The 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)80 includes an interesting pro-
vision about the temporary local presence of enterprises in the territory of the 
other party in the case of cross-border provision of services. The provision 
defines that no party may require the service provider of the other party to 
establish or maintain a representative office in any form or enterprise, or to be 
resident, in its territory as a condition for the cross-border of a service. Accord-
ing to the WTO, the notions non-permanent or temporary range from an em-
ploying period varying between 3 months to 5 years.
For each service there are different methods in which they can be supplied.81 
Mode 1 concerns the cross-border trade in services. To define the cross-border 
supply of services between the EU and the Mediterranean countries, other 
services liberalisation agreements may serve as an example. The NAFTA is 
used as an example to define the cross-border provisions of a service as fol-
lows: the provision of a service (a) from the territory of a party into the territory 
of another party, (b) in the territory of a party by a person of that party to a 
person of another party or (c) by a national of a party in the territory of another 
party.82 Services under mode 1 are supplied through the telecommunications 
or postal infrastructure of a country and may include consultancy or market 
research reports, telemedical advice, distance training, architectural drawings 
being electronically transmitted etc. Mode 2 concerns consumption abroad 
which refers to European residents obtaining services in the territory of a Med-
iterranean country and vice versa. For example, it applies to an Algerian lawyer 
going to France to provide legal advice and European tourists visiting Morocco. 
Mode 3 concerns the delivery of services through commercial presence, such 
as the establishment of a branch office of a foreign bank in a partner country. 
Mode 4 concerns temporary movement of natural persons such an independent 
supplier (consultant, health worker, etc.) or an employee of a service supplier 
(for example employee of a consultancy firm, hospital, construction company). 
Free movement of services often implies movement of persons. Therefore 
mobility agreements will need to be negotiated.
Free movement of services implies the prohibition of quantitative restrictions 
and all measures having the same effect. A quantitative restriction is a non-
discriminatory measure that imposes limitation on: (a) a number of service 
providers, whether in the form of a quota, a monopoly or an economic needs 
test, or by any other quantitative means; or (b) the operation of any service 
80 See http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?conID=590.
81 See Article I:2 GATS.
82 See Nafta.
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provider, whether in the form of a quota or an economic needs test, or by any 
other quantitative means.83 A measure having the same effect as a quantitative 
measure might be for example the obligation for the service provider to obtain 
authorisation from the authorities of the country in which the service provider 
wants to provide its services. In the Euro-Med context however, full free move-
ment of services is not the end goal. The desired degree of integration in the 
field of services is not yet clear, but there should be a deep and comprehensive 
movement of services. According to Müller-Jentsch, the purpose of the Euro-
Med liberalisation of movement of services is the removal of the main tariff and 
non-tariff barriers that hinder the movement of services, reliant on the eco-
nomic development of the Mediterranean country involved.84 Since full Euro-Med 
liberalisation of services is not the end goal of the future DCFTAs, each party 
will have to explain all restrictions on the movement of services it wants to 
maintain. Services that will still be subject to quantitative restrictions and/or 
measures having the same effect should be notified to the other party and in-
cluded in an Annex to the DCFTA. The same goes for the prohibition of dis-
crimination based on nationality. This prohibition will not apply to the services 
included in the Annex to the DCFTA. To further liberalise Euro-Med trade in 
services, the EU and the Mediterranean country may, after a period of time, 
renegotiate and remove some services from the Annex. 
4.2.2. Mutual Recognition principle in non-harmonised areas 
In the EU, the ECJ introduced the principle of mutual recognition in the field of 
services85: if a service was lawfully authorised in one Member State, the service 
should be acceptable throughout the EU. In Euro-Med context, the mutual 
recognition principle would imply that a service lawfully supplied in a Mediter-
ranean country should be accepted in the EU, even when this service does not 
fully comply with the rules of the EU and vice versa. There is one exception to 
this principle: the EU or an EU Member State may refuse the supply of the 
service in its present form as the refusal is strictly necessary for the protection 
of, for example, public safety, health or environment. In that case, the EU or 
the EU Member State must also demonstrate that its measure is the least 
trade-restrictive measure. In the EU, the application of the mutual recognition 
principle in the field of services seemed ineffective in practice: numerous bar-
riers remained in the EU Member States and prevented providers from offering 
services in another EU Member State.86 The application of the judicial principle 
of mutual recognition of services proved to be a challenging form of transna-
83 See NAFTA, article 1207.
84 D. Müller-Jentsch, Deep integration and trade in services in the Euro-Mediterranean Re-
gion, World Bank/European Commission, p. 15.
85 Such as Case 205/84, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of 
Germany, ECR 1986, p. 3755.
86 Claes-Mikael Jonsson, Paper for the ETUC Working Group on Social Policy and Legisla-
tion, Comparing the mutual recognition principle and the country of origin principle, 2005, at http://
www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/Mutual_recognition_prinEN.pdf, p. 10.
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tional governance in the EU and will certainly be too demanding between the 
Mediterranean countries and the EU. Jakubiak correctly remarks that the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition requires a substantial amount of confidence in the 
other party which will take time to develop in the Euro-Mediterranean relation-
ship.87 It implies the existence of and trust in each other’s regulations on ser-
vices, quality assessment mechanisms and testing facilities that should offer 
equivalent levels of protection. ‘Equivalence’ between levels of protection in 
the Mediterranean countries and those in the EU cannot be presumed. The 
Istanbul Framework Protocol defines that the EU and the Mediterranean coun-
tries shall provide recommendations on the criteria for the authorisation, licens-
ing, operation and certification of service suppliers. The EU and the 
Mediterranean country involved will consider the level of correspondence of 
their respective regulations. When both parties decide that the recommendation 
is consistent with the provisions of the agreement, the recommendation will be 
implemented through a Mutual Recognition Agreement on requirements, qual-
ifications, licenses and other regulations to be negotiated by the EU and the 
Mediterranean country involved. MRAs do not involve any legislative alignment 
to European norms, but concern the guarantee of quality of services through 
the acceptance of authorisation, licensing, operation and certification of service 
suppliers other countries. For example, through a mutual recognition agreement 
(MRA), qualified professional accountants from a Mediterranean country can 
practice in the EU without double testing. 
4.2.3. Approximation in harmonised areas
The EU established another liberalisation mechanism through the Services 
Directive since the principle mutual recognition was not sufficiently effective.88 
The Directive regulates the mutual recognition principle (regulatory mutual 
recognition) which is different from the previous mutual recognition principle 
which was developed by the ECJ (judicial mutual recognition).89 The imple-
mentation of the Services Directive in the different Member States was hindered 
by many legislative problems as well as practical problems such as language 
barriers and insufficient awareness.90 Aligning their norms to other existing EU 
standards and legislation, such as EU legislation in the financial sector and 
banking sector, is not the priority of the Mediterranean countries at this moment 
87 M. Jakubiak et al., supra n. 24, pp. 22-23.
88 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on services in the internal market, OJ L 376/36. Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications 
applies to all EU Member State nationals wishing to practise a regulated profession, on either a 
self-employed or employed basis, in a Member State other than that in which they obtained their 
professional qualifications.
89 C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
90 In October 2011 the Commission has decided to refer Austria, Germany and Greece to the 
ECJ on the ground that they have so far only partially transposed the Services Directive. 
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and is be too costly and complex.91 The Mediterranean countries have weak 
administrations with not much financial means and are trying to reform their 
state into a more democratic system and to improve their legislation on human 
rights. The example of Turkey that is in the process of aligning its legislation to 
the EU acquis as regards the movement of services demonstrates that liber-
alisation of services is very difficult to achieve at the legislative level and in 
practice. Negotiations between Turkey and the EU were opened in 2000,92 but 
until now no progress has been made on the chapter on the freedom to provide 
services.93 The Turkish example shows that such harmonisation is very time 
consuming and comes to a halt in times of political unrest in the country. At 
present there is no real progress as regards the alignment of Turkish legislation 
in the area of free movement of services and the right of establishment to the 
EU acquis. however, the Mediterranean countries could opt for harmonisation 
in certain fields. The Euro-Med liberalisation of services goes hand-in-hand 
with the protection of some vital principles, such as the protection of the con-
sumer. The EU harmonised essential requirements for the protection of its 
consumers.94 For the protection of such vital interests, the Mediterranean con-
sumers could opt for alignment of their legislation to the already existing EU 
acquis on consumer protection.
4.2.4. Standardisation projects in the Euro-Med area
In the EU, standardisation in the services sector is heavily supported by the 
Commission. The Commission wants to open up standardisation to the widest 
range of services.95 Also the Services Directive encourages the development 
91 I. Dreyer, Trade Policy in the EU’s Neighourhood, Ways Forward for the Deep and Com-
prehensive Free Trade Agreements, 2012, Paper for Notre Europe, available at http://www.notre-
europe.eu/.
92 Decision No 2/2000 of the EU-Turkey Association Council of 11 April 2000 on the opening 
of negotiations aimed at the liberalisation of services and the mutual opening of procurement 
markets between the EU and Turkey, SEC/2000/0476 final.
93 Commission Staff Working Paper Turkey 2011 Progress Report of 17 October 2011, SEC 
(2011) 1201 final states as follows: Work on the detailed alignment strategy is ongoing. Dispropor-
tionate requirements are still in place with respect to the right of establishment. There has been 
no progress in the area of freedom to provide cross-border services. The granting of work and 
residence permits to service providers established in an EU Member State remains subject to reg-
istration, license or authorisation requirements that are incompatible with the acquis. Alignment 
with the Services Directive still has to be achieved, and a Point of Single Contact for the provision 
of services has to be set up. No progress can be reported on mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications. Recognition of professional qualifications still has to be differentiated from recog-
nition of academic qualifications. It has to be noted that, in December 2006, due to the Turkish 
failure to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement the Council decided 
the chapter on right of establishment, the freedom to provide service and financial services will be 
put on hold until Turkey fulfills its commitments towards Cyprus.
94 See Services Directive and Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, OJ L 255/22.
95 Communication from the Commission to European Parliament, the Council and the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee, A strategic vision for European standards: Moving forward 
to enhance and accelerate the sustainable growth of the European economy by 2020, Brussels, 
1.6.2011, COM (2011) 311 final, p. 14; Communication from the Commission: Single Market Act: 
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of European standards for services. The EU promotes its standardisation of 
services through technical assistance to the countries from the Mediterranean 
basin in order to create common a Euro-Med economic area.96 According to 
several authors, the Euro-Med liberalisation of services will develop best when 
the different countries perceive this process as a form of ‘cooperation’ rather 
than a competitive process.97 The best way to remove the barriers to the move-
ment of services is for the EU and the Mediterranean countries to reach agree-
ment on a common set of standards.98 
There are different steps to be followed towards common standardisation 
in the field of services. Firstly, the types of services have to be selected. Since 
the Mediterranean countries have no accession prospect, the end goal is to 
establish a deep and comprehensive Euro-Med liberalisation of services. The 
EU and the Mediterranean countries will have to select the services they want 
to liberalise. An example of a chosen service concerns the information and 
communications technology (ICT) sector. The Commission wants common ICT 
standards for the entire European area, but also for the Euro-Med area. An 
ongoing Euro-Med standardisation process aims at common ICT standards so 
that the EU and the Mediterranean countries profit to the highest extent from 
ICT.99 Second, training courses for the Mediterranean partners have to be 
initiated. An essential part of the ‘Common Standardisation Process’ exists out 
of the organisation of multiple training courses for officials of the willing Medi-
terranean countries by the EU to improve knowledge amongst these officials 
in the areas of standardisation, testing, certification, inspection, accreditation 
and metrology. An improved knowledge will result in educated officials which 
will be able to negotiate in an effective way about the opening of their markets 
to the EU. In the past CEN100 organised training courses, called the ‘EUROMED 
quality Programme for the movement of goods’. Follow-up courses, called 
‘EUROMED quality Programme for the movement of services’ should be per-
formed, in order to improve knowledge amongst the officials which will lead to 
better quality of services that move between the EU and the Mediterranean 
Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen confidence: Working together to create new growth, 
COM(2011)206/4; Commission Staff Working Document, Delivering the Single Market Act: State 
of Play, SWD(2012) 21 final.
96 Commission staff working document, of 18 October 2004, on the challenges for European 
standardisation [SEC(2004) 1251 – Not published in the Official Journal], p. 10. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/european-standards/files/standards_policy/role_of_stand-
ardisation/doc/staff_working_document_en.pdf.
97 K. Nicolaïdis and S. K. Schmidt, Mutual Recognition on “Trial”: The Long Road to Services 
Liberalization, Paper to be presented at the EUSA Tenth Biannual International Conference, Mon-
treal, (2007), available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/7985/1/nicolaidis-k-03a.pdf, p. 31: citation from K. 
Nicolaïdis and G. Shaffer, ‘Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Glo-
bal Government’, Michigan Review of international law (2005) 68: 267-322 and K. Schmidt, ‘Mu-
tual recognition as a new mode of governance’, Journal of European Public Policy (2005) 14(5).
98 P. Brenton and M. Machin, Trade Policy Issues for the Euro-Med Partnership, Working 
Paper published by the CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Project (2003) p. 8.
99 Communication from the Commission, A strategic vision for European standards: Moving 
forward to enhance and accelerate the sustainable growth of the European economy by 2020, 
Brussels, 1.6.2011, COM (2011) 311 final, p. 15.
100 Comité Européen de Normalisation or European Committee for Standardisation.
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countries.101 The training courses should take place before the actual negotia-
tions about the standardisation of certain services commence. It is essential 
that the Mediterranean partners are involved in the negotiations rounds at the 
very beginning of the standardisation process. Officials of the Mediterranean 
countries and the EU should involve important stakeholders, such as the rel-
evant industry, academics, consumer groups and international organisations. 
Thirdly, the EU needs to know which regulations, rules and practices are in 
place in the Mediterranean countries and needs a better understanding of the 
regulation and practices of the delivery of the specific service in the Mediter-
ranean area which should happen through in-depth studies of the rules govern-
ing the admission to and exercise of a profession. A good example of such a 
study is the comparative survey on called ‘The accounting and auditing profes-
sion in the Mediterranean area’.102 The study provides the regulatory framework 
governing the professions; use of professional titles by members of each na-
tional professional society; mandatory requirements of citizenship/residency 
as a condition for membership of the relevant national body; distribution of 
members in public practice, industry or governmental bodies; restrictions im-
posed by national law on the establishment and legal form of professional 
partnerships; general statistical information; statutory audit reports and listed 
companies audited. The study also focuses on the practice of the profession 
in the Mediterranean Area. A detailed analysis is offered on, inter alia, the range 
and scope of activities performed by members of each national professional 
body, as well as limitations and/or prohibitions imposed by national law on the 
performance of certain activities; accounting, auditing, practice and rules of 
professional conduct.103 In the banking sector, a common Euro-Med study was 
performed through the exchange of information between the Mediterranean 
countries themselves and the EU. All Mediterranean countries and the EU were 
able to compare national rules and practices. This resulted in standards con-
vergence both in the Mediterranean region and with the EU. Finally, the Med-
iterranean partners must become member of the EU standardisation bodies. 
Most Mediterranean countries have national standardisation bodies (Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Palestine), but competition be-
tween the different national standardisation bodies in the Mediterranean area 
will work contra-productive. Most Mediterranean countries are also affiliated 
with the European standardisation body.104 Affiliation means no voting rights 
and simply implementing the produced standards. Mediterranean countries 
must become member of the existing European standardisation bodies so they 
will have a say in the standardisation process. Most standards of these bodies 
101 http://www.cen.eu/cen/Services/Visibility/Euromedquality/Pages/default.aspx.
102 Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Romania, 
Serbia – including the special status territory of Kosovo, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.
103 http://www.fcmweb.org/
104 Algeria (IANOR Institut Algerien de normalization), Egypt (EO Egyptian Organisation for 
Standardisation and quality Control), Israel (Standards Institution of Israel), Lebanon (LIBNOR) 
Lebanese Standards Institution, Morocco (SNIMA Service de Normalisation Industrielle Maro-
caine) and Palestine (PSI Palestine Standards Institution) and Jordan (JSIM Jordan Institute for 
Standards and Metrology)
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are voluntary, but some standards become mandatory when they are adopted 
by regulators as legal requirements. The abovementioned steps should result 
in the establishment of need to set up sectorial Euro-Med Entities for Standar-
disation that will coordinate the standardisation process for the selected ser-
vices. The establishment of the central Euro-Med entity for Accountancy and 
Auditing, for example, is a sectorial standardisation body which will coordinate 
the standardisation process for the professions of accounting and auditing.105 
These sectorial Euro-Med entities can be compared with the DCFTA Task Force, 
composed of technical working sub-groups (such as market access; barriers 
to trade; financial services) which was set up for the liberalisation of services 
between the EU and Moldova.106
Trade in Euro-Med services will be hampered by inadequate mutual recog-
nition of qualifications.107 The EU and the Mediterranean countries should 
promote the development of mutually acceptable standards and criteria for li-
censing and certification of professional services suppliers on the basis of 
factors such as educational background, qualifying examinations and experi-
ence.108 
4.2.5. Derogations from the Euro-Med liberalisation of movement of   
  services in the DCFTAs
The Istanbul Framework Protocol provides us with a whole range of general 
restrictions: 1) protection of public morals or public order (the public order 
exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat 
is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society); 2) protection human, 
animal or plant life or health; 3) conservation of exhaustible natural resources; 
4) compliance with laws or regulations which are in line with the provisions of 
this Framework Protocol 109 etc. The Protocol also provides for security reasons 
and no country may be asked to furnish any information about essential secu-
rity interests. Finally any country may action in pursuance of its obligations 
105 Final Conference of the EuroMed Market Programme Barcelona, 28-29 April 2009 Final 
Conclusions, available at http://www.fcmweb.org.
106 See quarterly Progress Report no. 1/2011 on the Action Plan for implementing the Rec-
ommendations of the European Commission for the future negotiations of the Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). See DCFTA Task Force for the Moldova/EU DCFTA.
107 I. Andersen et al. for the World Bank, From Political to Economic Awakening in the Arab 
World: The Path of Economic integration Deauville Partnership Report on Trade and Foreign 
Direct investment, Volume II: Main Report, May 2012, p. 40.
108 Directive on mutual recognition of services in the EU is the mutual recognition of profes-
sional qualifications between the different Member States via Directive 2005/36/EC covering all 
recognition rules (except for those applicable to lawyers, activities in the field of toxic substances 
and commercial agents). I. Andersen et al. for the World Bank, From Political to Economic Awak-
ening in the Arab World: The Path of Economic integration Deauville Partnership Report on Trade 
and Foreign Direct investment, Volume II: Main Report, May 2012, p. 75.
109 Including those relating to: (i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to 
deal with the effects of a default on services contracts; (ii) the protection of the privacy of individu-
als in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confi-
dentiality of individual records and accounts.
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under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, even if it restricts the Euro-Med movement of services. The num-
ber of derogations from the Euro-Med movement of services depends on the 
degree of economic integration of services the EU and the Mediterranean 
partners envisage: the deeper the Euro-Med integration in the field of services, 
the fewer exceptions will be tolerated. 
Further, the ECJ made it possible to restrict free movement of services on 
the grounds of the rule of reason within the EU. The ECJ accepts long list of 
public interest objectives that need to be safeguarded in services, such as for 
example in health care where it is in the public interest that there is no seri-
ously undermining the financial balance of the social security system or over-
capacity in the supply of medical care. Restriction of free movement of 
services is allowed, in anticipation of harmonisation of laws in particular fields 
at EU level, if a mandatory requirement or public interest needs to be satisfied 
such as the protection of public health, the protection of consumers, the protec-
tion of the environment, the protection of traffic safety, or the proper functioning 
of telecommunication services.110 As regards the Euro-Med relationship, the 
rule of reason can be applied in the Euro-Med relations in anticipation of har-
monisation of particular fields if a mandatory requirement or public interest 
needs to be satisfied. It can be argued that the rule of reason also applies 
between the Mediterranean countries and the EU in anticipation of harmonisa-
tion of laws in particular fields of services. Parties may restrict free movement 
of services if a mandatory requirement or public interest needs to be satisfied, 
in fields that are waiting of harmonisation. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
By means of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) the 
EU and the Mediterranean countries intend to establish a form of integration 
which goes beyond the level of integration established through free trade agree-
ments. Deep integration refers to the removal of legal, regulatory and institu-
tional barriers between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. 
Comprehensive integration implies a degree of regulatory and institutional 
harmonisation to the highest extent possible. The EU currently focuses on the 
four countries that created a free trade area by means of the conclusion of the 
Agadir Agreement; being Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. however, the 
European financial crisis and slowdown of the European economies resulted 
in a shift of focus of the EU towards more economically interesting countries, 
such as Korea, instead of free trade agreement with developing countries, such 
as the Mediterranean countries. The Mediterranean countries come now sec-
ond in rank as concerns the conclusion of DCFTAs. 
The movement of goods and services between the two shores of the Med-
iterranean Sea (will) happen(s) via legally enforceable provisions in the Euro-
Med DCFTAs and further through the implementation in the Mediterranean 
110 This list in not exhaustive. 
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countries of the most essential EU acquis. For some goods for which there is 
no harmonisation, the principle of mutual recognition of goods will apply. The 
application of the principle of mutual recognition between the Mediterranean 
countries and the EU is only possible if goods are being tested by strong inde-
pendent and trustworthy institutions. This means trustworthy institutions deal-
ing with health, safety or environmental standards of goods should be established 
in the Mediterranean area. Independent and reliable test facilities responsible 
for standardisation, conformity assessment, metrology and market supervision 
should be established in all Mediterranean countries and/or the Mediterranean 
neighbours should participate in European and international standardisation 
bodies. As regards the future movement of services between the Mediterranean 
countries and the EU, the application of the principle of mutual recognition in 
the services sector will also require confidence. Therefore, institutions that 
develop standards for licensing and certification of professional service provid-
ers equal to those in force in the EU should be established with financial sup-
port of the EU. It can be stated that common Euro-Med standardisation projects 
are the best solution to establish an efficient Euro-Med system of movement 
of services.
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